

The Naval Career of Admiral

Sir George Pocock, K.B.

1743 - 1763



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
Sir George Pocock, K.B.

1743 - 1763

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THE PASSAGE OF THE OLD BAHAMA CHANNEL BY ADMIRAL POCOCK, 1762

To Havana, as to Puerto Rico, there existed another route from the eastward and windward. It lay through the Old Bahama Channel, and as the similar route through the Virgins had never been used till Drake sounded his way through it, so the Old Bahama Channel, from its intricacies and dangers, was regarded as impracticable for the unweatherly fleets of those days, and was never used by the Spaniards except for quite small craft. But Anson had in his possession -- booty probably of his adventurous youth -- an old Spanish chart of it, and it convinced him that under such a man as Pocock, a British fleet could pass... To the men of Quebec, who made light of the St. Lawrence, the Old Bahama Channel can have presented few terrors. The pilots proved as useless as Douglas had feared, but fortunately, owing to his foresight, Elphinstone met them the day after they sailed. He had been right up to Cay Sal and back again, and was able to produce a complete survey of the channel, with sketches of the land and cays on both sides, and to report that Anson's chart was correct. He was therefore in a position to lead through, and the main cause for anxiety was at an end. Following the method Saunders had adopted on the St. Lawrence, Pocock organized the transports into seven divisions, each with its conducting men-of-war. The way in which the escort was distributed deserves notice. Contrary to what would naturally be looked for, there was no regular vanguard or rearguard -- the whole of the navy ships being allotted to the various divisions. With the first division were four of the line under Pocock; with the second was Keppel's ship alone; and with the third were again four of the line, the idea being apparently to provide for a concentration of nine of the line in the van or the centre. The next two divisions had between them only two of the line and a fifty, but the sixth had three of the line and a fifty and the last division five of the line and a fifty... No hitch of any kind occurred. The narrowest and most dangerous part of the channel between Cay Lobos and Cay Comfite was actually passed at night by means of fires burning upon the rocks, and by the evening of June 5th, that is a week after leaving Cape Nicholas, the whole fleet was clear of Cay Sal, and in sight of Matanzas, less than a hundred miles from its objective.

"Happy eighteenth century, which had only humane weapons, small forces and limited funds at its command in warfare....Restricted warfare was one of the loftiest achievements of the eighteenth century. It belongs to the class of hot-house plants which can only thrive in an aristocratic and qualitative civilization. We are no longer capable of it. It is one of the fine things which we have lost as a result of the French Revolution."

G. Ferrero, Peace and War, 63-64



Contents

Illustrations	v
Preface	vi
Introduction	vii
Chapter I	1
Chapter II	30
Chapter III	47
Chapter IV	79
Chapter V	111
Chapter VI	137
Chapter VII	165
Chapter VIII	189
Conclusion	205
Appendix I	208
Appendix II	211
Appendix III	216
Appendix IV	218
Appendix V	227
Appendix VI	241
Bibliography	259



Illustrations

Sir George Pocock	Frontispiece
Chart of the English Channel	Facing page 1
Africa	Facing page 30
India	Facing page 111
The Greater Antilles	Facing page 165
Havana, 1762	Facing page 189



Preface

This dissertation is undertaken as an essay in naval history. Its main purpose is to examine the career of Sir George Pocock whose proper merits as a naval logistician and strategist have been overlooked by similar studies in the past.

I have been the fortunate recipient of help and guidance from Professor John J. Murray and Professor Albert L. Kohlmeier both of whom have given me great benefits from their stores of scholarship and friendship. To Mr. D. Bonner Smith, Admiralty Librarian for his patient explanations of the intricacies of old naval charts and to the ready aid and help of Commander John H. Owen, R.N., I owe an especial debt of gratitude. The kindness and solicitude of the officers of the British Museum, the Public Record Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office Library, the National Register of Archives, the Institute of Historical Research of the University of London and the Middlesex County Record Office makes it pleasant to record here my particular gratitude and thanks.

To my wife I am especially a debtor and accordingly this work is dedicated to her.

R. F. S.

Bloomington, Indiana
July 11, 1950



Introduction

The wars which lasted from 1739 to 1763 marked a definite phase in English naval history. The seventeenth century, which in an historical sense may be said to have lasted till the peace of Utrecht, had been a period in which the sea had played a supremely important part. It had been a century in which colonial expansion had held the foremost place in the external policy of England. As the sixteenth century had witnessed the discoveries of the Portuguese and Spaniards, and the acquisition by those powers of vast dominions and trading interests overseas, so the following hundred years had seen Holland, England and France stretching out their arms both in the East and in the West. England had become a truly maritime power on a new scale. She had taken her place as a factor to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean, as a colonial power in the West Indies and America and as a trading power in the far East, where the first year of the century was marked by the establishment of the East India Company. The eighteenth century inherited the effects of this development, which showed themselves in a struggle, lasting through a series of wars, to decide whether France or the United Kingdom should finally become the great colonial power.

In considering therefore the strategy of these wars the

great struggles on the continent must not be allowed to obscure the fundamental contention between France and England; and the importance attached to colonies and trade was the direct outcome of the prevailing national sentiment. The significance of naval power was fully appreciated by the statesmen of the day, and naval strategy took the color of the objects of national policy. With this object--the development of colonial power and trade--crystallized in their minds they saw clearly the means of reaching their ends. That a supreme navy was the essential instrument formed an article of faith; but they had an equally unshakable conviction as to the general principles governing the employment of that weapon. Whether it were the trade of the enemy to be attacked or their own protected, whether the Kingdom were to be defended or military operations to be supported, it was an accepted formula that these ends could only be fully attained by the destruction of the sea forces of the enemy. If these were swept away or rendered impotent the enemy's trade, without protection, must collapse; the enemy's troops, undefended, could not risk themselves on the water; and the troops and stores of Great Britain and their allies could pass unmolested across the sea, or naval forces could cooperate tactically with troops on shore to the extent of the range of their guns because the sea forces of the enemy would be unable to interfere with them. Whatever the ends might be the means were governed by the one main

principle--the necessity for destroying the enemy's sea forces.

There was however a link wanting in the chain of the factors necessary for success. However sound the national policy, and however correct the tactical doctrines, the desired results could not be reached unless the principles of strategy were equally appreciated and acted upon.

The common habit of accounting for things by establishing generalizations or employing catchwords led to the failures in the early part of the wars of 1739-1763 being ascribed entirely to a want of professional ability on the part of the naval officer of the day. Yet a navy, however well conducted, officered and manned, can do nothing in the shadow of inefficient strategical direction.

Infinite pains at different times have gone into the making of officers, as experts in seamanship and gunnery, but little towards instructing them in the design and conduct of operations. Yet when the rare and unusual officer grasped these skills, he was not often appreciated by his colleagues. Sir George Pocock was one of these rare officers and this study attempts to outline his naval career so that these talents, as evidenced in the naval wars of 1739-1763, will not go unnoticed.

West Africa and the West Indies, 1743-1747

George Pocock entered the navy in 1718 and the first part of his early professional life was spent with his uncle, George Byng, Lord Torrington on Torrington's flagship, the Barfleur, when the Spanish were defeated off Cape Passaro. Pocock was appointed a captain in August 1738 and shortly afterwards joined Admiral Nicholas Haddock¹ in the Mediterranean as commander of the Aldborough (20), fireship. After returning to England in 1741, Pocock served on various small ships in home waters. His early career was largely undistinguished and his promotions up to the rank of post-captain were in the main due to chance and the prestige of his famous uncle.

In 1743 the command of the Sutherland (50)² and the circumstances of the next five years' time enabled him to

1. Admiral Nicholas Haddock (1686-1746). Entered the navy in 1699 and was present at the siege of Cadiz (1702) as a midshipman. Promoted to captain in 1707 at the age of 20. His brilliant conduct at the action off Cape Passaro in 1718 largely contributed to the success of that engagement. Promoted to rear admiral in 1734 and commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean 1738-1742. He died in England in 1746, admiral of the blue.
2. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Captain George Pocock; Public Records Office: Admiralty 2/60 (Out Letters; Orders and Instructions), January 21, 1743 (Hereafter cited as LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/60).

demonstrate to his superiors that he had an ample store of professional skill. In October 1739, England declared war against Spain; France, who had nominally been at peace with England for five years, joined the struggle in 1744. The war against France opened new areas of conflict to the navy; the coasts of Africa and the Indian Ocean. On the 16th of October, Captain Pocock, then lying in Plymouth Sound, received orders to clean and refit at Plymouth for a voyage to Africa.³ Five years of war had drained every seaport of men and Pocock received a draft of marines to fill up his complement,⁴ since seamen were so difficult to find. But the detachment sent him were better fitted for land service in Pocock's opinion. The uncongeniality of their officers resulted in friction⁵ and disturbed the rest of the ship's company, while the relatively calm waters of Plymouth Harbor unnerved the miserable marines.⁶

3. Pocock to Thomas Corbett (Secretary of the Admiralty 1742-1751); PRO:Adm. 1/2286 (Captain's Letters), October 21, 1744.
4. "To own the receipt of their Lordships Orders of the 15th to be compleated with Duncomb's Marines..." Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, October 21, 1744, Sutherland, Plymouth Sound.
5. "The Captain and Lieutenant of Marines lately come on board are having an irreconcilable difference and it may prove ill convenient to have them together a voyage, I desire you will please to move their Lordships that another Lieutenant of Duncomb's be appointed and Lieutenant Plaistow ordered on shore." Same to Same; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, November 4, 1744, Sutherland, Hamoaze.
6. "As the health of the ships company ought to be the care of the Captain in all voyages [he] begs leave to observe to their Lordships that the Marines he has on board not being

At the beginning of January 1745, the Admiralty sent Pocock fresh instructions, ⁷ ordering him to go immediately to Spithead as convoy to any merchant shipping that were ready there. Fresh east winds kept Pocock at Plymouth until the 19th of January and he was unable to comply with these orders, but while he was delayed at Plymouth, the Admiralty was busy drafting instructions for his African voyage.

These instructions, a very detailed guide for Pocock's conduct, were sent to him on January 8, 1745. He was to take with him the Gosport (44) which was to be under his command. The main part of his convoy consisted of a number of ships at Spithead loaded with men and supplies for the forts and settlements of the Royal African Company. In addition, a considerable number of ships would accompany him part way to Africa, as soon as he picked the vessels up at Spithead.

Pocock was to go first to the Island of Madeira to load ⁸ wine for his ship's company. From there, he was to go to

"accustomed to the sea are the more liable to fall sick than seamen as I find now in harbour, having one sick seaman in the Hospital and almost daily complaints from the Surgeon of the Marines....[He] hopes that their Lordships will let him have but fifty marines..." Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, December 21, 1744.

7. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/63, January 1, 1744/45.
8. This was necessary in the opinion of the Lords of the Admiralty, because rum and beer were believed to be unhealthy in tropical climates.

the Island of May⁹ with the convoy. The Gosport was to be sent ahead, before Pocock and the convoy left Madeira, to follow the coast of Africa from somewhere between Cape Blanco¹⁰ and Portandick down to the mouth of the River Gambia. The captain of the Gosport was to sink or destroy all French or Spanish vessels he met with. Upon joining Pocock and the convoy at Gambia, the two ships were to remain there until the African Company ships had discharged their cargoes at James Fort, in the mouth of the river, and then Pocock was¹¹ to take the remainder of the convoy to Cape Coast Castle where they would be unloaded.

Pocock was to stay there no longer than fifteen days, and to use his time cruising off the coast for enemy trading vessels, but he was not to go into the Gambia River on any pretext unless it was to destroy enemy ships or settlements. While Pocock went with the convoy to Cape Coast Castle, the Gosport was to call at Sierra Leone and Sherbroe¹² with what trade was bound for those places. The captain of the Gosport

9. Isla de Mayo: in the Cape Verde Islands.
10. Cape Blanco: lies in about Long. 15° and about Lat. 20°N just south of the frontier of the present-day Spanish colony of Rio de Oro. Portandick: a French fort located on a bay of the same name a short distance north of the Senegal River.
11. Cape Coast Castle: one of the largest of the English factories in Africa, located on the coast of the present-day Gold Coast Colony in the Bight of Benin.
12. Sherbroe or Sherbro Island: an island off the mouths of the Bagru and Jong rivers in the present-day British colony of Sierra Leone.

was to assist Mr. John Boyse, the resident agent of the Royal African Company, as much as possible, and then to cruise for three weeks between Cape Mount and Cape Palmas, and three weeks between Cape Palmas and Cape Apolonia to protect the trade on the windward parts of the coast and to intercept enemy trading vessels. He was then to join Pocock at Cape Coast Castle.¹³

On Pocock's arrival at Cape Coast Castle, he was ordered to consult with the governor's council to find what station they thought might be best for cruising, the protection of the trade, and the destruction of the enemy's forts and settlements "without too much endangering the ship or ships under your command." Further, since the African Company planned to resettle their fort at Annamboe,¹⁴ Pocock was directed to give what aid he could towards this end.

If Pocock's crews were healthy, the original two week cruise off Cape Coast Castle might be lengthened, with the advice of the governor's council, to four months, and he was to keep in constant touch with the Company's agents and factors for his intelligence of the enemy's movements. Pocock was informed that in some parts of the African coast, wood

13. Cape Mount: to the SE of Sierra Leone in Lat. $6^{\circ}38'N$ and Long. $9^{\circ}49'W$. Cape Palmas: the southern boundary of Liberia $4^{\circ}18'N$, $5^{\circ}56'W$. Cape Apolonia: 15 leagues W by N from Cape Three Points.
14. Annamboe or Animbo: a factory on the Gold Coast; 3 leagues NE by E from Fort Maurice.

and water could be obtained by trading cheap goods, but he was particularly warned that some men belonging to his Majesty's ships had been killed and wounded when they attempted to supply themselves with these articles without having given the proper presents for the natives. He was empowered to direct his purser to obtain a supply of trading goods for this purpose not to exceed £ 100 in value and he was to dispose of them in such places as wood and water could not be gotten without them. An invoice was to be kept, signed and attested by both the purser and Pocock. The Admiralty officers informed Pocock that

15

"complaints have been made that the Captains of His Majesty's Ships have made an ill use of this liberty by trading themselves on the Coast of Africa, and have even transported great numbers of negroes to Barbadoes for Publick Sale, to the dishonour of His Majesty's Service, the prejudice of the fair Trader and in breach of an Act of Parliament passed on 8 George I which Prohibits under severe Penalties the Commanders of His Majesty's Ships to receive any goods or merchandise on board in order to trade with the same..."

In addition to this, Pocock was given further instructions in order to insure the health of his crews while he was on the coast of Africa. First, he was not to lie in any river longer than twenty-four hours nor allow his officers and men sleep on shore or drink palm wine. Second, he was not to permit his men to cut wood or do any work on shore that the natives could do for a token reward and lastly,

15. By the Royal African Company to the Admiralty. See PRO:Adm. 1/3810.

when any of his men were recovering from illness they were to be excused from duty as much as possible until they were completely recovered.

When the allotted four months time cruising had expired, Pocock was to take his ships either to Prince's or Saint Thomas islands¹⁶ to take in wood, water, and to refresh his crews. As soon as this was done he was to proceed to Barbados Island, further instructions¹⁷ being sent him for this duty.

On the same day¹⁸ that these instructions were sent Pocock for his guidance while on the west coast of Africa, arrangements were made by the Admiralty to prepare his convoy. Captain O'Hara of the Gosport was given orders to escort the convoy to Plymouth where Pocock remained wind-bound, then the two warships would proceed with the convoy to west Africa.¹⁹ During the early part of February Pocock's instructions regarding his conduct in west African waters were changed because of pressure applied to the Admiralty by the Africa Company merchants who felt their trade was not receiving enough

16. Prince's Island: on west coast of Africa about 24 leagues from Cape St. John in Lat. 10° 35' N and Long. 9° 38' E. St. Thomas Island: on the Gulf of Guinea in Long. 8° 5' E. It is due west from the River Gabon about 40 leagues. The Equinoctial Line crosses the middle of the island.
17. See pages 18, 19.
18. January 8, 1744/45.
19. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/73, January 8, 1744/45; January 11, 1744/45; Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, January 14, 1744/45; January 16, 1744/45, Sutherland, Plymouth.

protection.²⁰

This change in his instructions was acknowledged by Pocock who wrote²¹ he was still wind-bound at Plymouth and enclosed a list of all merchant vessels there desiring convoy²² to Spithead. On the next day the Admiralty wrote²³ him that if the wind remained easterly he was to stay at Plymouth until Rear Admiral Medley²⁴ called there. On the 19th Pocock acknowledged these new instructions and by the 24th had joined Rear Admiral Medley

20. "Whereas Mr. Fryer, a merchant trading to the coast of Africa has represented to us that in Sierra Leon River, at the Bananas and Galinas, on the Windward part of that Coast there are six or seven private English Factories, where a great trade is carried on, and in particular that he himself is sending out goods to the Factory at Sierraleon to the ammount of £ 28,000; and Whereas by Our Instructions to you dated January 8, 1744/45, you are directed to send the Gosport to lie off Sestos or cruise between Cape Mount and Cape Palmas for about three weeks and between Cape Palmas and Cape Apolonia for three weeks more for the protection of the Trade on the Windward part of the Coast. We do in addition to our said Instructions hereby Require and Direct you to order the Captain of the Gosport instead of continuing only Six weeks on said station on the Windward Coast to remain there for ten weeks and then repair and join you at Cape Coast Castle."
21. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm.2/73, Febuary 12, 1744/45.
22. 3 bound for St. Johns, Newfoundland; 8 for London; 1 for Boston; 1 for Piscatague; 1 for Barbadoes; 1 for Cape Verde Islands; 3 for Lisbon; 1 for Oporto; 3 for Plymouth.
23. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm.2/73, February 16, 1744/45.
24. Rear Admiral Medley commanded a cruising squadron in the Soundings from 1744 until the begining of 1746 when he was appointed commander in chief in the Mediterranean.

and the Gosport off Dunose.²⁵ Captain O'Hara brought him letters from Spithead and a complete list of what ships were bound to the coasts of Africa. On joining Medley, Pocock found Medley was first bound for Torbay and that Pocock's²⁶ convoy would have to accompany Medley's squadron there before they could clear the Channel. Pocock was apprehensive of the conduct of his convoy in Torbay Harbor. When he wrote Corbett on March 3d he found that his fears were justified. On joining Medley he had made signal to speak with the masters of those ships that were bound to Africa in order that signals and orders might be made clear; some masters had come on board, others had patently ignored Pocock's signals. Furthermore, the Loyal Judith, one of the Africa convoy, had sprung her bowsprit in a collision in narrow, crowded Torbay Harbor on the 27th, and the Cape Coast, another of the Africa convoy, was run down and sunk by an Indiaman in Torbay. As the Loyal Judith's bowsprit carried away completely on leaving the harbor, Pocock made signals to the ships under his convoy to go to Plymouth so repairs could be effected, but

"of the five vessels mentioned in my instruc-

25. Dunose or Dunnose: headland on SE coast of Isle of Wight.
26. This fact upset Pocock no little. In a letter to an unnamed naval officer friend who had written to get a recommendation of character for one of Pocock's old officers, Pocock unburdened himself, "I dont like these Torbay voyages, but we are getting out this morning the wind being at SE which makes it tedious [since the] sea [is] bumbling in:" Pocock to _____; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, February 26, 1744/45, Sutherland, Torbay.

"tions designed for the service of the African Company only two are yet arrived here [Plymouth], but I apprehend only the Cape Coast is lost." ²⁷

While the Loyal Judith was being repaired, Pocock²⁸ searched for men for the Sutherland and exercised his crew. Some days later he joined Admiral Medley and sailed with him to Latitude 41°50' North where they parted company; Pocock and his convoy holding course for Madeira where they arrived April 27th.²⁹ Pocock found there much information and rumor of French activities, proposed and actual, on the African coast. From a Mr. Scott, a merchant, information was gained that on April 14 six French men of war, four of which were of 74 or 64 guns, were at the Canaries for ten days, and were bound for Martinique. Also there was news that the French Guinea Company had been lent a king's ship of 54 guns which was to be sent to Senegal at the latter end of February, to cruise and protect the French trade.³⁰

While Pocock was digesting this information, an express letter from the Admiralty reached him, warning him that five

27. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, March 3, 1744/45, Sutherland, Plymouth Sound.
28. "Asks for three "old standers" in the hospital and stationed on board the Winchester to be transferred to the Sutherland" Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2286, March 17, 1744/45, Sutherland, Plymouth Sound.
29. Same to Same; Ibid; April 28, 1745, Sutherland, Madeira.
30. John Scott to Captain Pocock; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, undated but enclosed in Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, April 28, 1745, Sutherland, Madeira.

French men of war were cruising off the Cape Verde Islands. Consequently when Pocock left Funchal Road on the 4th of May he took his convoy directly to Gambia to avoid the enemy concentration at the Cape Verde Islands. Sailing, hull down, by the Canary Islands, Pocock detached O'Hara in the Gosport to make for the African coast between Cape Blanco and Portandick and to follow the coast down to the mouth of the River Gambia and join him there. On the 16th of May, the rendezvous was accomplished. O'Hara told his commander that he had sighted a large French ship anchored off Senegal, and of avoiding action for a council of war had decided that the French vessel was impossible to take with the available British force. Pocock, with good reason, was alarmed at this news, for the Frenchman at Gambia could certainly be expected to know of the six French men of war at the Cape Verde Islands and would inform them of the few ships that the British had on the coast. A clean sweep of all the trade between Senegal and Cape Coast Castle would be the result and there would be little or nothing Pocock could do about it against six heavy French men of war.³¹

Pocock decided that as soon as the convoy were safely at anchor in the river, it would be imperative to destroy the French ship off Senegal before she could spread the news of his arrival on the coast, consequently to avoid surprise,

31. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, August 4, 1745, Sutherland, Cape Coast Road.

he ordered O'Hara to keep off the mouth of the Gambia until he saw his convoy safe and picked up intelligence from James Fort.

On the afternoon of May 16th, the Sutherland stood in for the mouth of the river, having for pilot the master of the Expedition, a Royal African Company ship, who had made ten voyages to Gambia and said he knew the river well. Despite the pilot's confidence and knowledge, the Sutherland ran aground on a sand bar about four leagues from the mouth known as the Red Sand. Only by staving the ship's water butts, removing the upper deck guns, and lightering the guns and the ship's provisions to shore was the ship lightened enough to be able to slide off the bar. On May 18th, at high tide, after several unsuccessful tries, the ship came off and anchored safely in five and a half fathoms of water. Pocock was relieved to know that no damage was suffered, but two days had been wasted.

The following day as the guns and provisions were being replaced, the officer of the watch noticed a sloop at anchor about two miles from the Sutherland, close inshore. Pocock immediately sent off boat crews to examine the vessel, which had slipped by O'Hara at night, and found it to be a French ship bound from Goree to the Albreda factory in the Gambia River. The boat crews made it a prize easily and although the French ship contained only fourteen slaves and a small quantity of foodstuffs, it was a valuable addition to Po-

cock's little force. On the 21st of May, the Sutherland refilled her water butts and six days later, with the Gosport and the captured sloop, Pocock sailed for Senegal.

On the 1st of June all three ships hoisted French colors and that morning reached Senegal where Pocock was relieved to see the French vessel still at anchor. Without a pause, Pocock took his three ships into the surf and opened a hot fire on the surprised Frenchman. From 4 in the afternoon until nightfall the cannonade continued, until the French ship ran on shore and her crew abandoned her. Then Pocock sent his boats over to burn her. She proved to be the Maurepas (36) a French East India Company ship with a crew of 170 who had sailed from L'Orient on the 2d of April with a³²convoy of six ships for Senegal.

On the 3rd of June, Pocock sailed from Senegal and on the 6th anchored again off the mouth of the Gambia. Nine days later he detached the Gosport with a ship to convoy to Sierra Leone and since the Admiralty had changed Captain O'Hara's instructions again, the Gosport was to cruise between Cape Vergas and Cape Mesurado for protection of the trade until her provisions should give out and then join the³³Sutherland at Cape Coast Castle.

32. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, August 8, 1745, Sutherland, Cape Coast Road.
33. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/73, February 16, 1744/5.
Cape Vergas: near Cape Mesurado. Cape Mesurado: on west coast of Africa between Cape Palmas and Tagren; is in Lat. 6°12'N and Long. 9°8'W and about 12 leagues SE by E from Cape Mount.

While he was waiting for his convoy to discharge their cargo at James Fort, Pocock sent ships' boats loaded with marines up the Gambia and burned the French factory at Albreda. On the 20th of June he sailed with his convoy for Cape Coast Castle and after a leisurely voyage, stopping on the way at the usual places of trade, arrived at Cape Coast Castle on the 28th of July. After consultation with the council at Cape Coast Castle, Pocock learned that no French ships were reported on the coast and that plans were being made to resettle the factory of Annamboe. A few Frenchmen had settled there, but the council believed that they would give themselves up peaceably.³⁴

By the 11th of August it was apparent that the Frenchmen at Annamboe were not going to give themselves up; in fact they were arousing the natives to storm the English forts and factories. The council asked Pocock to fire some shot into Annamboe and on the afternoon of the 11th Pocock moved down to the road and did so. But the rolling swell and the fact that the huts were constructed of clay and thatch conspired to defeat his purpose. The natives evacuated the town before the bombardment and the solid shot simply was not impressive enough. Pocock advised the use of a bomb vessel to thoroughly destroy the village and overawe the natives; while the council asked for a full scale landing

34. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, August 4, 1745, Sutherland, Cape Coast Road.

operation to burn the town. Discussions between Pocock and the council continued until the 26th but no decision was reached, and the next day, August 27th, he sailed to the leeward coast to visit the company's forts.³⁵ After visiting the company's forts, he went further south and made the Island of St. Thomas, where he sent ashore for intelligence of enemy activity in the area. The governor of St. Thomas had no information so Pocock sailed across to the African coast at Malenbar.³⁶ There he found two Dutch ships whose captains told him that no French ships had been at the trading places on that coast for the greater part of a year. After stopping at a few more ports, he gradually worked his way up the coast, anchoring off Cape Coast Castle on the 18th of September.³⁷

There the council once again urged Pocock to attack Annamboe, whose inhabitants still were sheltering the members of the French African Company. Pocock after lengthy talks with the council could only repeat his early objections to the shelling of mud huts with solid shot and explain how a bomb vessel would do the job adequately. The council, feeling that Pocock was not doing all he could for them, withdrew some of the traditional courtesies and a hot

35. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, August 26, 1745, Sutherland, Cape Coast Road.

36. Malenbar: a port on the eastern side of the Gulf of Guinea.

37. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, February 9, 1745/46, Sutherland, Antigua.

38

correspondence began between Pocock and the agents of the company at Cape Coast Castle. Pocock, for his part was

38. The difficulties arose largely over the failure of the African Company's forts to salute Pocock. The African Company's agents wrote a lengthy letter to Pocock stating their case: "... We also observe what you are pleas'd to say concerning Our Forts under our directions not having saluted His Majesty's Colours, as you went to Leeward. We take this Opportunity to return our thanks...and to...set our motives of procedure in a clear light as you seem to think it may bear an unfavorable interpretation. In the first place we desire to remark to you that we have no Orders from our Constituents regarding Salutes of any kind, and in General they reccomend to be careful of our expense of Gun Powder whatever accidents may happen; and further we only rec'd 10,000 wt. of Gunpowder with the last supplies from the Company for the use of the forts which seeing accidents that may attend a French War if there happen to be any commotions in the country (which we daily have reason to suspect an intended descent of the King of Ashantee upon the Fanteen Country) that but a very moderate prov'n; and further, Sir, We are in some Measure Authorized in this procedure of Ours by having the Sanction and Opinion of one of His Majesty's Captains, namely Mr. William Boyce, then Commander of HMS Greyhound, who when his Sentiments was askt with regard to Sallutes in a French War, his answer was, that he thought wasting of Powder in Sallutes...was a thing out of character: and likewise when the Fort of Secondee was beseiged by the Blacks in the Year 1739, Henry Osborne, commander of HMS Salisbury sent an officer on shore and desired the Chief [of the fort] might forebare saluting His Majesty's Colours, as there were more urgent occasions for Gunpowder at that time than mere formality; now Sir, we leave You to judge whether or not a French War is as cogent a motive to husband our powder and to supercede Ceremony as a Skirmish with the Blacks was and particularly at this juncture when we are actually engaged in the One and daily expect the Other to ensue, And further we must observe to You another reason that induces us to be parsimonious with regard to powder is that no merchant Ships come on the Coast at this time: Powder is not to be purchased and once we felt the want of it when the King of Ashantee above ment'd, conquered the Akirns and afterwards came down upon Acra, we were obliged to borrow 3000 wt: of the Dutch in that exigency and if that King shall be successful in his intended Expedition against the Fantiens we cannot foresee the use we may have for Powder, as no body can be certain what length a Barbarian flushed with Victory may go.

Upon the whole, Sir, we never imagined that we should

unable to see what actually the African Company was accomplishing on the coast³⁹ and despite the agents' protests that preparedness was the reason for the lack of formal courtesy, Pocock's inspection⁴⁰ revealed that unpreparedness and negligence was the rule at the company's forts.

Shortly after his inspection of the forts and the acrimonious correspondence with the company's agents, Pocock left the West African coast in accordance with the instructions issued in January 1745 and sailed with the Gosport for Antigua

have been obnoxious to censure for managing and husbanding the Gunpowder, destined for the defence and preservation of the Forts on this Coast against the Enemy which are esteemed of so much consequence to the Nation that His Majesty is graciously pleased to recommend the support thereof to Parliament. On the other hand we merit applause for not squandering Gun Powder on the manner of Ceremony as Saluting --- Since you make a point of it, we would be glad if you would represent the Affair to the Admiralty that a certain rule may be established for the Government of the Company's Servants, as the present situation is quite ambulatory and no two of His Majesty's Captains on this Coast agree.

(Signed) James Craik
D. Crichton
Thos: Chalmer"

Royal African Company's Agents to Captain Pocock; PRO:Adm.
1/2287, November 27, 1745, Cape Coast Castle.

39. With regard to the Council of Cape Coast Castle's pleas about aid in driving out the French from Annamboe, Pocock wrote Corbett:
"The Blacks of Annambo are not against our rebuilding the Fort or carrying on trade with the Company, but really by all I could learn from anybody on the Coast, the Company does not send a sufficient stock of merchandize to promote commerce; when I arrived the Forts were in want of almost everything." Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2287, February 9, 1745/46, Sutherland, Antigua.
40. Enclosed in letter to Corbett of February 9, 1745/46.

in the West Indies.⁴¹

Naval affairs in the West Indies since the beginning of the war had excited attention and comment from all spectators;

41. "You are hereby Required and Directed as soon as you arrive with His Majesty's Ship under your command and the Gosport at Barbadoes, to put yourself under the command of the Senior Officer there, but in the absence of the Senior Officer, you are to communicate these our Instructions to the Governor and Council of that Island and to Consult and advise with them from time to time, in what manner the ships under your Command may best be employed in guarding the Coast, and securing the Trade of that Colony from any attempts of the Enemy, and to govern yourself according as shall be agreed on, using your utmost endeavours to take and destroy all such ships and vessels of the Enemy as shall come upon the Coast of the said Island, and whereas We have directed the Captains of His Majesty's Ships stationed at the Leeward Islands to hold a constant correspondence with you, you are whenever you find the Enemy's Ships too strong for you to send immediate advice thereof to the Captains of the said Ships whom we have ordered to repair to your assistance, and you are with all possible dilligence to proceed to their Assistance if the Captains of the said Ships shall at any time send you notice of the Enemy's Ships being too strong for them, and you are to endeavour jointly to take or destroy them; before leaving to go to the aid of the afore-said Captains you are to communicate in the first place the Intelligence you have received to the Governor and Council of Barbadoes and receiving their concurrence for your so doing: And when the Service is performed you are directly to return to your Station.

And whereas the Captains of His Majesty's Ships stationed in America, have of late years taken a very unwarrantable liberty of lying in Port with their ships for the greatest part of the time they remained abroad to the dishonour of His Majesty's Service, and the great detriment of the Colonies for whose protection they are appointed; and We being determined not to suffer any such neglect for the future do hereby strictly charge and direct you to keep constantly at Sea when the weather will permit and cruize in proper stations for meeting the Enemy's Ships or Privateers and for protecting the trade of His Majesty's Subjects and guarding the said Islands from any attempt of the Enemy.

.....
And in order to enable you the better to keep the ship und'r your command in a good condition to Cruize and Protect

both at home and abroad. Generally speaking, the comment had in the main been violently partisan. By 1746/47 a series of blunders and miscarriages of fortune had made the Islands outstanding in the eyes of naval officers everywhere. Some men saw in the confusion and chaos a chance for fame and reputation, but a great number of naval officers echoed Admiral Cornwallis writing a generation later to Lord Spencer:

"I never did, my Lord, express a desire to go to the Leeward Islands considering from the number of them and jarring interests, that it was always a station where an officer, instead of gaining credit was likely to lose any little reputation he might have acquired. I hardly know an instance where it has happened otherwise except in the case of Lord Rodney and that only the last time he was there; but he was a particularly 'fortunate man'."⁴²

Throughout 1746/47 the Leeward Islands station had had

the trade as well as to Annoy the enemy, You are to cause her to be Cleaned once in every Six months at such time as it can be most conveniently done.

.....
But whereas Captain Warren is, by Our Commission appointed Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships at Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands, You are notwithstanding the foregoing Instructions, in case You shall hear of his being there on Your arrival at Barbadoes or any other person Commander in Chief at those Islands who is Your Senior Officer, to put Yourself under his command and follow his orders for Your proceedings.

You are to give an attested copy of this order to the Captain of the Gosport and direct him in Your absence diligently to put the same in execution."

LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/73, January 8, 1744/45.

42. Cornwallis to Lord Spencer; February 8, 1796, Private Papers of George, second Earl Spencer, I, Navy Records Society, (London, 1913), vol. XLVI, pp 210-11.

43
six commanders and each had approached the problems of the station in a different manner. At the beginning of 1746 Commodore Fitzroy Lee had relieved Admiral Isaac Townsend.⁴⁴ The French had no strong forces in the West Indies; three ships were escorting a merchant fleet to Hispaniola⁴⁵ and two men of war⁴⁶ that Townsend had driven ashore had been refloated at Fort Royal. There a merchant fleet of some 40 sail was lying, waiting an opportunity to proceed to Cape François. Early in February Lee received news that this fleet was about to sail. He got up to Fort Royal as soon as possible only to find the French had already gone. Lee set

43. Admiral Townsend, Commodore Fitzroy Lee, Commodore Mitchell, Commodore Lee, Commodore Legge, Captain (temp. Commodore) George Pocock, Admiral Henry Osborn. The best discussion of the naval strategy and tactics in West Indian waters is found in Sir Herbert Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-48, 3 vols. (1920), Cambridge University Press. This is the definitive study of the naval aspects of the War of the Austrian Succession. A valuable supplementary account is Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763, (1936), Oxford University Press. This study is exhaustive in its relation of the actions and reactions of the West Indian planters and their governments with regard to naval concentration in West Indian waters.
44. Fitzroy Henry Lee (1699-1750). Entered navy in 1717. In 1742 was in Mediterranean with Haddock; in 1746 sent to West Indies. Promoted in October 1747 to rear admiral and in 1748 to vice admiral. Isaac Townsend (d. 1765). Entered navy in 1699 and served with Haddock at Cadiz in 1739. Served with Sir John Norris and Sir Chaloner Ogle as a post captain. In 1744 was promoted rear admiral of the blue and in 1754 was made Governor of Greenwich Hospital.
45. Hispaniola or Haiti: Island of central West Indies in north central Caribbean Sea; east of Cuba and west of Puerto Rico.
46. Magnanime and Rubis

his ships to cruising about Martinique and the adjacent islands which he declared to be blockaded.

Although the necessity for steady cruising was obvious, Lee did not in the subsequent months maintain a regular service of cruising and relief.⁴⁷ In June he missed another convoy by not cruising regularly in the main trade routes. Although he had no organized cruising system, it is doubtful that if he had, he would have been able to do much against the heavily protected French convoys. His squadron⁴⁸ was too small to ensure a disposition of ships that would have intercepted the convoys, even though Captain Pocock had reinforced him with the Sutherland and the Gosport early in December 1746.

Nothing very much happened during the remainder of Lee's command which ended in the spring of 1747. The assembly of Antigua had kept up a running series of complaints against

47. Nor was this always the fault of the commanders on the station. The West Indian planters were never happy unless they could see the English ships at anchor in the harbors of their islands; when it was necessary to cruise or when orders came to detach ships to other stations howls of rage arose from their legislatures and were heard by the sensitive ears of the Ministry at home. cf. PRO:Admiralty Minutes, Feb. 7 and 12, 1744/5, May 30, June 4 and 6, July 29, 1745, Adm. 3/49; Orders to Townsend, June 18, 1745, PRO:Adm. 2/64, p. 285; Legislature of Antigua to Townsend, Jan. 13, 1745/6, PRO:Adm. 1/305; Townsend to Legislature of Antigua, Jan. 13, Ibid; Matthew to Townsend, Jan. 28, 1745/6, PRO:Adm. 1/305; Townsend to Matthew, Jan. 28, Ibid.
48. Suffolk (70), Dreadnaught (60), Sutherland (50) (from West Africa), Gosport (44) (from West Africa), Lyme (24), Richmond (20), Saxon (16) sloop.

Lee and the failure to intercept the two French convoys during November 1746 led to a perfect storm of petitions for his removal and trial.

49

The assembly's complaints as Richmond points out fall into two classifications. The first and main charge was that:

"The trade has not been protected, there having been taken in these seas...upwards of 170 vessels of his Majesty's trading subjects some of which have been taken within ten leagues of the islands and even at the mouths of the harbours."50

The second group of lesser charges:

"betray a very bitter feeling against Lee, and also a lack of appreciation on the part of the members of the Council as to the value of their own judgements. They complained that Lee sent ships away to the Spanish main during the hurricane season to cruise there for private profit ---a charge which Lee had no difficulty in answering by pointing to his instructions which directed him to employ ships in that manner at that season. They further accused him of lack of diligence because he did not bombard the French ports, an accusation which needed no serious reply; and they criticised his behaviour in his pursuit of the outward bound convoy, saying he should have pursued the convoy instead of the men-of-war."51

In spite of the fact that during most of the time that Lee held his command he was acting not under his own but

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49. See especially PRO:Adm. 1/305 although all the volumes of In Letters, Leeward Islands Station, from 1745 to those volumes that cover the Napoleonic Wars have countless letters from the assemblies of these islands containing much the same complaints.
50. Quoted in Richmond, III, 66; PRO:Adm. 1/305.
51. Richmond, III, 66, 67.

under Isaac Townsend's orders, the influence of the West India merchants was such that the Admiralty sent orders for him to be relieved of his command, and appointed a successor with instructions to try Lee at a court martial on charges to be preferred by the assembly on his arrival.⁵²

The successor was Commodore Edmund Legge⁵³ who was given extensive instructions for his guidance:

"You are to employ the said ships either separately or together in such manner as you shall judge best for His Majesty's service, making the security and protection of His Majesty's islands in those seas, and the free navigation to and from thence, the principal point of your care and attention, and in the next place how to annoy the enemy's trade, ships and settlements.

If you find sufficient encouragement from the Governors of Barbados and the Leeward Islands, and from adventurers, to give you reasonable hopes of success in an attempt to conquer and settle the island of St. Lucia, we direct you to advise with and concert measures with the said Governors, the Captains of your Squadron, and the chief adventurers relating to the making such an attempt, and to proceed upon it if the said measures shall be found proper.

52. Many of the officers on the Leeward Island station considered Lee unjustly accused. Pocock writing to Anson after Legge's death said: "I can assure your Lordship that while I was under Mr. Lee's command I never knew him behave otherwise than as an officer that had His Majesty's service at heart and regarded his private interests as little I dare say as any commanding officer ever did notwithstanding so much is said of that part by these people against him; they were going on to perplex Mr. Legge as well..." Pocock to Anson; British Museum: Additional Manuscripts 15,956, f.310, October 14, 1747. (This same letter is incorrectly cited in Richmond III, 67 as Add.Mss 15957, f.310.) Hereafter cited as BM: Add.Mss 15,956, f.310.

53. Edmund Legge: One of Anson's captains on his great voyage against the Spanish colonies in 1739; subsequently held other commands.

And whereas it has been proposed by Mr. Knowles to ~~make~~ up two fleets of merchant Ships in a year at the Leeward Islands and Barbados, one in June and another in August or September, to send home under convoy to England, you are to do so if you find the same agreeable to the times the merchants want convoys for their trade home; but you are to consult and advise with the Governors and Councils of Barbados and the Leeward Islands and to receive their concurrence therein." 54

Legge wrote⁵⁵ the Admiralty, regarding his instructions, pointing out that an offensive against the enemy at sea as soon as he arrived in the Leeward Islands was the surest defense of British possessions and the ruin of the enemy's trade. However, in view of the fact that the enemy's trade was now open to capture it was likely they would increase the strength of their convoys and that at least six sail of the line and a frigate could be counted on being with their convoys in the future. To put offensive operations in action he suggested he would need an addition to his squadron. The Admiralty in reply sent him the Captain (70) which brought his squadron up to a total of six of the line, three heavy "frigates" (44's) and six smaller vessels.⁵⁶

54. LCA to Commodore Legge; PRO:Adm. 2/64.

55. Legge to Corbett; PRO:Adm.1/305, November 18, 1745.

56. Suffolk (70), Captain (70), Dreadnaught (60), Dragon (60), Sunderland (60), Sutherland (50), Mary galley (44), Ludlow Castle (44), Gosport (44), Centaur (24), Lyme (24), Richmond (20), Dreadnaught's prize (12), Porcupine (10), Saxon (16). Some controversy exists about the term "frigate". As Professor Michael Lewis of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich points out in his Navy of Britain, Allen and Unwin, (London, 1948) pp. 99-103, there are six different definitions of the

Legge arrived at Barbados on April 14, 1747 and shortly afterwards went to Antigua where he received the charges against Lee and informed the governor of the Admiralty's instructions for Lee's trial. Soon afterwards he wrote home to say that he

"Has settled matters at Barbadoes as far as the uncertainty of his position would admit of to the satisfaction of the people I had to deal with and have endeavoured to reduce everything to regular order and method---The first request made of him was for a convoy to Lat. 20^ono., and the Gosport coming in, he promised them to carry their petition [for the convoy] to the Governor although he desired that he [the Governor] would let it be known publically and for the future [that] all Petitions of that kind must come through his hands....

I arrived at English Harbour Antigua Tuesday 28th April and delivered to Mr. Lee their Lordship's order of suspension and...sent a letter to the Governor...to inform him...that he might know what it was in my power to furnish the prosecutor with---but Mr Matthew, being of this Island the Deputy Governor and Council refused to open the letter and after some debates resolved to send it to the Governor, but took no notice to me that they had so done...the 30th I wrote a letter to the Deputy Governor and Council and enclosed in it

term. In the sense the term is used here as referring to single or double-decked ships with a small number of heavy guns designed primarily for speed, it is used not quite accurately. The first ships built as "frigates" and fulfilling the qualifications of the above definition appeared slightly later than this period---about 1756. They were a commonplace in the navies of all nations throughout the latter part of the 18th and 19th centuries and were used as scouts. It was the lack of this particular type of ship that caused Nelson to say in 1798: "Was I to die at this moment want of frigates would be found stamped on my heart." However, the Mary galley, Ludlow Castle and Gosport were all reasonably fast ships and although technically they were known as Fifth Rates (see Appendix I), both Legge and later Pocock used them as scouts; hence my use of the word "frigate".

a copy of my letter to the Governor and of my order for trying Mr. Lee; the effect this had was to produce a letter from him [the Deputy Governor] to let me know that he and the Council had been fully apprized of the trial that was to be and that everything was prepared as far as possibly could be before my arrival, upon which I did imagine the business would immediately be brought on. May 1st I heard nothing of them, May 2d I heard nothing of them...May 3d. being the 6th Day since my arrival I began to think the inactivity of his Majesty's Squadron the disadvantage of his Subjects, the advantage to the enemy and the whole train of ill consequences that I apprehended and of which I had informed them might be attributed to me, I called a Council of War..."⁵⁷

58

This council of war, of which Pocock was a member decided, after hearing what Commodore Legge had done and what satisfaction he had received, that he should write to the deputy governor and

"demand an immediate conference with him and the Council upon matters of special moment to his Majesty's Service which I accordingly did and sent an officer with the letter and in return the Council was summoned to meet on Wednesday, May 6th which was the 9th Day after my arrival, when accordingly they met and I went to them; I remonstrated the necessity I had been under of calling a Council of War to justify myself, laid before them the State and Condition of the rest of the Islands that my concern was for the whole tho' their's only a part, Shewed them how effectually they would put in execution the grievances they complained of, how severely the

57. Legge to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/305, May 8, 1747, Captain, St. John's Road, Antigua.

58. "Present---

Hon. Ednd. Legge, Pres

Capt. G. Pocock

Capt. T. Broderick

Capt. R. Tyrrel

Capt. J. Franklin

Capt. Ed. Pratten

Capt. H. Pallisser"

PRO:Adm. 1/305, May 3, 1747, Council of War held on board HMS Captain, St. John's Road, Antigua.

British trade to the Colonies must suffer, how absolutely the North American trade must be ruined and how much it would be in the power of the enemy to reduce these islands to what extreme distress they pleased." 59

This appeal served but to stiffen the backs of the assembly and the preparations for the trial moved forward at even a slower rate than before. Legge held another council of war on May 18th, of which Pocock was again a member, and it was decided to send all the correspondence that had passed between the council, the governor and Commodore Legge to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty so that their "Lordships may see how His Majesty's officers are treated here."⁶⁰ In addition, the council of war recommended that Legge write the governor again and tell him that in their opinion, the convoy ought to sail for Europe in six weeks time. Since the only orders for this convoy were in Lee's hands, they could not be put into execution until the trial was over, therefore, it would be expedient if the council and governor arranged matters so that a speedy and just trial could take place and the convoy be free to sail.

By the 21st of May, Legge felt it necessary to hold

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59. Legge to Corbett; PRO:Adm.1/305, May 8, 1747, Captain, St. John's Road, Antigua.
60. Minutes of Council of War; PRO:Adm.1/305, May 15, 1747, Captain, St. John's Road, Antigua.

still another council of war; the governor and council had done nothing and Lee's trial was still as far away as ever. The council of May 21st decided that the squadron should leave St. John's Road and take dispositions for cruising⁶¹ while the log books and journals of Lee's squadron were to be sent to English Harbor, Antigua for the better guidance of the court when it did meet.

As soon as Legge realized that quibbling and procrastination were going to be the only reaction of the governor and council of Antigua to his pleas for speed in Lee's trial, he began to look about him and concentrate on how he could best employ his squadron. He decided that Lee and other commanders in the past on the Leeward Island station had erred in not organizing their strategy on a more systematic basis.

To repair this deficiency he set up a "General plan of operations", which he forwarded to the Admiralty, and circulated among the ships of the squadron.⁶² Legge thus established a regular and systematic rotation of cleaning his ships and cruising. As the French convoys were expected soon Legge issued orders⁶³ on the 22d of May for his squad-

61. Captain, Suffolk, Sunderland, Sutherland, Dragon, and Dreadnaught were to cruise with Commodore Legge. Minutes of Council of War; PRO:Adm. 1/305, May 21, 1747, Captain, St. John's Road Antigua

62. See Appendix II.

63. Legge to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/305, May 22, 1747, Captain at sea.

ron to go to sea. The main body of the squadron⁶⁴ was under Legge's command and cruised to windward of Martinique. The lighter vessels⁶⁵ were disposed to windward and leeward of Barbados to protect trade and pick up stragglers from the French convoy. Unfortunately no great fleet appeared and by June 14, Legge began to call in his ships to give them time to refit before the hurricane season.⁶⁶

In August Legge fell ill and had to go ashore at Barbados to recuperate. The command of the squadron was transferred to the senior captain, George Pocock. On September 18th Legge died and Pocock was left to carry out his orders until the Admiralty should see fit to send out a successor.

64. Captain, Suffolk, Sunderland, Dreadnaught, Dragon, Sutherland, Gosport.

65. Centaur, Ludlow Castle, Saxon, and Dreadnaught's prize, to leeward of Barbados; Mary galley, Richmond, and Porcupine, to windward of Barbados.

66. Legge to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 1/305, June 14, 1747, Captain at sea.

II

Squadron Commander: West Indies, 1747-1749

After Legge's death two problems faced Pocock, the first, dealing with the trial of Lee, and the second, concerning the proper employment of the squadron. In both cases, Pocock showed himself a proper pupil of Legge and handled these matters with sureness and with as much dispatch as possible.

Two months before Legge's death, a program had been outlined¹ for Pocock's guidance in the conduct of Lee's trial. Legge had issued orders on May 22d that all ships in the squadron were to rendezvous by June 24th in St. John's Road, Antigua. Pocock was to have the Mary galley and Richmond to return to their station to protect the trade after watering and keep with him the Sutherland, Suffolk, Centaur, Gosport, Lyme, and Ludlow Castle² so as to have enough members to constitute a proper court. As soon as these ships were on St. John's Road, Pocock was to inform the governor and assembly of Antigua of his instructions for holding a court martial, and as soon as the prosecutors

1. Legge to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 1/305, June 14, 1747, Captain, at sea.
2. The remaining ships of the squadron would be with Legge at Barbados.

were ready the court was to begin.

As soon as the trial was over, if Lee was acquitted, the Suffolk and Lyme were to return home with him convoying the trade. The Centaur and Ludlow Castle were to take station for the protection of the Leeward Islands, while Pocock and the Gosport were to join Legge at Barbados. If Lee was not acquitted, the Suffolk was to go to Barbados to pick up the convoy.

Pocock accordingly carried out the first part of these instructions and on July 24, 1747, under his orders, the court met to try Lee³. For nearly a week legal squabbles prevented the trial from proceeding, then just as these were ironed out to the satisfaction of the members of the court martial and the governor, council and assembly of Antigua, the Judge-Advocate of Antigua, Roger Parman, who was conducting the prosecution's case against Lee, died.⁴

After another week's wait, a new Judge-Advocate was appointed, but the assembly was now not satisfied with the constitution of the court. The new Judge-Advocate, Richard Lee, protested that the bulk of the members of the court had all served under Commodore Fitzroy Lee, were personally concerned in the outcome of the trial, and therefore were prejudiced in favor of the defendant. After some debate,

3. Minutes of Court Martial; PRO:Adm. 1/305, July 24, 1747.

4. Minutes of Court Martial; PRO:Adm. 1/305, July 30, 1747.

Pocock decided, with the assent of the other members of the court, to stop the trial temporarily until he heard from Legge.⁵

Legge wrote that he could not give an opinion on the legal aspects of the case and if the court was of the same opinion, the best thing to do was for Pocock to give orders to the captains of the Suffolk and Lyme to proceed directly with the convoy to England, and to send by the Suffolk with the original charges, Lee and all the papers, minutes, and letters belonging to his trial. Pocock followed Legge's advice, explaining in a letter to Corbett that:

"For his part he all along as President endeavoured to carry on matters in the best manner he was capable of but as words are of very little significance without showing matters of fact, Their Lordships will be capable to judge by whose means the trial was so long protracted which has occasioned infinite detriment to his Majesty's service by death and sickness of seamen in this harbour which carried so terrible an aspect that I was apprehensive that his Majesty's ships if detained much longer would be rendered incapable of Protecting the Sugar Colonies and annoying those of his Majesty's enemies..."⁶

After Pocock sent home Lee⁷ with the Suffolk and Lyme

5. Minutes of Court Martial; PRO:Adm. 1/305; August 6, 1747.
6. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, August 22, 1747, Sutherland English Harbor, Antigua.
7. Lee was subsequently tried in England, but none of the charges made against him could be proved and he was reinstated in the service.

to convoy the trade, he conformed with Legge's instructions and disposed the rest of his squadron for the protection of the Leeward Island's trade.⁸ In carrying out these duties, Pocock was caught in a hurricane which dismasted the Sutherland and left eight feet of water in her hold. Shortly afterwards, aided by jury masts, he arrived home successfully.⁹ Fortunately, no other ships were damaged by the storm so his squadron was kept ready for the time when the French convoys might be expected from Europe.

About this time Pocock wrote Lord Anson to congratulate him on his victory over the Marquis de La Jonquiere¹⁰ on May 3, 1747 and to inform him of Legge's death and the other incidents of the service in the Leeward Islands. For this service, "which was valuable if not brilliant,"¹¹ Anson was created a peer and Pocock was quick to see that Anson's friendship was a thing to be cultivated if he expected to get ahead in the service. The letter therefore served a useful purpose. It re-introduced Pocock (for he had already

8. The Ludlow Castle and Saxon were to accompany the Suffolk and Lyme with the convoy as far as Lat. 21°N and then to re-join the squadron. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, August 24, 1747, Sutherland, English Harbour, Antigua.
9. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, October 16, 1747.
10. The action took place on May 3, 1747 off Cape Finisterre. The French squadron was composed of 8 king's ships, 4 East India Company's ships and a 20 ship convoy intended for the recovery of Cape Breton. De La Jonquiere was ill-supported by his captains and Anson captured twelve of the enemy ships and scattered the rest.
11. William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy (7 vols), (London 1897-1903), III, 126.

met Anson) to the future First Lord of the Admiralty and showed him what a good job Pocock was doing in a difficult situation.

"I have not troubled your Lordship with a letter since I left England but on the occasion of the late Glorious defeat of his Majesty's enemies under your Command (sic) permits me no longer to suffer my pen to be dry, therefore I take this occasion to congratulate Your Lordship on your success and on your well deserved promotion to the Peerage.

I now must acquaint your Lordship with a melancholy story which has given me much concern as I am sure it will your Lordship the death of Mr. Legge at Barbadoes. On my arrival here the 9th Captain Franklin informed me he was taken ill the 11th of September and died the 15th of Yellow fever; I was then with him six days together before his illness all which time I have never known him in better health or Spirits, the 10th I sailed with his orders to cruize to leeward of Martinique as he had information some of the French ships wou'd not tarry for the Convoy, but some small vessels being bound to the Northward, I was first to see them safe to the lat. of 20° and then look for the Dreadnaught off St. Bartholomew and take her with me if I thought proper, this brought on my misfortune as related in my letter to Mr. Corbett for at Martinique they had more of the hurricane."

Since the unfortunate circumstance of Legge's death, the command of his Majesty's ships had fallen to Pocock, who assured Anson that "as senior Captain I shall act in the best manner I am able to serve his Majesty in executing their Lordships' Instructions and Commands to the utmost of my capacity." The French trade still was at Martinique waiting convoy to Europe and Pocock wrote that the rumors in the islands were that one was expected from France. In fact some French ships had already arrived.

"We have intelligence which I have sent to Mr. Corbett of five sail of Men of War from the East Indies about four weeks ago, very likely I suppose they are the ships that took Fort St. George; I shall watch their motions and hope to get the four 60 gun ships ready for them in a short time: We hear of nothing beside in these parts."

Then, having outlined the strategic situation in the islands he devoted the remainder of his letter to the difficulties that he and his predecessors had had with the planters.

"I conclude your Lordship has seen Mr. Lee and my account of His Affair that went by the Suffolk by which you find what a troublesome sett of people we had to deal with, never satisfied, and seem to choose contention rather than carry on his Majesty's service in harmony with his Majesty's officers; Sir Peter Warner and Mr. Knowles know them perfectly and I am informed were not well treated in their time. I can assure your Lordship that while I was under Mr. Lee's Command I never knew him behave otherwise than as an officer that had his Majesty's Service only at heart and regarded his private interest as little I dare say as any commanding officer did notwithstanding so much is said of that part by these people against him: They were going on to perplex Mr. Legge, their petitions to the King no doubt you have seen, they never sent him a copy and ordered none shou'd be taken in Council. At Barbadoes they regret Mr. Legge extremely and his intentions to carry on the Service in all parts with Harmony had he not mett with so many obstructions from the people of this Island..."

Legge had not had time to send home all the letters that he had intended to and Pocock wrote Anson that he intended to call at Barbados to forward them.

"I was very well pleased Captain O'Hara did not get at them as I am told He wanted to do who was very troublesome at Mr Lasscelles about them; he had no more to do than enquire of the Secretary

for a copy of my Orders to send after me, but probably he wanted to search rather after others. He may come up to carry away the ships bound for England and was to have sailed the 19th of last month according to the joint resolution of the Governor and Council at Barbadoes with Mr. Legge for the latter convoy to proceed that day and the Summer convoy the 24th of June but Mr. Legge was not able to sign the orders. I shall learn more about him [O'Hara] when I get up, he is now putting in a bowsprit but shall not stay a minute longer than is necessary: all the World knows he is a most troublesome man, wants to stay out and has offered to change with Cornwall but that won't do and I really think none of his Majesty's officers should associate with a man of his character who is in a manner generally disliked by most in the Service: Captain Cornwall has wrote to Mr Harry Legge about disposing of the Commodore's things which we will continue in the best manner we can, and what is proper to sent home shall go by the most safe convenience as Your Lordship will do me the favour to let Mr Legge know with My Complements,

I am

Your Lordship's

Most obedient

Servt.

G. Pocock¹²

Two days later, he wrote Corbett¹³ in much the same vein, to inform him officially of Legge's death, of the hurricane which dismasted the Sutherland, and of the present disposition of the squadron. Pocock was grieved that the Saxon, sloop, had been condemned by the shipwrights at English Harbor and that he had had to put her out of commission.

12. Pocock to Lord Anson; BM:Add.Mss 15956, f.307, October 14, 1747. Mr. Lascelles was the agent commissioner of victualling at Barbados, whose office was used by Legge as his headquarters on shore.
13. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, October 16, 1747, Sutherland, English Harbor, Antigua.

In view of his comments to Anson about Captain O'Hara, Pocock was of the opinion the only thing to do with this officer was to send him home with the trade and this he informed Corbett he was planning to do.¹⁴

As commander of the squadron, Pocock thought that he needed a bigger ship and accordingly on October 21st moved to Legge's old flagship the Captain. As soon as the hurricane season was over, Pocock resumed Legge's old station off Martinique. Five large French East India ships¹⁵ had been reported to have put into Port Royal¹⁶ and Pocock's squadron stood in close to the harbor of Port Royal to confirm this

14. O'Hara was a political appointee and had friends in the ministry. Some years later Anson wrote the Duke of Newcastle condemning this kind of political jobbery that endangered the safety and discipline of the navy. "I must now beg your Grace will seriously consider what must be the condition of your fleet if these Borough recommendations, which must be frequent, are to be complied with. I wish it did not at this instance bring to my mind the misery poor Pocock (that excellent officer) suffered from the misbehaviour of captains of that cast; which has done more mischief to the public (which I know is the most favourite point with you) than the loss of a vote in the House of Commons." Lord Anson to Duke of Newcastle, Admiralty, June 15, 1751. Walter Vernon Anson, The Life of Admiral Lord Anson, (London 1912), p. 115.
15. Achille (74), Penthievre, Argonaut (36), Balene (36), St. Malo (20). Their commander was Bertrand François Mahe La Bourdonnais who was in the Achille. He had left India with twelve sail which became separated in a gale. He transferred his wife and children, who were with him when he left, to a Portuguese vessel for safety on the passage, and when he found himself blockaded in Port Royal he slipped over to Eustatia, where he embarked on a Dutch vessel and took passage to Europe, but eventually was taken prisoner at Falmouth.
16. Port Royal or Fort Royal: present-day Fort-de-France. A city of Martinique on the SW coast of the island.

information. The India ships were there but did not appear ready to sail for some time as their yards were all down and few crews appeared on board. Receiving reports that seven more French ships were at Grenada, Pocock sent the Porcupine there for news, remaining with his squadron off Martinique to blockade the Indiamen. A sprung bowsprit required his leaving the blockade for Carlisle Bay, Barbados,¹⁷ and repairs but as soon as this was accomplished, he intended to rejoin his squadron off Martinique. News had arrived early in November that a large French convoy was expected from France,¹⁸ and he was anxious to return as quickly as possible.

On his return, towards the end of November, he transferred the squadron to the windward side of Martinique so as to be in a better position to intercept the convoy. Since the five Indiamen were still not ready to sail, he felt quite safe in doing so. As soon as the Porcupine came back from Grenada, she was sent to bring in all of his outlying ships¹⁹ to the weather side of Martinique.

Meanwhile Admiral Edward Hawke²⁰ had been appointed on

17. Carlisle Bay: Bay on SW side of Barbados, where Bridgetown, the capital, is located.
18. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, November 9, 1747, Captain, Carlisle Bay, Barbados.
19. Sutherland, cleaning at Carlisle Bay, Sunderland and Mary galley.
20. Edward Hawke, Lord Hawke, Baron Hawke of Towton, Admiral of the Fleet (1705-1781). Entered the navy in 1720, served with distinction at the Battle of Toulon, 1744 and decisively crushed the French navy at Quiberon Bay 1759.

September 8 to cruise

"diligently with the said ships or so many of them as you shall judge fitting, and to dispose of the whole either jointly or separately, on such station or stations in the mouth of the Channel, Soundings Bay of Biscay and adjacent parts, as may best answer the ends of protecting the trade of his Majesty's subjects, taking or destroying the ships of war, privateers and other ships and vessels of the enemy, meeting and intercepting their convoys outward and homeward bound, and annoying them by all means in your power."

Acting in the spirit of these instructions Hawke, on October 14, observed a great convoy of French ships escorted by eight ships of the line. Hawke had fifteen ships and attacked the French ships of the line. By nightfall the French escort had been cut to pieces but the French convoy had escaped to the West Indies. Hawke had not for a moment entertained the idea of sending any of his ships of the line after the merchantmen until he had accounted for the escorting men of war, and he considered it would be imprudent to send frigates only as there were several large ships that escaped with the convoy. But he dispatched the Weazel, sloop to the commodore in the Leeward Islands to warn him that the French ships were coming.

The report Pocock received²¹ from Admiral Hawke in the Weazel, sloop mentioned that he, Hawke, had scattered the convoy's escort although a 64 gun ship was leading the rem-

21. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/8, Captain, at sea to leeward of Martinique.

nants. Hawke wrote that if Pocock thought wise to do so, he might send the news to Admiral Knowles who was commanding at Jamaica as it seemed likely that some of the ships were heading for Santo Domingo; this Pocock did immediately.

The day after the Weazel arrived with Hawke's news the first of the French merchantmen came in sight and for the following eight days they came rolling over the horizon. "Having no need to keep together after their escort was destroyed the French merchant ships had made a good passage." 22

Pocock's squadron was busy night and day taking prizes. The Captain, Dragon, Dreadnaught, and Ludlow Castle took 21 prizes and the Sunderland turning up late made three more near the land. The Sutherland had the bad luck to lose her maintopmast and caught only one prize, as did the Mary galley, although the latter brought the total up a few days later by taking a small French ship bound for Vera Cruz. The grand total was 40 ships in all; 30 taken by men of war and ten by privateers.²³

About 60 more ships eluded Pocock's squadron and reached ports about Martinique. The ships bound for Santo Domingo with a 64 gun escort escaped notice entirely by keeping north of Martinique.²⁴

22. Richmond, III, 71.

23. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/48.

24. 66 ships in all got into Martinique, but in spite of this

Pocock waited in these happy hunting grounds until the 2d of December for stragglers, and then set sail for Barbados with his prizes reaching there the 5th. A few days later the rest of his squadron arrived with more prizes. Despite the fact that Pocock and his squadron had struck a deadly blow at the French in the West Indies the planters of the Island of Barbados were not pleased. the 40 odd ships had hundreds of sailors and passengers who needed to be landed, so that the squadron could return to its duty of blockading Martinique.

In spite of the necessity and urgency of Pocock's request to land the prisoners of war the governor and council debated for half a day as to whether it was really

the blow was a terrible one to the island. For the moment the population was rescued from starvation but the losses raised the insurance premiums to such a height that not another vessel would sail. An intercepted letter dated December 19 from Martinique tells the story graphically:

"We are here an hundred vessels ready for sailing and only wait for a convoy which we expect with impatience having been here for fourteen months. We intend to go all alone next month if no man of war comes. As to what regards the trade of the island, it is very melancholy, and if it were not for the thirty-six privateers I doubt but we should have had a famine and the island been in a miserable condition from the long time that passed before those ships arrived to assist us, of which only sixty-six are got into different ports of the island, while twenty-one [the remainder taken by Pocock's squadron] were bound to other islands are taken and carried to Antigua. This is very unfortunate for us..."

Richmond does not cite a letter reference for this letter but it is to be found enclosed in Pocock to Corbett; PRO: Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/48. It is quoted in Richmond III, 72.

necessary to keep the prisoners, despite Pocock's warning that if these sailors were returned to Martinique the five East Indiamen, which badly needed crews, would promptly sail away. After the debate the council agreed to take 370 and the rest were sent to Antigua where there were about 500 prisoners.

Pocock was informed that the cost of guarding these prisoners would be born for six weeks at the most. Writing to Corbett, Pocock suggested bitterly:

"to ease this unsupportable burden of Guarding Prisoners, a few companys of regular forces or three companys of Marines quartered in the island would take off that tax and his Majesty's service would not be liable to be obstructed in time of war by difficulties which at no time ought to be made by any of his Majesty's subjects when the necessity of affairs requires immediate despatch...but the expense to the island was not foreseen by the inhabitants, though it might reasonably be expected in time of war."²⁵

Not only did the planters object to guarding prisoners of war but Pocock's proposal of fixed dates for the homeward bound convoys was hotly debated. The council of Antigua disagreed with the council of Barbados; both disagreed with Pocock. The council of Antigua said that their crops were sooner ready to be shipped than those of the people of Barbados and the council of Barbados said that "fix'd days are improper". Pocock could only say:

"I shall be well pleased to content both Windward and Leeward Islands, however discontented they are

25. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/8.

with each other, I think the promoting his Majesty's service should be the first principal of his Loyal Subjects and as such I hope all in these parts will approve themselves."²⁶

Having disposed of the problem of the prisoners, Pocock was free to start cruising again without delay on the same stations as before,²⁷ keeping a particular watch upon St. Pierre's and Port Royal²⁸ in order to prevent any ships from sailing and to distress Martinique to the extent where the island might be forced to surrender.²⁹

On December 28th, Admiral Knowles arrived at Barbados and sent a message on the 3d of January, 1747/8 announcing that fact and his congratulations on the fine catch of prizes that met his eye as he sailed into Carlisle Bay.³⁰ Pocock

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26. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/8.
27. "The Richmond is clean'd and in a good condition again for cruizing; I keep her and the Porcupine to Windward of Barbadoes, the Centaur and Dreadnaught prize to Windward of Antigua and the rest of the squadron (Captain, Dragon, Dreadnaught, Sunderland, Sutherland, Ludlow Castle, Mary galley) are cruizing to intercept the enemy, when that service is over some of the ships must clean and the others shall be employed to protect the trade and annoy the enemy, according to their Lordship's order of 21 April last on the Prayer of the Merchants." Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/8.
28. St. Pierre: a town on Martinique.
29. Since the island was almost wholly dependent on outside sources for foodstuffs this was a most reasonable hope.
30. These prizes led Pocock to write Corbett concerning his position with regard to prize money: "I must beg leave to trouble their Lordships to indulge me with their opinion with respect to the share of the prizes since the command of the Squadron has devolved upon me, by which I shall abide in

replied at once to Admiral Knowle's letter giving him information regarding the strength of his squadron and on his own plans as well.³¹ A short time thereafter Knowles joined Pocock off Martinique.

Knowles was anxious to work with Pocock in an attempt at capturing one of the French islands; for choice, he proposed Grenada. Pocock answered that he would willingly cooperate

"if that service would not prevent the immediate service I was on, the intercepting those men of war from India and the Convoy designed going under their protection which was expected to sail daily..."³²

Knowles fell in with Pocock's refusal with good grace and cruised with him until the 10th of January, during which

great deference to their Lordships' judgement and that is if I can properly have the 1/8 part of all Prizes since the late Commodore Legge's decease, concluding the proclamation has supposed the next in command on the demise of a Flag Officer or Commodore to have a right to the 1/8 part, otherwise a Commanding Officer for the time being might be in a worse position than he was in before, as possibly he could not have the opportunity of being on a cruise, as the business of the squadron may require him to stay in Port longer than other Captains, I ask pardon of their Lordships and hope they will not think me impertinent, although it personally concerns me in the late captures." Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2298, January 12, 1747/8. The Admiralty did accede to Pocock's request for 1/8 part of all the prizes since Legge's death.

31. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, January 12, 1747/8.

32. Ibid. It would be difficult not to applaud Pocock for his wisdom. Knowles was impetuous, but a full scale amphibious operation against one of the French islands would have been disastrous. In any event Pocock was right to have concentrated on Martinique for it was a main center of French trade.

time Knowles went close in to Port Royal harbor to see if the shipping gathered there could not be destroyed. An examination of the batteries guarding the mouth of the harbor showed him, however, that the place was too strongly defended for such an operation to have any chance of success. Knowles then left for his station at Jamaica and Pocock continued on his blockade.

Writing to Anson at this time Pocock said;

"If we go on with the war I should propose as the most effectual way to root out the French entirely in these parts, to attempt Martinique as the head island and as we have had such glorious success at sea whereby we may spare Ships of war for that service, is to surround the island and keeping all manner of supplies from them, they will in a few months be reduced to such extreme misery and want so that with such a number of land forces as may be judged sufficient to land with some cannon the Island must fall and the rest probably soon follow..."³³

On May 1st Admiral Henry Osborne³⁴ arrived to take command in succession to Legge, and Pocock went back to his old ship, the Sutherland. Pocock's last independent action on the station was sending a boat's crew at night to spike the guns of a battery on the Island of Ramieres on the south side of Port Royal. Unfortunately, the spikes were not hard enough and the French drilled them out again without too

33. Pocock to Lord Anson; BM:Add.Mss 15956, f.311, January 12, 1747/48, Captain, at sea off Martinique.

34. Admiral Henry Osborne (?1698-1771). Entered navy in 1714. Served at Battle of Passaro 1718. In 1747 promoted to rear admiral and in February, 1747/8 appointed commander in chief, Leeward Islands.

much trouble. However, Osborne, on arrival, complimented him on his initiative.³⁵

Shortly after Osborne assumed his duties, Pocock was sent home with the trade and arrived in the Downes on the 21st of August. On the 2d of September he was in London turning in his paybooks³⁶ and shortly thereafter he retired to his house on St. James Street to rest after the past active years.

35. Pocock to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/2289, May 21, 1748.

36. Pocock to John Cleveland (Secretary of the Admiralty (1751-1763)); PRO:Adm. 1/2289, September 3, 1748.

III

East Indian Waters: Watson and the Conquest of Bengal

Pocock had relatively little time to relax after the close of the War of the Austrian Succession. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle proved to be only a truce, and the end of the preliminary round of the struggle for Empire between Great Britain and France. Whether France would establish a dominion across the American continent from the Alleghenies to the Pacific; and whether Britain could be ejected from her trading settlements in India and the whole of the sub-continent fall under French rule, depended upon which power had superiority on land in each continent. The troops who would be the deciding factor could only go by sea. Therefore, command of the sea was the key to these questions.

The British forces in India, since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, had declined to the strength of a battalion. It was thought in London that this dangerous situation should be rectified before war broke out with France. In case the French did not abide by the provisions of the peace treaty and resumed hostilities in India, Rear Admiral Charles Watson¹ was sent out to the Coromandel coast in February

1. Rear Admiral Charles Watson (1714-1757). Entered the navy in 1728. Served with Admirals Haddock and Matthews in the Mediterranean from 1737 to 1742 and was present at Toulon

1754,² with a small squadron³ and Colonel Adlercron's regiment of foot. Pocock was to sail as second in command to Watson. The appointment was probably due to his friendship with the admiral, which dated back to the time when they were both captains under Nicholas Haddock in the Mediterranean, and to the reputation he now held, in the Admiralty, for his work in the West Indies during the past war. As early as January 1754, Pocock wrote to Cleveland, the Secretary of the Admiralty, asking for the payment of his half-pay, which he maintained "will be useful to me on this occasion..."⁴ By February 4th he was at Plymouth on board his ship, the Eagle.⁵

Two weeks later Pocock was still struggling to put Watson's squadron in condition for departure. Shortly afterwards, the squadron sailed for Kinsale Harbor, Ireland, to

on February 11, 1743/4 during the battle. Served with some distinction under Admiral, Lord Anson in the Bay of Biscay, October 14, 1747. In March 1747/8 he was appointed commander in chief of the Newfoundland and North American station with the rank of commodore and on May 12 was promoted to rear admiral of the blue. In February 1754, he was sent to India as commander in chief and acted in that capacity until his death on August 16, 1757.

2. Coromandel coast: the coast line on the south-eastern side of the sub-continent of India was known by this name.
3. Kent (70), Cumberland (66), Tyger (60), Salisbury (50), Bridgewater (24), Triton (24), Kingfisher (14).
4. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/2291, January 26, 1754, St. James St., London.
5. Same to Same; Ibid, February 4, 1754, Eagle, at Plymouth.

load Colonel Adlercron's regiment before making for India.⁶ While the ships were moored in station in Kinsale Harbor and waiting to finish loading the soldiers, a strong gale started to blow during the night. The Eagle's power anchor carried away and she fouled the Bristol which was moored beside her. Soon both ships' remaining anchors dragged and the two smashed against each other for some time until the captain of the Bristol, in order to save her from running aground, chopped away her masts. When morning came the wind fell, but both the Bristol and the Eagle were so badly damaged that Watson ordered them to Plymouth for repairs. As soon as the repairs were completed, they were to sail to India and re-join him there.⁷

After being buffeted about by storms, Pocock reached Plymouth⁸ in April with the injured ships. The Admiralty sent him the Cumberland so that he would not have to wait for the Eagle to be repaired⁹ and could leave Plymouth sooner. This proved to be a mixed blessing because the Cumberland was very poorly equipped for a voyage to the tropics:

"As the Cumberland has only her ground tier of Water which with her Gang Casks makes but 124 Tun, there will be a necessity for a complete

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6. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/2291, February 19, 1754.
 7. Same to Same; Ibid; March 24, 1754, Eagle, Kinsale Harbor.
 8. Same to Same; Ibid; March 31, April 2, 5, 9, 16, and 21, 1754.
 9. The Eagle's knees of the head were broken in two places.

set of Butts for the second tier which shall be supplied from the Eagle; this will occasion a delay but it will be done with all possible despatch..."¹⁰

Two days later he wrote again:

"I acquainted you in my last [letter] that finding the Cumberland's hold stow'd in a confus'd manner and only her ground tier of water, we have been obliged to get out all casks in the middle tier which were filled with Beer in order to take in as much water as we can stow with Beer enough to last to Madeira; this will retard our sailing, but [we] shall loose no time in getting away when that is completed."¹¹

By May 5 Pocock was ready for sea and two days later sailed from Plymouth Sound with the Tyger. He reached Madeira on the 25th after an uneventful voyage. Some of his pressed men had come down with a "slow fever" and were treated with Dr. James's Powders¹² which Pocock found "serviceable" for their ailment. He wrote Cleveland

"Webber's Machine [was] useful in extracting the foul air from the Hold and other parts of the ship and conveying fresh air in room of it which will contribute greatly to [the] Health of the ship's company."¹³

10. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/2291, April 26, 1754, Eagle, in Plymouth Sound.
11. This letter and a similar one dated May 4, 1754 are endorsed by Cleveland: "Let him know I have communicated it to their Lordships who are sorry to find the Cumberland was brought to him in such condition." Same to Same; Ibid; April 28, 1754, Cumberland, Plymouth Sound.
12. A chemical compound of doubtful value which was the mainstay of the ship's surgeon throughout the 18th century for everything from malaria to scurvy.
13. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/2291, June 2, 1754, Cumberland, Madeira. There is no record at the Patent Office regarding "Webber's Machine" but it has many prototypes and

After leaving Madeira, Pocock had good cause to regret his endorsement of Dr. James's Powders and Webber's Machine. The "slow fever" which his impressed seamen had brought on board spread throughout the ship's company. At the same time, his crew contracted a severe attack of scurvy and by the time he had reached Madagascar, he was forced to send 230 of his men ashore to recover.¹⁴ The Tyger's company seemed healthier and had to send only 62 of her men ashore. Pocock hoped that by the beginning of October, his men would be well enough to return on board ship. For he estimated that it would now be some time in December before he could get to the Coromandel coast. With a total of 78 dead of all causes, he was very anxious to join Watson before his complement became too depleted, and he, the second in command, a burden to his admiral.

Pocock sailed from Madagascar on the 6th of October with only five seamen not completely recovered. By December 20th he arrived on the Coromandel coast, having been troubled by calms, and anchored in Fort St. George Road¹⁵ where he was joined on January 17th by Admiral Watson. Pocock, before Watson's arrival, had sent the Tyger, with the remainder of

successors. The problem of foul air in the wooden ship of the line was not, however, successfully overcome until the advent of the iron and steel hull in the 19th century, when auxilliary motors could force air in and out.

14. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/2291, September 21, 1754, Cumberland, St. Augustine's Bay, Madagascar.

15. Fort St. George: the present-day city of Madras.

Adlercron's regiment, to Fort St. Davids¹⁶ where the main body of the troops was quartered.

At the time of Pocock's arrival in India, a three months' truce was in force between the English and French companies on the coast because they were waiting to hear the terms of the peace from Europe. Watson, soon after the rendezvous with Pocock, sailed with his squadron for Trincomalee¹⁷ to wood and water his ships. On May 15th he arrived at Fort St. David's where he met with the governor and council. He also received letters from Fort St. George asking him to wait with his squadron on the coast until intelligence came from Europe. A plan had been formed in London whereby the French were to be attacked first, since it was shrewdly suspected that the French would refuse to evacuate the territories they had seized during the late war.¹⁸ But the scheme fell through partly because the dispatches to Fort St. George were sent in the Doddington, East Indiaman, which was lost, and partly because the Presidency of Bombay would not cooperate. However, Watson assembled his squadron at Bombay in November because the Presidency of Bombay had prevailed upon him to carry Colonel Clive and an armed

16. Fort St. Davids: an English factory a few miles south of the French base at Pondicherry.
17. Trincomalee: the main port and naval dockyard on the eastern side of the island of Ceylon.
18. H. H. Dodwell, (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, (6 vols.), (Cambridge, 1929), V, 157.

force to attack a pirate base at Geriah.¹⁹ Ships from this base had frequently seized East India Company and country²⁰ ships so the presidency wished it destroyed.

Commodore James of the East India Company with the company's ships Protector, Revenge, and Bombay went to reconnoitre Geriah and on December 31st, Watson sent the Bridge-water and Kingfisher to cruise off that port. James joined them on January 27, 1756, with the Protector and Guardian; Watson, with Pocock and Colonel Clive, arrived on February 12th. That afternoon, having summoned the town to surrender, the squadron stood into the harbor in two divisions: the one to attack the pirates' fort, and the other their shipping. After three hours' bombardment, the pirates' batteries were silenced, and at about 6:30 p.m. Colonel Clive's troops disembarked to storm the town. Since night was approaching, Clive decided to wait until morning before storming the town, but throughout the night town and forts were kept under constant bombardment. The following morning Clive entered the town, which surrendered, and the next day, the fleet returned to Bombay.²¹

At the end of April, Watson and Pocock left Bombay and sailed for the Coromandel coast, arriving off Fort St. David

19. Geriah: chief port of the island of Severndroog.

20. Native.

21. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 14, 1756.

May 14, 1756. They had not been there long before they heard that six large French East Indiamen, full of troops, were expected in India, where they were to be fitted as men of war. This news had only just been given to Watson when an urgent message called him to Madras. He learned there that the nabob of Bengal, Siraj-ud-daula,²² had seized Calcutta on June 20th. To further complicate the situation Watson received word while he was still in Madras that war with France was expected at any moment, and that a further reinforcement for the French in India was expected to sail very soon.

About the same time that Watson arrived in Madras and learned of the fall of Calcutta, he received orders from the Admiralty to return with his squadron to England.²³ Watson had sufficient strength of character to ignore these orders which he knew had been drafted with a misconception of the British position in India.

In the series of councils of war that were held at Madras to decide what was to be done,²⁴ a firm plan of action

22. Siraj-ud-daula was the successor and great nephew of 'Ali Wardi Khan, subahar of Bengal who died April 9, 1756. Siraj-ud-daula was a young man of 23. Of him, neither his English nor Indian contemporaries have any good to say.
23. These orders, of course, had been sent before news of the French reinforcement under d'Ache was learned of. PRO:Adm. 1/161.
24. Report of the Council of War held at Fort St. George; India Office:Home Miscellaneous Series, Vol. 95, folio 85, September 29, 30, 1756, October 1, 1756, (Hereafter cited as IO:HM 95/85, etc.); Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 20, 25, 27, 30, September 29, October 1, 1756.

was decided on only after some hesitation. With war with France an immediate possibility and a known French reinforcement of ships and men expected at any time, Watson was not enthusiastic about dividing his squadron which was the first course the council of war proposed.²⁵

Expecting the French ships every day Watson did not want to face them with a divided squadron. He must, he told them, keep it in one body and for one objective at a time. It could be used either for defending the company's interest on the Coromandel coast and their capital at Madras, or it could go north to make certain of recovering Calcutta.

After all the facts had been laid before them, the council at length decided. Madras must take its chance, and Watson with practically his whole force should sail with Clive and his troops to retake Calcutta. There was some discussion about who was to lead the military expedition, and much time was wasted while these matters were straightened out.²⁶

While the last arrangements for the proposed expedition

25. A detachment would carry Colonel Clive with troops to retake Calcutta while the remainder of the squadron would stay on the Coromandel coast.
26. The command was claimed by Colonel Adlercron, the commander of the royal regiment that had come out with Watson. But he refused to agree to the division of the prospective plunder in the shares laid down in the company's instructions, or promise to return on a summons from the Madras council; and so the command was finally entrusted to Clive. It was a miracle of fortune that Colonel Adlercron had been so unaccommodating.

IO:HM 94/210 (Madras Public Consultations), September 21, 1756.

were being made, Rear Admiral Pocock²⁷ wrote to Lord Anson his impressions of the reasons for the fall of Calcutta:

"By what I hear from those acquainted, the benefit of that settlement was of more consideration to them [the company] than all their others in India; If this be the truth it must surprize all the world that so little care was taken of a settlement of so great importance to the Company ---The Fort by all accounts of it is a poor pityfull Fortification, has no Ditch around it, no Esplanade, and Storehouses called Godownes built between two of the Bastions that the Curtain could not be flank'd, thus when the Nabob's [Siraj-ud-daula's] people broke through the Line and got possession of the houses close to the Fort it was deem'd no longer tenable and a retreat was resolved on, for the Houses overlooked the Bastions and the men were all exposed to the enemy's fire under cover; By what has happen'd ... it is easy to see that it was in ...a defenceless state..., but let the causes be what they may, it is judged proper by the Governor and Council here to send a force sufficient to retake Calcutta and put the representatives of the Company in possession of the place at all risques."

After discussing the many and varied motives that the nabob might have had for descending on Calcutta, Pocock stated that it was due to a growing awareness of the native that the European was trying to subjugate him and not simply trade with him.

"I think the best step the Europeans can take in this Empire is to be satisfied with

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27. His commission arrived in India July 3, 1755, and he hoisted his flag on the 4th on board the Cumberland. Watson had received a promotion to be rear admiral of the red squadron on the 12th of August. Pocock's commission was in the white squadron. (For an explanation of the significance of the "red and the white" see Appendix III.) Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 6, 1755, Cumberland, Madras Road.

keeping the Settlements allotted them and not interfere with the country powers as their [the European's] sole end is commerce."

Pocock would have been thoroughly horrified had he known what was in Colonel Clive's mind, but this anxiety was spared him. On October 16, the expedition sailed. The north-east monsoon had already set in and their passage was long and stormy.

The expedition was a brilliant success. On January 2, 1757, Calcutta was in British hands, but the business was far from ending there. While lying off Calcutta, Watson received news from the Admiralty that war was officially declared and that since the French were sending out ships and men, Watson might look for a reinforcement of ships and a big East India convoy under Commodore Stevens.²⁸ Some

28. "Whereas in pursuance of the King's pleasure, signified to us by Mr. Pitt, one of his Majesty's Principal Secretary's of State, Charles Stevens is under our Orders to proceed with his Majesty's ships per margin [Elizabeth (64), Yarmouth (64), Weymouth (60), Newcastle (50), and Queenborough (24)] to the East Indies; and it being the King's further pleasure that such of the ships already in the East Indies as are or can be put in good condition should remain there under the command of Vice Admiral Pocock and that you should return to England with such ships or ship only, as cannot be made fit for further service in those parts; You are hereby required and directed with his Majesty's said pleasure by leaving Vice Admiral Pocock with such ships of your squadron as are or can be put into good condition for another year's service accordingly and to return home yourself, with the rest.

In case you shall be in your way home when this comes to your hands, You are to detach Vice Admiral Pocock, back to the Coast of Coromandel with such Ships of your squadron as are aforementioned together with the Queenborough, by which this will be brought to you; and if this finds you at the Cape of Good Hope, or nearer to England, you are also to direct Vice Admiral Pocock to call at Madagascar on his way

fifty miles above Calcutta was Chandernagore, the headquarters of the French Company on the Bengal side, and focus of all their operations against British influence in that region. The size of Watson's force was such that Chandernagore at the moment was helpless before him. Yet, now that Calcutta was recaptured ought he not return to the Coromandel coast and prepare for the French squadrons which he knew to be on the way? With Clive's persuasive voice at his ear, his hesitation was not for long. The next objective was Chandernagore.

The French agent there, seeing the hopelessness of his situation first offered to sign a treaty of neutrality. This was rejected by Watson on the ground that the agent had no authority to bind the company. Then the agent attempted to arouse Siraj-ud-daula to aid him. Watson wrote the nabob that he must keep the treaty of peace which he had made after the fall of Calcutta, or Watson said, "I will kindle such a flame in your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish."²⁹ The nabob hastily answered, professing his complete readiness to abide by the treaty of peace. Watson and Clive, reassured by this answer,

back, in order to join Mr Stevens there who is directed to call at that Island; and when he meets with Mr Stevens he is to take them under his command" LCA to Watson; PRO:Adm. 2/1331, February 24, 1757.

29. Watson to the Nabob; Proceedings of the Bengal Council and Select Committee, March 4, 1757.

moved on up the river to attack Chandernagore which fell on March 24th. But Watson now found that the conquest of Chandernagore involved his fleet still more deeply in Clive's ambitious projects.

Although the English recovered Calcutta, although they had secured from the nabob promises of privileges which they had long desired, and although they had succeeded in depriving the French of their principal stronghold in Bengal, they were still far from a position of safety. At any time news might come that the French had arrived in strength upon the coast, and then Madras would have to be abandoned to the French or Calcutta to the nabob. There was in Clive's mind only one course to choose and that was to replace the nabob's administration with the administration of a puppet prince who would be the servant of the English. Having persuaded Watson to give him naval support, Clive started to foment a rebellion in the nabob's government. In this he was successful and a puppet was found in a dismissed favorite, Mir Ja'far. On the 23d of June, Clive met the nabob's army at Plassey and defeated him. Siraj-ud-daula was captured and executed, and Mir Ja'far was proclaimed the new nabob.³⁰

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30. Clive's great campaign was scarcely appreciated at home by the authorities and English people in general were too poorly informed about India to realize what had happened. Lady Anson writing to her cousin, Lord Royston, sets the tone perfectly: "...The reports and apprehensions about Madras do not yet appear to have any great foundation, as I learn, and the less so as they have varied and from saying the place was taken have been

A few days later Pocock received information by the Marlborough, Indiaman, that the British fort and factory at Vizagapatam³¹ had surrendered to the French with a loss of 130 troops. This Pocock thought was a needless loss. The chief of the factory had known the place to be untenable as did the governor and council of Madras. They should have allowed the garrison to embark in the Protector which called at Vizagapatam on her way north with stores for Pocock.

With the news of the fall of Vizagapatam, the Marlborough brought intelligence that the French had had three ships of war cruising in the Straits of Malacca³² and one in the Straits of Sundy³³ early in the year in order to intercept the China-bound East India ships, but fortunately these vessels had sailed through the Straits before the French had arrived on their station.

In a letter from the governor of Madras further information had been garnered from captured French letters which confirmed the fact that a French squadron was destined for India, although

changed into the French squadron having been before it and not having chose to attack it; which is extremely vague; and old Mr. Clive goes about talking of his son's having demolished some other Nabob, which nobody knows anything more of." Lady Anson to Lord Royston; BM:Add. Mss 35,376, f. 152. For a general account of Clive's activities see: Pocock to John Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, July 16, 1757, Kent off Calcutta.

31. Vizagapatam: A British factory located in 17°42' N and 83°18' E about 484 miles from Madras.

32. Straits of Malacca: Between the northwest coast of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsular.

33. Straits of Sundy or Sunda: Between Java and Sumatra.

nothing had arrived in India yet from France or England. By the 20th of July, Captain Townley in the Triton had arrived at Fort St. George. The governor and council petitioned him to take station to the windward of Pondichery with the Revenge (20) a company ship, in order to give advance warning of any French ships that might come from Europe.³⁴

On August 15th, when Watson was preparing the squadron to leave the Hughley River³⁵ and return to Madras, he was taken with a fever and died suddenly on the 16th. Pocock took over the command of the squadron and wrote to the Admiralty, the Secretary of State and the various governors and councils of the Presidencies of the Company in India, to inform them of Watson's death.³⁶ With this unhappy news he included more ominous information. The Kent, Watson's late flagship, and the only 70 gun ship in the squadron, had suffered so much from the actions of the past year and from general decay that Pocock was forced to condemn her as unfit

34. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, July 16, 20, 1757, Kent off Calcutta.
35. Hughley, Hughli, or Hooghly River: The most important and most westerly channel of the Ganges River entering the Bay of Bengal.
36. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO: Adm. 1/161, August 20, 1757, Tyger off Calcutta in the River Hughley; Pocock to Earl of Holderness; IO: HM 95/11, August 20, 1757, Tyger off Calcutta; Pocock to Governor and Council of Madras; Madras Public Consultations, August 20, 1757.

for service.³⁷ Pocock ordered her to be dismantled and her men sent to fill up the complements of the other ships of the squadron, all of which were very short, and he wrote to Cleveland,

"I much fear the Kent's company will not compleat them to the proper Number, the Squadron being very sickly having near Two Hundred Men at the Hospital, and till this and the next Month is over, there is no probability of the Number decreasing."³⁸

37.

"PURSUANT to an Order from Charles Watson Esq Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet and Commander in Chief of all his Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed in the East Indies

"We whose Names are hereunto Subscribed have been onboard his Majesty's Ship Kent, and have taken a Strict and Careful Survey of her, and find as follows (Viz)

the Orlop--Two of the beams Canted. One Sprung and Clampt, Nine of the Gun Deck Beams very much opened in the Scarfs...The Bulkhead of the Magazine dropt two inches....the Gun Deck--The Foremost Beam Sprung...and all the Beams 'fore and Aft very much opened in the Scarfs...The Ship very Weak in all Parts and is Spread midships four inches could not in our opinion be repaired here or any other Place, without being in a Dock where a great Quantity of Compass Timber can be got to Shift a Number of Timbers between Wind and Water, that are Rotten, Decayed and Cutt in two by Shott....

(Signed) Capt. --- Tyger--John Sherren

Do --- Salisbury--Edward Parker

Do --- Bridgewater--Thomas Browne

On board his Majesty's Ship, Kent off Calcutta the 1st August, 1757"

Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 20, 1757, Tyger, off Calcutta in the River Hughley.

38. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 20, 1757, Tyger, off Calcutta in the River Hughley.

It seemed unlikely that the squadron would be able to sail out of the river and back to Madras soon. Pocock had hoped to be out by the beginning of September but the pilots believed that the river would not be safe for navigation until the beginning of October. So Pocock had had to "give over all thoughts of being able to Call at Fort Saint George in my Way to Bombay, as the Monsoon will then be set in and make it very hazardous to touch on the coast of Coromandel."³⁹ As if to mock him in his predicament, he had received a letter from Madras informing him that the Glory (20), a French ship, had arrived at Pondichery on June 30th; the certain herald of more to come. Captain Townley in the Triton and Captain James in the Revenge did not get to their station, windward of Pondichery, until July 10th and so missed the Glory's arrival. The two ships, however, remained on this station until the monsoon began in order to give quickly the news of the arrival of the French ships.

A week later, Pocock wrote to acknowledge letters just received from the Admiralty which told him again of his coming reinforcement under Stevens.

On September 17 the East India ship Revenge anchored in the Hughley and Captain James went across to the Tyger with the news Pocock had been both expecting and dreading for a long time. Captain James in the Revenge and Captain Townley

39. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 20, 1757, Tyger, off Calcutta in the River Hughley.

in the Triton had been cruising as ordered off Fort St. David and on the 8th they had been forced off their stations by the arrival of a big French squadron. Although the French sailed better than they did, the Revenge and the Triton got away without being chased. Their intelligence was alarming; they took the leading ship to be a 74, and seven more appeared large to them. These eight were accompanied by two frigates of 36 guns, and as Pocock already knew, the Glory was at Pondichery. James informed him that a few days later, a bomb vessel had arrived which made a grand total of twelve ships.

Captain Webb of the Marlborough brought, also, an account from the governor of Trincombar⁴⁰ of the strength of the French squadron. Pocock had received other intelligence from an Italian priest who had come as a passenger from Port L'Orient on board the Duke of Burgundy, one of the French squadron, and only arrived at Calcutta a few days before the Warwick. Pocock thus could compare the two estimates and come to some reasonable conclusion about his enemy's strength. The two sources he had agreed that twelve ships were in Indian waters.⁴¹ To oppose this force, Pocock had only five

40. Trincombar or Tranquebar: 11°1'N and 79°52'E. About 18 miles north of Negapatam. Was a Danish settlement until purchased by the British in 1845.

41. "INTELLIGENCE of the French ships undermentioned from an Italian Priest that came Passenger onboard the Duke of Burgundy from Port L'Orient, compared with an account received by Captain Webb from the Governor of Trincombar

ships⁴² although he knew Commodore Stevens was on his way with a reinforcement. Still of the ships available, the Cumberland was very leaky and needed a thorough overhaul at Bombay.⁴³ Not only was his own force in poor shape, but the Warwick, Indiaman, which arrived at Calcutta on October 2, having left Commodore Stevens on May 8th, reported the commodore was having trouble with the Yarmouth which had a leaky bowsprit.

<u>Comte de Provence</u> (74);	600	seamen;	300	soldiers
<u>Duc de Burgundy</u> (64);	500	"	250	"
<u>St. Louis</u> (64);	500	"	250	"
<u>La Silphyde</u> , frigate (34);	100	"	230	"
<u>La Reine</u> , do (34);	100	"	200	"
<u>Companie des Indes</u>	Left at the Islands			
<u>Duc D'Orleans</u> (64)	500	seamen		
<u>Duc De Berry</u> (64)	500	"		
<u>Seychel</u> (54)	500	"		
<u>Rubie</u>				
<u>Bristol</u>				
<u>Bomb Ketch</u>				

1. These 6 ships sailed from Port L'Orient the 29th December 1756 arrived at the Mauritias the 6th May, and sent their sick men to the island Bourbon, sailed from the Mauritias the 2d July to Bourbon and after taking on board their sick Men, sailed from thence, and arrived at Foul Point on the Island of Madagascar, the 15th where they remained in supplying the ships with Provisions till the 1st August when they sailed and arrived at Pondichery the 8th September last.

2. These ships I am informed were some time ago cruising in the Streights of Mallacca and Sundy but returned and joined the squadron at the Mauritias, and proceeded with them to Pondichery.

3. Guns not mentioned and joined the squadron at the Islands."

Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757, Tyger, off Fort William; Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/51, November 18, 1757, Tyger, off Fort William.

42. Tyger, Salisbury, Cumberland, Bridgewater, Triton and two bomb vessels that Admiral Watson had purchased for operations in Bengal.
43. Pocock to Earl of Holderness; IO:HM 95/11, August 20, 1757, Tyger, off Calcutta in Ruver Hughley.

If the French had not arrived when they did Pocock had planned to go on around to Bombay, but the twelve French ships at Pondichery made it necessary for him to remain at Calcutta, at least until the end of December. He summed up the situation in writing to Cleveland and Pitt:

"Fort William not being in any sort of Condition to defend itself, even against two of the enemies ships; and as they are now begun to clear a place for building a New Fortification it will be a work of time to put it in a proper Posture of Defence and as the neutrality in the Ganges no longer subsists between us and the French it will be extremely difficult for one Squadron to protect all the Company's settlements in India, in case the French Naval Power increase in these seas, which by the inclosed Intelligence from Fort St. George, the French seem to have great hopes of, in January next." 44

44. On October 13, the president and select committee had written to the secret committee of the East India Company in London that they had received information from Pondichery that 18 ships with 2500 troops had been preparing at Port L'Orient in December the past year. Now new information from the same source affirmed that another squadron of 18 would arrive at Pondichery in January and bring Mr. Lally, a Lieutenant General in the French service as commander of the French forces. The squadron that was expected, they wrote, had been identified; it was commanded by Count D'Ache and he had Count de Choiseul and M. Bouvet for Chefs d' Escadre. There were six king's ships: Bien Aime (74), Zodiaque (74), Superbe (74), Comte de Provence (64), Belliqueux (64), Vengeur (64), and two frigates of 30 guns. They had escorted 22 company ships (of which 12 could be fitted out as warships) and all the ships carried troops onboard. However the president and select committee at Fort St George hoped that this report was exaggerated.

The squadron that arrived at Pondichery on September 8th had been identified also; it consisted of five of the company's armed ships: Duc de Bourgogne (64), Duc de Orleans (64), St. Louis (64), Sechelle (50), Duc de Berry (50). Besides these there were the Sylphide (30), Reine (22), Bristol (16), Gloire (36) and Comte de Lancastre, bomb.

IO:HM 95/29, October 13, 1757. Enclosed in Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757.

Already quite well informed of the French strength, Pocock determined to be more so. He sent the Triton to Fort St. George for intelligence and with letters for Commodore Stevens in case he might call there first on his way to join Pocock's squadron. At the same time the Bridgewater was to go as far to the southward as Merqui⁴⁵ with orders to get what intelligence she could of the strength of the French squadron at Pondichery, which Pocock estimated to be about seven⁴⁶, and especially of their destination as he had no account of this. Then the Revenge was sent around to Bombay with more letters for Stevens in case he should call there or at Anjengo.⁴⁷

Having done this, Pocock took stock of his squadron; the Cumberland was very leaky, but since there was no careening gear at Calcutta he would have to use other methods to make her as fit for sea as possible. Even after repairs Pocock feared that at best she would only be serviceable for a year in eastern waters. In fact he even doubted, as he wrote Cleveland, "whether We shall be able next year, to put her and the Salisbury in a condition fit to be trusted

45. Merqui: A collection of islands in the Bay of Bengal between 9° and 13° N.

46. Comte de Provence, Duc de Berry, Duc de Bourgogne, St. Louis, Duc d'Orleans, Seychelle, Sylphide, frigate. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/51, November 18, 1757.

47. Anjango or Anjengo: On the Arabian Sea, 8° 40' N and 76° 45' E, About 72 miles north of Cape Comorin. It was the home of Sterne's Eliza Draper and a depot of the East India Company.

on a passage to England." The Tyger was little better, for she had a nine inch shot groove in her mainmast which she had received at Chandernagore and Pocock doubted if the mast was strong enough to stand the strain of heaving her down to clean her. So it would be necessary to give her a Parlement Keel.⁴⁸

In addition to the sad state of the ships of the squadron, the health of the seamen was becoming worse:

"I am sorry to inform you, that the Seamen continue Sickly, with intermitting Fevers and Agues, many have lately Died, and am very apprehensive that notwithstanding the Kent's turned over men we shall go to sea much short of complement and of the present number there are about Seventy invalids, incurable and altogether unserviceable. If a few Seamen were sent out in each of the Company's ships it would be of infinite service to his Majesty's Squadron, without which there will be no possibility of keeping up the Complement of Men in this country, as we have not yet entered Lascars."⁴⁹

While Pocock was making his arrangements to deal with his battered squadron and anxiously waiting for information

48. Parlement Keel: A false keel of planks.

49. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757; Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/51, November 18, 1757.
"State and Condition of His Majesty's Squadron in the East Indies... November 18, 1757."

<u>Ships Name</u>	<u>Complement</u>	<u>Mustered</u>	<u>Sick</u>	
<u>Tyger</u>	400	189	198	
<u>Salisbury</u>	300	184	109	All
<u>Cumberland</u>	520	319	174	Ships
<u>Bridgewater</u>	140	90	46	Fit For
<u>Triton</u>	160	145	6	Sea

Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/63, November 18, 1757

about the French squadron at Pondichery, he entered into a controversy with the East India Company's representatives at Fort William. After Mir Ja'far had been enthroned as nabob of Bengal, he had sent a very large sum of money to the select committee at Fort William in order to show his appreciation of all that had been done by the company to enable him to assume the throne. That he had been encouraged in holding these opinions by Clive and other members of the company, there can be little doubt. But the negotiations that led up to the gift were kept hidden from Admiral Watson and Admiral Pocock until the arrival of 23 sacks of rupees at Fort William made the secret an open one. This was soon followed by another gift in which the council of Fort William shared.

Since Admiral Watson had died, it fell to Pocock to ask for an explanation of the company's conduct, and what was perhaps even more important, for a share of the new nabob's gift.⁵⁰ Watson, as Pocock wrote to Pitt and Cleveland, had been one of the chief negotiators with both Mir Ja'far and Siraj-ud-daula. "[They both] looked upon him [Watson] as the Chief Person in the Transactions of affairs and [he] was first named in Treatys and other matters since

50. Agreement on the division of the expected spoils at Calcutta had been thrashed out between the governor and select committee of Madras and Admiral Watson before the expedition had sailed to retake Calcutta, but nothing had been said about other areas, because Clive's plans were not divulged to Admiral Watson until after the recapture of Calcutta.

his arrival in this River."⁵¹ Also, Pocock thought that by virtue of his instructions from the British government, Admiral Watson should have been considered as "one of the Select Committee at all the Company's Presidencies where Operations of War are concerned, which is the case here..."⁵² and although this point had never been made fully clear to the company's agents, Admiral Watson had intended to do so on the very day he was taken ill.

Pocock, after Watson's death, took upon himself the task of claiming a share for the dead admiral's estate. What seemed grossly unfair to him was that Clive received a share in addition to the proportion that was allotted to the army, while Watson had been excluded entirely. Although the committee of Fort William saw nothing unusual in this turn of events, Pocock argued that

"they would not have attempted to Justifie had he [Admiral Watson] lived to have done himself justice; As he had given up to the Army one half of everything taken by the squadron, of which Colonel Clive had an equal share with him."⁵³

Pocock began to write letters to each of the recalcitrant committee and to Clive, asking for a part of their portion for Admiral Watson's share. To be sure of who got

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51. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/67, November 18, 1757, Tyger, off Fort William in River Hughley; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757, Tyger, off Fort William in River Hughley.
 52. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/67, November 18, 1757; Pocock to Cleveland, PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757.
 53. Ibid.

what part he found out from the clerk of the committee the exact way in which the nabob's gift had been divided.⁵⁴

The committee of Fort William did not see Pocock's proposals in quite the same light that he did. The committee argued that the nabob's gift had been a private affair and only the committee of Fort William was concerned in it. Even by stretching the letter of the late Admiral Watson's instructions to the limit of credibility, it was impossible, they felt, to see how the admiral could have ever considered himself a member of that body. The committee pointed out to Pocock that they retained "a true sense of obligation for the great services rendered the settlement by Mr. Watson" and they were "desirous to testify our Grateful and sincere

54.	"	Names	Rs	
		Governor Drake	133,000	
		Colonel Clive	133,000	
		Major Killpatrick	114,000	
		Mr Watts	114,000	
		Mr Manningham	114,000	
		Mr Beecher	114,000	
		Mr Pearks	47,500	
		Mr Frankland	47,500	
		Mr Collett	47,500	
		Mr Mackett	47,500	
		Mr Boddam	47,500	
		Mr Amyatt	47,500	
		Mr Cooke	28,500	
		Mr Walsh	28,500	
		Mr Scrafton	19,000	
		Mr Lushington	9,500	
			Rs. <u>1,092,500</u>	
				These are said to make up the Select Committee
				These are of the Council only
				Secretary
				Paymaster to Company Troops
				Subaltern Officer in Company's service
				Writer in Company's service

Rs 1,092,500 which is $\frac{1}{2}$ Rs 2,300,000 abating 5% that premium being given to Ray Doulab the Nabob's Treasurer." Doidge to Pocock; IO:HM 95/81, October 30, 1757.

Veneration for his memory," but they were not prepared on the other hand, to betray the trust and confidence of an equally useful and beneficial friend, the nabob Mir Ja'far, who doubtless, if he had intended the gift to be more than what it was, would have included the late Admiral Watson among those who were to receive a part of it. However, out of their great estimation for the late Admiral Watson and to serve as a monument to his memory four of the committee⁵⁵ would contribute ten percent of what they had received and they hoped the members of the council would express the same regard for the late admiral's high worth.⁵⁶ This letter Pocock sent on to the council of Fort William with hopes that they would also see the justice of his case.

The council, however, found all sorts of excuses to disclaim responsibility for turning over a percentage of the nabob's gift to Pocock.

"We beg leave to observe," they wrote him, "that although Mr Clive, Watts, Killpatrick and Manningham have consented to give up ten percent of their proportions of the Nabob's donation for the benefit of Admiral Watson's Estate yet they seem to be clearly convinced he had no right or Title to partake of that Donation..."⁵⁷

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55. Robert Clive, William Watts, James Killpatrick, and Mr. Manningham.
56. Select Committee to Pocock; IO:HM 95/71, September 15, 1757; Pocock to Roger Drake President and Council of Fort William; IO:HM 95/73, September 18, 1757. Also enclosed in Pocock to Cleveland; Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757, Tyger, off Fort William in River Hughley.
57. Council of Fort William to Pocock; IO:HM 95/77, October 10, 1757. Also enclosed in Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757.

To be sure, the council was well aware of the great services that Admiral Watson had rendered, and they would respond as readily as the gentlemen of the select committee:

"if our circumstances would admit of a deduction for that end out of the gift made us by the Subah, which Messrs Drake and Beecher assure you they cannot do without prejudicing their fortunes so considerably by it, as to leave them but a trifle after discharging the just demands of their creditors..."⁵⁸

In conclusion the council informed Pocock that they all felt that since they were not members of the select committee, they understood that their gift was a separate and distinct one and therefore did not "esteem themselves liable to any deduction on account of the claim made in behalf of Admiral Watson."⁵⁹

After much discussion and frequent correspondence with the council of Fort William, Pocock sent Henry Doidge, the local commissioner for victualling, and late secretary of Admiral Watson, to a meeting of the council of Fort William in order to receive a more satisfactory reply to his request. Doidge wrote Pocock that the sum of 1,092,500 rupees had been received by the select committee and the council, however, as Mr. Drake the governor of Fort William informed him this was only one half the sum that Mir Ja'far had promised

58. Council of Fort William to Pocock; IO:HM 95/77, October 10, 1757. Also enclosed in Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757.

59. Ibid.

to the committee and the council. Mr. Drake also told Doidge that in his opinion

"Admiral Watson should be esteemed as of the Committee and have an equal share with himself and Colonel Clive, and that he himself would be ready to pay, or refund his Proportion"⁶⁰

which must have surprised Pocock no little since the governor and council had written the very reverse of these feelings to him on October 10.

Evidently Governor Drake reconsidered his airy promise to Doidge and Doidge wrote that the following day when he attended the council's meeting that he was surprised

"to find by a receipt which he Governor Drake had drawn out and put into my hand to read and sign, that 'twas true he was ready to pay Mr Watson's Estate a Proportion of the half he had already received, but upon the condition only that I would by this Receipt acquit him from paying the other future one half of all Claims and Pretensions from Mr Watson's Family relative to that half..."⁶¹

And although Doidge remonstrated with him on the patent unfairness of this, he could get no other satisfaction from the governor than "that upon those terms only was he ready to pay."⁶²

As a result of this firm stand by the governor, Doidge left without claiming any part, and appealed to Pocock to

60. Doidge to Pocock; IO:HM 95/81, October 30, 1757.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

carry on the struggle. Having collected a partial sum⁶³ for Watson's family, Pocock was happy to find excuses for not entering into a further correspondence with the determined governor and council and sent Doidge home with copies of all the letters that had concerned the affair that were in his possession.

It was with obvious relief that Pocock turned to the more pressing problems of his squadron. On December 12th the Triton returned from her cruise with the welcome information that the Queenborough, frigate had arrived at Fort St. George and the news that Commodore Stevens' squadron was not far away. This was partially confirmed in a letter from the council at Bombay which mentioned that four English men of war had just arrived, which certainly could be Stevens.

However, the Bridgewater had not returned as yet and so Pocock still remained in doubt as to the French intentions. Moreover, the seamen of the squadron continued to be sick in great numbers (over 400 still remaining at the hospital at Calcutta) but Pocock hoped that in a short time it would be possible to take them on board as he felt the air on the Coromandel coast would aid in their recovery. As a step

63. "A List of those who have given me the Sums as against their names exprest, Account of the late Adml. Watson:

Col. Clive	13,300
Mr Watts	12,000
Mr Manningham	12,000
Mr Boddam	4,670

Rs 41,970

Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, November 18, 1757.

towards this goal, he moved the Tyger and Cumberland down the river to Ingerlee⁶⁴ and planned to move the Salisbury down very soon.

The ships had all been cleaned as well as possible but the Cumberland's leak had increased and she now made thirty-two inches of water every two hours in the river. Pocock had doubts as to whether she would last through the coming summer.⁶⁵

Three days later (January 13) the long awaited letter from Commodore Stevens arrived. Stevens informed Pocock that he had a commission from the Admiralty appointing him a vice admiral of the white and other letters and orders that he did not care to risk sending for fear of capture.⁶⁶

On January 22d the long-awaited Bridgewater arrived in the river. She had looked up and down the Coromandel coast as far south as Merqui but had seen no sign of the French. Concluding from this information that the French had retired to the Islands⁶⁷ Pocock sent the Queenborough up to Calcutta

64. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 10, 1757, Tyger, at Ingerlee; Pocock to Pitt: IO:HM 95/89, January 10, 1757, Tyger, at Ingerlee.
Ingerlee: a town near the mouth of the Ganges.
65. Ibid.
66. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/95, January 13, 1758, Tyger, at Ingerlee; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 13, 1758, Tyger, at Ingerlee.
67. This was the usual term applied to the French base at Mauritias.

to clean with orders to rejoin him at Fort St. George as quickly as she could. He then sailed with his squadron⁶⁸ from Ingerlee and arrived in Fort St. George Road February 23d.

There the select committee passed on to him what intelligence they had of the French squadron which was supposed to be fitting out at Port L'Orient. Twelve of the French company's ships, six large ships of war and two frigates, all under the command of the new governor of the French settlements, M. Lally, were expected any day.

A few days later a letter came from Stevens saying that he had sailed from Bombay on January 21 and that he had seen no sign of the French on the Malabar coast. On March 12 and on March 24 Commodore Stevens joined Pocock with the remainder of the squadron.⁶⁹ He was now up to strength and the enemy had not caught him with his force divided, although what force there was seemed to Pocock to be a very shaky matter.

"The Old Ships will not be capable of continuing abroad longer than this year; the Cumberland has a constant leak in her Garboard Streak, her frame grown weak and much fallen; the Salisbury has the same complaint and the Bridgewater is very weak.

68. Tyger (60), Salisbury (50), Cumberland (56), Triton (24), Bridgewater (24), Queenborough (24) cleaning at Calcutta.

69. Yarmouth (64), Newcastle (50), Weymouth (60), and Elizabeth (64).

The Tyger is the best of the four but is in general weak." 70

Pocock was alarmed when he considered meeting the French in battle with ships that were structurally weak and undermanned. In writing to Pitt and Cleveland, he mentioned his depleted crews and urged them to send replacements as soon as they could.

70. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/99, March 13, 1758, Tyger, Fort St. George Road; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 13, 1758, Tyger, Fort St. George Road.

71. "State and condition of His Majesty's Squadron in the East Indies, Fort St. George Road, March 13, 1758.

Name	Complement	Mustered	Condition
<u>Tyger</u> (60)	400	267	Fit For Sea
<u>Cumberland</u> (66)	520	405	Leaky
<u>Salisbury</u> (50)	300	229	Fit For Sea
<u>Queenborough</u> (24)	160	150	Fit For Sea
<u>Triton</u> (24)	160	123	Fit For Sea
<u>Bridgewater</u> (24)	160	120	Fit For Sea
<u>Yarmouth</u> (64)	520	500	Fit For Sea
<u>Newcastle</u> (50)	350	320	Fit For Sea
<u>Weymouth</u> (60)	420	393	Fit For Sea
<u>Elizabeth</u> (60)	495	416	Leaky and Mast

Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/107, March 13, 1758; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 13, 1758. repaired on shore "

IV

East Indian Waters: Pocock and D'Ache

The British strategic situation on the Coromandel coast was far from good. Madras lay to the northward and leeward of both Pondichery and Carical,¹ the chief French ports. It was expected by the British that the French would make Fort St. David their first objective since it was so close to Pondichery and so easily approached from sea by the French forces at Mauritius. Pocock and Stevens, unless they left Madras immediately, would have no chance to save the settlement.

From March 24th to April 16, 1758 the two British commanders worked to make their ships ready for sea. They drew on the stores and supplies available at Madras for everything that contributed to this end. Then, with all done that could be done in that short time, Pocock hoisted his flag on board the Yarmouth. On the morning of April 17th the squadron sailed out of Madras Roads on a south-easterly course.² Pocock's plan was to secure a position to windward of Fort

1. Carical or Karrical: 10°55'N, 79°51'E, located 8 miles northward of Negapatam.

2. PRO:Adm. 51/1090 (Log of HMS Yarmouth), April 17, 1758; Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM-95/191, July 22, 1758

St. David to intercept any French force at sea intent on taking that place. To do this necessitated making a heavy beat southward, but Pocock handled his squadron so well that he reached the head of Ceylon in ten days.

Unfortunately, his fine effort was useless for he was too late. Unseen in the night, the French squadron had passed him and on April 28th anchored before Fort St. David. There two British frigates³ were surprised at anchor in the roads. Their captains, who saw escape was impossible, ran the ships ashore, burned them, and added their crews to the garrison of the Fort. This French squadron⁴ was under the command of Antoine, Count d'Ache, and he in turn was under the orders of Lieutenant-General Thomas Arthur Lally, Baron Tollendal, Count Lally⁶ who was accompanying the squadron as

3. Triton (24) and Bridgewater (24)
4. Bien Aime (58), Vengeur (54), Conde (44), Duc d'Orleans (56), Zodiaque (74), St. Louis (50), Moras (44), Sylphide (36), Duc de Bourgogne (60), Comte de Provence (74), Diligente (24).
5. Commodore Anne-Antoine, Count d'Ache (1702?-1780). Entered the navy in 1717 and made his first campaign in the West Indies in 1718. Was present at Louisburg in 1745 and served under Conflans in 1756; rose to rank of vice admiral in the French navy. Most biographies present him as an incompetent (cf: "L'un des marins les plus incapables de l'epoque de Louis XV..."M. Berthelot et al., La Grande Encyclopedie, Paris n.d., I, 378) officer and the chief cause for the loss of the French possessions in India.
6. Thomas Arthur Lally, Baron Tollendal, Count Lally (1702-1766). A distinguished and hot-headed soldier of Irish descent. At age of eight served with father, Sir Gerard Lally, commanding the Irish regiment in the French army at the Seige of Gerone. Joined the establishment of James III and was sent to St. Petersburg to try and gain support for

a passenger with 4,000 troops and four million francs. Lt. Genl. Lally bore a commission as governor-general and commissary-general signed and attested by both the French government and the French East India Company. His instructions were simple; to drive the English into the sea. Commodore d'Ache was to aid in this design by furnishing naval support to Lally's military forces,⁷ and his instructions specifically assigned him and his squadron to the support of the army of General Lally in its operations towards this end.

The French had had a slow passage. D'Ache had sailed from Brest on March 5, 1757.⁸ On July 23d he had anchored at Rio de Janeiro because the seamen and soldiers were suffering from fever. Only on September 23d was D'Ache able to leave Rio de Janeiro and then many of his crews were still ill. By December 17 he reached Mauritius, the main French naval base in the Indian Ocean, where he joined Bouvet's

Jacobite cause. Made a brigadier on field of Fontenoy by Louis XV. Served as chief of staff for the proposed expedition under the Duc de Richelieu to establish Prince Charles Edward on the British throne in 1745. Present at Battle of Falkirk. Decapitated in Paris, May 9, 1766.

7. "Memoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au sieur d'Ache chef d'escadre des armees navales" and "Memoire pour servir d'instruction particuliere au sieur d'Ache" paraphrased in Dictionnaire de biographie Francaise 3 vols (Paris 1933--), I, 43. These instructions and orders set D'Ache's main tasks as three: To reinforce and supply Pondichery, to take Cuddalore (Fort St. David), and to capture Madras. Nowhere in his instructions is there any mention of gaining control of the sea.
8. Dictionnaire de biographie Francaise, I.

squadron which had come out earlier. Because the monsoon was against them, it was not until April 23, 1758 that the combined squadrons sighted Ceylon, and five days later anchored in Fort St. David's Roads.

The following morning, April 29th, General Lally went northward to Pondichery with the Comte de Provence (74) and the Diligente (24) to take up his duties, while Commodore d'Ache prepared to bombard Fort St. David. While these two ships were still in sight of Fort St. David, Admiral Pocock's squadron appeared over the southern horizon, his ships running before the wind, and the signal for general chase whipping from the Yarmouth's yard arms.⁹

D'Ache weighed, stood out to sea, and signalled to recall the two detached ships. Pocock held on in the disorder of general chase until he was within a league¹⁰ of the French squadron which had formed a line of battle. Then in

9. "At 10.30 AM the Admiral hoisted a Blue Flag in the Mizzen Shrouds with a Blue Pendant at the Mizzen Peak and fired one gun as a signal to chase to Leeward" PRO:Adm. 51/994 (Log of HMS Tyger). In the accounts of the battle in the log books of the British ships engaged, the date of the engagement is noted as April 30, 1758. This is because log books in the British navy were divided into a twenty-four hour period from 12 noon to 12 noon. So that every date is 12 hours in advance of the ordinary calendar date. Thus by the logs D'Ache was sighted early the morning of the 29th and the battle took place the afternoon of the 30th. Where by calendar notation the whole action occurred on the 29th.
10. League, about three miles.

accordance with the "Fighting Instructions" ¹¹ Pocock hoisted the signal for the line of battle and steered on a converging course with that of the enemy.

It was not until 2:45 in the afternoon that all the ships in the British line were in their proper positions ¹² and about three o'clock, Pocock made the signal for each ship to bear down upon the enemy ship opposite it. However the two leading ships, the Salisbury and the Tyger did not bear down with the others as the Tyger had overlapped the French van and if she had backed her topsails to correct this error, she would have fouled the Salisbury. ¹³ After some time the two leading ships got correctly aligned with their opponents, and a little after three o'clock Pocock made the signal for a general engagement.

Although the French ships had opened a desultory fire, as the British line began to run down towards them, Pocock did not make his signal for engaging until the two squadrons were only a hundred yards apart. ¹⁴

11. Article XIX: "If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and then to engage them." See Appendix IV.
12. They were to keep half a cable or 100 yards distant from each other.
13. PRO:Adm. 51/994 (Log of HMS Tyger), Sunday, April 30, 1758; PRO:Adm. 51/843 (Log of HMS Salisbury), Sunday, April 30, 1758.
14. "The French began to fire on us as we went down; but I did not make the signal to engage... until we were within half-musket shot" Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/191, July 22, 1759. One man was killed by a musket shot from the French line on the Tyger and

The first broadside of the British forced the Sylphide out of the French line and a few minutes later the Duc de Conde and the Duc de Bourgogne withdrew with damage, but the rest of the French squadron closed up the gaps and opened an intense fire directed mainly at the masts and rigging of their opponents. Shortly after making the signal for a close engagement, Pocock noticed the three last ships of his squadron, the Cumberland, Newcastle and Weymouth, were well out of the action. He made signals to all three ships to come to a closer action, but these ships were unable to comply with the admiral's orders and throughout the action remained at some distance from both the rest of their own squadron and that of the enemy.¹⁵ This gap in the British line was observed by D'Ache who signalled his rearmost ships to attempt to double the British.¹⁶ Well-

two were wounded on the Yarmouth before the signal to open fire was given. PRO:Adm. 51/994 (Log of HMS Tyger), Sunday, April 30 1758; PRO:Adm. 51/1090 (Log of HMS Yarmouth), Sunday, April 30, 1758.

15. This was mainly due to the fact that the Cumberland who was ahead of the Newcastle and Weymouth was a notoriously bad sailor. She had not been cleaned for nearly 14 months and the great size and weight of the marine growth that had accumulated on the bottom of her hull further retarded her speed. The captains of the Newcastle and Weymouth were strictly enjoined by the "Fighting Instructions" never to break the line, so that they could not sail around the slower Cumberland and close the gap between themselves and the Yarmouth.
16. Doubling the opponent's line was a classical manoeuvre of the 18th century much as crossing the "T" was to be for a later period. It simply consisted of one line, splitting and enveloping both sides of the enemy.

served guns and agile maneuvering on the part of Pocock and Stevens prevented D'Ache from succeeding, and about 4:30 p.m. D'Ache, in the Zodiaque, turned away, out of the French line and ran down to the Sylohide, the Duc de Conde and the Duc de Bourgogne. This "turn-away" was followed by each of the French line astern of the Zodiaque, who sailed up abreast of the Yarmouth and gave her a broadside before joining the other French ships. A few minutes later the French van followed their admiral. About four miles away from the scene of the action, the French formed a new line of battle standing to the west towards Pondichery.

Although about 6 p.m. Pocock made the signal for the general chase, the Yarmouth, Elizabeth, Tyger, and Salisbury were so badly damaged in the masts, yards, and rigging that not much more than steerage-way could be kept on them. Pocock, with his crippled ships, followed the rapidly disappearing French as best he could, steering to the south-west and keeping to the windward. As he expected to engage in the morning, working parties repaired the running-gear of the crippled ships, and a watch was kept for the French throughout the night. The next morning nothing was seen of the French squadron, and, they having shown no lights during the night, Pocock concluded they had weathered him and run for the north.

He continued to work up after them and by May 1st reached Sadras where he sent ashore for news. Here Pocock

was informed that the French had had to run the Bien Aime (64) aground a little to the south of Allemparve¹⁷ because she had received so much damage during the action. It was rumored that another of the French squadron was sunk, and that the remainder were at anchor at Allemparve.¹⁸

Although Pocock doubted that a second French ship had been lost there was something to be pleased about. From French and Dutch sources he learned that D'Ache had had the greater part of Lally's troops on board the ships during the battle. The Dutch estimate said the French had lost 600 killed and Pocock was convinced had he been able to maintain the action a little longer the French losses would have even been greater.¹⁹ But while this was comforting news, the unpleasant fact was that the French ships were not destroyed and were capable even in their present condition to outsail Pocock's vessels. There could be no doubt as to their ultimate destination; Fort St. David, where they had first been surprised. While masts were being fished, rigging re-rove, and shot-holes plugged, Pocock sent an officer with news of

17. Allemparve: a French fort located about 22 miles north of Pondichery.
Sadras: a Dutch factory close to Madras.
18. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, July 22, 1758, Yarmouth, in Madras Road.
19. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/191, July 22, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, July 22, 1759. Actually the French lost 162 killed and 360 wounded in the action. Pocock's own losses were 118 killed and wounded.

the battle to the select committee of Fort St. George with a request that all the seamen in the hospital there might be sent to the fleet at once. By the 7th of May, 120 white seamen and 87 lascars joined the squadron bringing the crews up to strength. Then, with the most outstanding damage repaired, Pocock tried to work up the coast to Fort St. David. After three days of slight breezes, long calms, and no progress towards his objective, Pocock altered course to south-east and got down as far as Lat. 9°30'S. However, by the 26th of May the wind freshened from the west and the Cumberland made so much water that Pocock was forced to keep the Weymouth beside her constantly for fear she would founder. The next day he received news that the French were besieging Fort St. David and that D'Ache's squadron lay in Pondichery Road.

By May 30th, Pocock was off Pondichery with the Cumberland behaving badly as the wind increased in velocity. The French squadron lay at anchor under the batteries of the town,²⁰ exhausted and certainly not in an aggressive spirit. However, the morning of the 1st, D'Ache, with 8 ships of the line and a frigate, weighed, stood out of the harbor, but

20. "As soon as the British squadron were descried by the enemy, M. d'Ache called a Council of war, composed of his Captains, and the Governor and Council of Pondichery; whose opinion was, that it was expedient for the squadron to remain moored as close to the shore as possible, that they might receive the assistance of the batteries facing the sea in case they should be attacked" Beatson, II, 196.

avoided Pocock and sailed towards the south. Pocock's battered fleet could not keep up and so he lost sight of them. On June 6, a letter came from Fort St. George informing him that Fort St. David had fallen to the French and requesting him to return to Fort St. George for its better protection. On the same day, Pocock brought his squadron back to water and to refit.

The situation that prompted the letter of June 6th urging Pocock's recall to Fort St. George was a serious one. Lally had begun an energetic campaign upon his arrival at Pondichery. The nearest British position, Fort St. David, had fallen on June 2 after only an indifferent defense, and the position of the British on the Coromandel coast seemed grave.

"The loss of Fort St. David was severely felt by the East India Company; and, from the great military force of the enemy...they had reason to apprehend the loss of all their settlements on the coast of Coromandel. The Governor and Council of Madras, however, took every precaution that human prudence could suggest, to frustrate M. Lally's designs. They raised some new companies of Sepoys; entered into new alliances with the country powers; and strengthened, by every means in their power, their old friendships."²¹

Despite these efforts, Madras was in a poor condition for defense. The fortifications were incomplete and divided counsels made friction rather than harmony the order of the day. After the conquest of Fort St. David, the French seemed

21. Beatson, II, 199.

to be in the best of possible positions for completing their task of driving the British out of India. A successful siege of Madras would make the Coromandel coast untenable for Pocock's squadron since all his bases would be denied him. Then it would be quite easy for Lally to complete the work by overturning the British control of Bengal.

On Pocock's return to Madras his ships were watered and small repairs that were possible with the limited facilities available there were made. At the same time, Pocock ordered courts martial held on the three captains of the Cumberland, Newcastle and Weymouth for their conduct in the action of April 29th. These courts martial were held on board the Elizabeth throughout the rest of June and into July.

Admiral Charles Stevens was the president and the rest of the court was composed of the captains of the squadron. The court found that Captain Vincent should be dismissed from the command of the Weymouth, Captain Legge of the Newcastle should be cashiered and that Captain Porenton who commanded the Cumberland in the absence of Captain Martin, who was sick on shore, should be sentenced to lose one year's rank as post captain. Brushing aside the court's recommendation for clemency, Pocock confirmed the sentences and wrote to Pitt:

"Sorry I am beyond expression! That any officer under my command should have failed in the most material part of his duty that he owes to his Majesty and to his country."²²

22. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/191, July 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

While the courts martial were taking place, Pocock attended meetings of the governor and select committee of Fort St. George to plan strategy for the coming months. The final meeting of the committee on June 26, 1758²³ decided to have Pocock's squadron take station in sight of Pondichery Road while the French squadron remained there. There was violent discussion as to whether Pocock's ships should take station to windward or leeward of Pondichery, but in the end, the choice was left to the admiral.²⁴

Pocock informed the members of the committee that he shortly intended to send the Queenborough to England to carry to the ministry an account of the strategic situation on the Coromandel coast and asked the committee for its opinions. In reply the members of the committee summed up the situation as exceedingly dangerous; the French were believed to have four thousand European soldiers at Pondichery and the committee had reason to believe that the French expected an additional reinforcement of one thousand men. Accompanying this body of troops, French warships were expected which would give the French a strength much superior to that which Pocock possessed. As opposed to this force of

23. The committee was composed of the Governor George Pigot, Stringer Lawrence, Robert Orme, Henry Powney, Robert Palk and Admiral Pocock. The deliberations are completely reported in IO:HM 95 and PRO:Adm. 1/161.
24. Council of War IO:HM 95/201, June 26, 1758, Fort St. George; PRO:Adm. 1/161, June 26, 1758.

the enemy, the garrison of Madras was composed of only twelve hundred European soldiers and thirty-five hundred native levies. To hold Madras, it would be necessary for the ministry in England to send out a strong reinforcement of both ships and men. There could be no thought of abandoning Madras, for it was the only bulwark to French expansion along the Coromandel coast and to the newly conquered area of Bengal. All this information Pocock rushed off to England with a request that it be acted upon immediately, then he prepared his squadron for sea. On July 25th the British ships left Madras Roads and stood to the southward along the shoreline until the evening of the 26th when they were off Allemparve. There Pocock saw a snow and seven chelingas²⁵ lying under the guns of the fort. These vessels were soon identified as French, and Pocock sent the boats of the squadron in to take or destroy them. The chelingas were burned but the snow, loaded with firewood for Pondichery, was brought off safely and the squadron continued its progress to the southward.²⁶

By the evening of the 27th Pocock was within sight of Pondichery Road where the French squadron was seen at anchor. At 10 o'clock the following morning they weighed and stood

25. Chelinga: A double ended barge used extensively along the Coromandel coast for transshipping goods from large ships to shore through the surf.
26. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/221, August 22, 1758; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 22, 1758, Yarmouth, off Carical.

out of the harbor²⁷ to the south away from Pocock's squadron. Pocock made the signal for the general chase but the French were able to keep away and avoid action. On the morning of the 29th, Pocock found them anchored a little to the south of Porta Nova,²⁸ but the French weighed and stood out to sea, sailing so rapidly that Pocock soon lost sight of them. But as partial recompense for losing sight of the French fleet a French ship was sighted about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, which was run aground by her crew about four leagues north of Porta Nova. Pocock sent boats in to see who she was and whether it would be practicable to get her off. She proved to be the Restitution bound to Pondichery from Carical, but it was impossible to refloat her, so Pocock burned her.²⁹

On the morning of the 1st of August the French squadron was sighted getting under sail off Tranquambar, but it was not until 1:30 p.m. on the 3d that the two fleets began an action. A running fight which followed the pattern of the earlier engagements, was the result. The French eventually fled, even cutting away their boats to give them more speed, as they ran straight to Pondichery.

27. Comte de Provence (74), Conde (50), Duc D'Orleans (60), Zodiaque (74), St. Louis (64), Duc de Bourgogne (60), Moras (50), Vengeur (64), Diligente (24).

28. Porta Nova: a Dutch factory about 13 miles south of Cuddalore.

29. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 22, 1758, Yarmouth, off Carical.

About 8 o'clock in the evening Pocock anchored off Carical where temporary repairs were made. The damage to the British squadron was mostly in the masts and rigging and the casualties were relatively light.³⁰ The French, Pocock had reason to believe, had had many killed and wounded. Some reports said a total of a thousand men and their commander Monsieur D'Ache, wounded as well. While the squadron was making its repairs, Pocock kept the Queenborough cruising off Carical Road since the admiral felt that the location would be the most valuable for intercepting French ships and protecting those of the company. This foresight was rewarded on August 5th, when the Ruby, snow was brought in to the squadron as a prize. Bound from the French base at Mauritius to Pondichery, she was loaded chiefly with shot and medicines, and had on board as passengers three officers in Lally's regiment and an ensign belonging to the Zodiaque. These officers had been left at Mauritius to recover from illness contracted on their passage from France and were just joining their respective organizations. They informed Pocock that the Centaur (64) with some other ships were at Mauritius, but there were not enough men to bring these vessels to the Coromandel coast. Thus Pocock learned that his opponent was in an extremely weak position. The French officers he exchanged for the captains and first lieutenants

30. Thirty were killed and one hundred and sixteen were wounded, among the latter was Commodore Stevens.

of the Triton and Bridgewater who had been captured at Fort St. David.³¹

On August 30th another French snow from the Isle of France was captured and her crew informed Pocock that the Centaur, Duc de Berry, Sechelle and four or five country vessels were all at Mauritius refitting but with so few sailors that the work was going slowly.

By September 3d, the French squadron at Pondichery sailed for the Islands and on September 25th Pocock returned to Madras. The latest and most accurate reports he had of the French losses in the late battle amounted to five hundred and forty killed and wounded and two of his ships very badly beaten about.

Pocock learned that the British ministry were preparing to send him reinforcements, which he expected sometime in December. He planned to take his own squadron around to Bombay for a complete refit during the early part of October when the change of the monsoon made the Coromandel coast a poor risk for his ships. However, he left orders for the commander of the expected reinforcement to winter at Anjengo as he "considered it to be of very dangerous consequences... [for no ships to be near the Coromandel coast] in case the French squadron should get here before me."³² The condition

31. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 22, 1758, Yarmouth, off Carical.

32. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/233, October 9, 1758, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

of his own squadron after a year of hard campaigning was as good as could be expected, but much needed to be done. The Cumberland and the Salisbury leaked badly and were in great need of cleaning, but Pocock thought it possible to make them fit for another season "by which means notwithstanding the enemy may have a greater number of ships we probably shall be able to maintain the Superiority of Naval Power."³³ The problem of men was a crucial one. Just before leaving Madras for his last cruise he had asked the governor and council if they could not aid him by transferring some of the crews of three India ships, then in the harbor, into his squadron. But the governor and council could only say

"It gives us great concern that the want of sufficient authority to oblige the commanders of those ships to part with any of their complements puts it out of our power to Comply with your request."

Pocock, undaunted by this refusal, wrote Pitt that "I then desired the Captains to bring me their books and took only 20 men from each ship."³⁴ But this served only as a temporary stopgap; what was needed was a large reinforcement of seamen to keep his crews up to strength. Naval officers had been broken for less than he had done; the power and influence of the East India Company was great and their

33. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/233, October 9, 1758, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

34. Ibid.

memory was long. Yet Pocock knew that without reinforcement he would be unable to get some of his ships out of harbor; and intelligence he had of D'Ache's ships in the Islands showed him what he might expect if he did not take active steps to prevent this contingency from arising.

On the 11th of October the squadron sailed for Bombay where it arrived on the 25th after a quiet and uneventful passage.³⁵ Before leaving Madras Pocock landed 105 officers and men of the squadron's complement of marines to aid in the defense of Madras should Lally initiate an offensive while Pocock was at Bombay. The men were paid and fed at the company's expense until the British squadron reappeared on the Coromandel coast after the monsoon.³⁶ On the squadron's arrival at Bombay, Pocock was delighted to see six East India ships with British troops on board escorted by the Grafton (68) and Sunderland (60). This welcome reinforcement, Pocock decided to send immediately to Madras escorted by the Queenborough and two of the company's frigates which sailed December 18 for that town.

Although news had reached the British admiral that a third division of French ships had arrived at Mauritius, Pocock felt the risk of having the troops taken at sea by

35. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/241, December 7, 1758, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, December 7, 1758, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
36. President and Council of Fort St. George to Court of Directors; PRO:Adm. 1/3912, July 28, 1759.

French raiders was slight, but had the Grafton and Sunderland been sent as escort and been captured the damage to the squadron's strength would be severe, if not complete.³⁷

It was extremely likely that the French naval strength would increase and Pocock was not at all sure about the final condition of his own squadron.

"It is very uncertain if we will be able to carry the Cumberland out of this harbour being apprehensive it will take more than time to make her fit for a Summer's Cruise..."³⁸

There was not a sufficient number of workmen at Bombay in Pocock's opinion and as he wrote Pitt

"I expected on my arrival here the Dock would have been fit to take in the largest ship but I find the corner of a Bastion is not yet removed which obstructs their going in; neither are the gates ready..."

Therefore he did not expect to be able to dock any ship larger than those of 50 guns "and not certain as to them." For the rest of the squadron the lower deck masts would be prepared in order to make them "fit for a heave down by" so that what scraping was necessary could be done. Mast timber

37. "From all that information I thought it would not have been proper to have sent the Grafton and the Sunderland with the convoy as there is not any possibility of the Enemy's having a force on the coast able to oppose the three frigates before they arrive with their convoy at Madras. But it is possible that the French squadron may intercept them off Ceylon in their return to join me which if it would happen would not be of very material loss to the squadron but if it were the Grafton and Sunderland the loss would be irreparable." Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/241, December 7, 1758, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

38. Pocock to Pitt; Ibid.

was virtually non-existent at Bombay, and yards and masts could only be fished and spliced.

By the 19th the Queenborough and the Newcastle had entered the dock at Bombay, and although Pocock seemed convinced that only the Salisbury would be able to follow, the other ships of the squadron were strengthening their masts for careening and the Yarmouth was prepared for cleaning.³⁹

By the end of January the Tyger and Salisbury had been docked and the Yarmouth and Elizabeth had been careened. In about four days' time the Weymouth's masts would be strengthened enough so that she could be careened. On the night of the 30th January the Cumberland was eased into dock. Having had her poop deck cut down and her head taken off, Pocock hoped to make her fit for one year's more service. Although it would be another month before the Cumberland would be ready to come out of the dock, Pocock was well satisfied with the progress made so far. The only pressing need now was for time--time to refit the squadron and get to sea. Pocock hoped to be ready to leave Bombay as soon as the Cumberland came out of the dock, and to sail immediately for Madras.

"I hope to be able to proceed to the Coast of Coromandel where there is very great occasion for me. M. Lally has besieged Fort St. George as you will see from the enclosed abstracts..."

39. Pocock to Pitt; 10:EM 95/249, December 19, 1758, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

Further news arrived at Bombay to confirm Pocock's earlier belief that D'Aché had or would soon receive a reinforcement of ships from France. The total number of French ships in the Islands being twenty-three. How many of these were capable of being manned and sailed to the Coromandel coast in the spring he, of course, had no way of knowing. But he shrewdly suspected that the French commander was in a poor position as far as the supply of seamen available to him went.

In point of fact, D'Aché's position was now disastrous. After the second engagement with Pocock "all the French repair stores at Pondichery were used up...and[D'Aché] had ... had to retreat all the way to Mauritius."⁴⁰ Mauritius had deteriorated as a naval base because of the neglect and maladministration of the French officials responsible for its upkeep, and the peculiar apathy of the French government at home who looked upon all colonial expense as needless. While the British yard at Bombay could build and dock even a 74 and its reserves in stores and supplies were ample and good, at Mauritius every kind of supply was deficient, even provisions. D'Aché was driven to cannibalize his ships in order to get a squadron available for action. Thus, although he had received a reinforcement from France, he was unable

40. Admiral G. A. Ballard "The First and Second Anglo-French Conflicts in the Indian Ocean", The Mariner's Mirror, The Journal of the Society for Nautical Research, (Cambridge University Press 1911-) vol XIII, (1927) pp 14-37.

to return to the Bay of Bengal until late summer 1759, and even then it was only a weak and make-shift naval force.

Although Pocock could not know this, he shrewdly guessed something of it.

"You will also find by Major Cailland's letter the Enemies Third Division consisting of 10 ships with the Regiment of Rouerge on board are certainly arrived at the Islands, which, together with M. D'Aché's squadron and the 3 ships at the Mauritiias make in all 23 ships; but I am apt to believe that he will not be able to bring with him above 16 sail of the line properly manned and a few frigates; however I shall put in practice all possible efforts with His Majesty's Squadron under My Command to oppose the Enemy, frustrate their designs against the Company's Settlements"⁴¹

Meanwhile, aware that Lally had begun his siege of Madras in earnest work was rushed to completion on the remainder of the British squadron at Bombay.⁴² For the dockyard and its manager, Pocock had nothing but praise.

"Bombay is now a very good Commodious Port to refit our Ships, and will be better next year, with regard to the Dock; the Superintendant, Mr. Hough, being a dilligent, active, and skillful man in his office, both with respect to the King's and the Company's Affairs, proof of the former he has shown to demonstration whenever we have had occassion to require his Service and he intends to have a Particular Attention to render the Dock further serviceable by next Year."⁴³

41. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/253, January 31, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 31, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
42. The full account of the repairs made to Pocock's squadron are to be found in the Dockyard memorandum entered in IO:HM 95/261.
43. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

Towards the end of March the repairs necessary for Pocock's squadron to keep the sea for another season were nearly completed. The Cumberland, which had given the squadron, not to speak of her unfortunate commanders, so much trouble was immensely benefited by having her poop cut down and her head taken off. Her stay in dry dock enabled the carpenters and fitters to seal her leaks and make her a tight ship for the first time since her original launching.⁴⁴ Pocock felt that by the end of March or "at the farthest in the first week of April" the squadron would be ready to leave Bombay, "so that probably we shall arrive on the other Coast about the 20th as the winds will be favourable all the way."⁴⁵

The last letters Pocock received from the governor and council of Madras spoke of a successful resistance to Lally's siege

"...the Gentlemen add that they have the pleasure to see the whole Garrison do their duty with the utmost Chearfullness and Spirit, that their Loss was much less than it might have been expected from so long a Seige and so warm a fire...they conclude with hoping their efforts will be attended with such success as to oblige the Enemy to raise the Seige."⁴⁶

44. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
45. Same to Same, Ibid.
46. Governor and Council of Fort St. George to Pocock; IO:Madras Public Consultations, January 26, 1759; Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

This information, and the knowledge that a large reinforcement was expected from England⁴⁷ led Pocock to believe that Lally's siege could be contained and was an affair of little moment. More important, from intercepted French letters,⁴⁸ it was apparent that there existed a radical division of opinion in the minds of the French commanders as to the proper course of the campaign. Lally was high-handed and had taken few pains to disguise his opinions of his subordinates and confreres. He was disgusted with what he called D'Aché's cowardice. After the French naval officer retired from the Bay of Bengal to Mauritius to repair his shattered fleet he had pinned all his hopes on the conquest of Madras. Pocock felt that,

"It is certain the number of men M. Lally sat down with before Fort St George was not to be supposed Sufficient by the General Rules of War to conquer it, unless some unforeseen accident should happen..."⁴⁹

Especially was this so when news, in the form of a letter dated February 26, 1759, from a "Shroff belonging to Madras who has retired on this occasion about 5 days Journey from

47. T. Grey to Joseph York; BM:Add.Mss 35,376, f 43, Thursday, May 29, 1759. "Lord Anson added (I believe from some other letter) that Cornish had joined him [Pocock] or would join him in a few days after the date of this letter"
48. Enclosed in Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1758 and Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
49. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759 and Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

thence"⁵⁰ gave an account that eight English ships "were arrived" and had landed 1100 men and

"drove the French from their Batterys had killed several Officers of distinction and obliged M. Lally to raise the Seige and retreat"⁵¹

Although this account was garbled and sufficiently misleading in itself to cast doubt on the accuracy of the report, especially so since the writer was some five leagues away from the action, Pocock wrote

"We daily expect accounts of this affair from the Gentlemen of Fort St. George, the particulars of which shall be sent by the same conveyance the ship Admiral Watson, if it arrives before my departure from hence [Bombay] she being detained for that purpose. M. Lally seems on this occasion to have been rash in his attempt which I apprehend no other motive would have induced him to undertake, but the account he received 1 December of Captain Tiddeman with his convoy being arrived at Goa..."⁵²

Although it was too soon to hope for miracles, it was possible that Lally's siege had been frustrated; and if that really was the case, command of the sea had been the deciding factor. That this had been won by Pocock in his two struggles with D'Aché there was ample evidence; for the

50. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759, and Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

51. Same to Same, Ibid.

52. This convoy was the one Pocock found on his arrival at Bombay October 25th, 1758, which he sent ahead to Madras under escort of the Queenborough and the two frigates belonging to the company. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

British reinforcements would never have been able to get to Madras if D'Aché's squadron had not been so badly battered about by Pocock and had been able to leave even a detachment on the Coromandel coast. A local command of the sea would have even more certainly upset Lally's plans and Pocock wrote feelingly to Pitt and Cleveland,

"I make no doubt the Gentlemen of Madras heartily repent their not keeping the Pitt, as she must have proved extremely useful and in all probity prevented the Seige taking place, as Cannon and Warlike Stores were brought by Sea in Country Vessels; had she not been sent away before my return from Cruizing I should have represented the great necessity and usefullness of her Stay as the Gentlemen were fully Satisfied it was not in my Power to leave one Ship of this Squadron, their Condition making it absolutely necessary to proceed to this Place [Bombay] and I have since thought the Pitt's return so very necessary at this Juncture, that I have despatched a letter to Batavia for the Captain to make all possible despatch to the Coast of Coromandel as the General Service requires as much Force as we can collect."⁵³

However much the smaller chances for success had been missed, the major prize was won. "I hope we shall be able in the course of this Summer," wrote Pocock, "to render His Majesty's Arms as respectable by Sea in these Parts as they were last year." Only the lack of troops prevented complete frustration of the French plans on land. But, the seapower that made this possible, being material, was expendable.

53. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor. The Pitt, an armed vessel of the company, was sent to escort the homeward bound China ships, by the council of Fort St. George.

and the Service will require constant Reinforcements sent out...and were the Company Ships built of such dimensions as to carry 50 guns, they would be a match for most of the French with Company's Ships, and I think would answer all Purposes better than keeping to their Present Built [Build], as then we could take them into the Line with the King's Ships, as the French do theirs..."⁵⁴

Pocock felt that at least twelve 3d and 4th rates were the minimum to keep in Indian waters at all times "as the French seem determined to push their Designs to the utmost of their Power in these parts."⁵⁵ Although it was to be some time before either the Admiralty or the East India Company acknowledged the sense of Pocock's proposals for keeping a sufficient squadron permanently in Indian waters, the wisdom of the step was apparent. The suggestion of having the Indiamen lie in the line as the French did was not without merit,⁵⁶ but was never taken up with energy by either the Admiralty or the company. By the 8th of April the Squadron was ready for sea.⁵⁷

54. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/265, March 22, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759; Yarmouth; Bombay Harbor.

55. Same to Same; Ibid. 95/265, March 22, 1759; Pocock to Sunderland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, March 22, 1759; Yarmouth; Bombay Harbor.

56. "In 1804, for example, such a fleet of Indiamen encountered in the China Seas a considerable French Battle-fleet under the command of the by no means inexperienced Admiralinois, and put on so bold a face that he sheered off, taking them for a superior squadron of Royal Navy ships" Michael Lewis, The Navy of Britain, p 111.

57. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/291, April 19, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, April 19, 1759; Yarmouth, off Island of Ceylon, Lat. 6°10'N.

underway⁶⁰ and the complicity of the squadron was necessary for their success. This proposition struck Pocock as fool-hardy in the extreme

"As the French Squadron is expected daily on the Coast the affair of the Surprize can't be executed yet... They [are said to be 4] King's Ships and 8 Company's Ships of the Line with 2 Frigates..."⁶¹

"We keep upon our Guard" Pocock wrote the council of Madras, "and are completing our water." Cruisers are out to give the squadron warning and all ships are ready to "put to sea in order to meet and engage the enemy before they reach Pondichery."⁶² The council at Madras bowed to the admiral's sense and sent him the marines of the squadron,⁶³ who had aided in the defense of Madras, and thirty seamen who had been exchanged by the French. This welcome addition of men brought the strength of the squadron well up and Pocock felt that he was quite well prepared to meet D'Aché.⁶⁴

60. These involved an amphibious operation against the French fort at Carical some eight miles to the north of Negapatam.
61. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/327, May 6, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, May 6, 1759, Yarmouth, Negapatam Road.
62. Same to Same; Ibid.
63. Now reduced from 105 to 88.
64. "State and Condition of His Majesty's Squadron...in the East Indies May 14, 1759"

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Complement</u>	<u>Mustered</u>	<u>Condition</u>
<u>Yarmouth</u>	540	500	
<u>Grafton</u>	535	507	
<u>Elizabeth</u>	480	433	<u>All</u>
<u>Weymouth</u>	420	364	<u>Fit</u>
<u>Sunderland</u>	420	393	<u>For</u>
			<u>Sea</u>

The council of Madras felt much the same way and wrote to the court of directors in London

"Admiral Pocock anchored off negapatam the 30th April with the whole Squadron, the old Ships having been well refitted at Bombay; he keeps that station in order to meet with the French Fleet on their first appearance on this Coast....We hope for everything from His Bravery and Good Conduct."⁶⁵

Pocock remained with his squadron in Negapatam road until June 30th, but his cruisers brought him no news of the expected French squadron. This was unusual because reports, since confirmed, had reached Madras in May, that the last French division had sailed from the Cape of Good Hope on March 24th, and it was known that they carried only three months' provisions on board.⁶⁶ Pocock wrote the council at Madras and asked for the loan of some of the company's ships to use as frigates⁶⁷ since the more fast ships he had the

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Complement</u>	<u>Mustered</u>	<u>Condition</u>
Cumberland	520	487	
Newcastle	350	323	All
Salisbury	350	328	Fit
Tyger	420	397	For
Queenborough	160	103	Sea
Revenge	160	156	
Protector, f/s	114	81	

IO:HM 95/313

65. President and Council of Fort St. George to Court of Directors of the East India Company; PRO:Adm. 1/3912, June 28, 1759.
66. President and Council of Fort St. George to Court of Directors of the East India Company; PRO:Adm. 1/3912, July 28, 1759.
67. "The Admiral represented that some of the Company's Ships joined to him would be of excellent service by reason of his want of Frigates and the Great Number on the Enemy's side,

sooner he could be expected to find the French squadron.

As the time was approaching when the East India ships homeward bound from China might be expected off Ceylon, Pocock sailed on June 30th from Negapatam to cruise off the Friar's Hood⁶⁸ since that was "the most likely station to meet the Enemy in case of their being cruizing for the Outward bound ships."⁶⁹ He was unsuccessful in meeting with any sign of the French squadron, but in a short time after he had taken station off the Friar's Hood the homeward bound China ships began to appear and by July 13, six ships had joined Pocock's squadron. The next day the squadron and its attendant Indiamen watered at Trincomalee Bay⁷⁰ and on the 26th sailed for Negapatam where provisions were waiting the

have sent him Strentham and Duke of Dorset and propose also to send him the Royal George." President and Council of Fort St. George to Court of Directors of the East India Company; PRO:Adm. 1/3912, July 28, 1759.

68. Friar's Hood (7°26'N, 81°30'E): a hill located behind Batticaloa Roads, usually the first prominent landmark to be distinguished on the Island of Ceylon when coming from the northward as it attains an elevation of 2,148 feet.
69. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/335, August 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 12, 1759, Yarmouth, off Pondichery.
70. This bay and the harbor of the same name "is the only sheltered natural harbor, not only in Ceylon, but in the entire Indian Peninsula." Sailing Directions for the West Coast of India, Hydrographic Office Number 159, (Washington, 1942), p. 83.

squadron, having been sent there in the Strentham and Duke of Dorset from Madras. On August 3d the squadron sailed, again, this time to take station off Pondichery, where Pocock intended to cruise until he sighted the enemy.⁷¹

71. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/335, August 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 12, 1759, Yarmouth, off Pondichery.



General Map of
INDIA,
including the Empire of
HINDOSTAN,
with the
HISTORY of AFGHANISTAN,
and the adjacent Countries,
1778.

INDIA
AND
NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES

East Indian Waters: Conclusion

Although Pocock expected the French squadron at any moment to appear before Pondichery there was a chance that D'Ache had split up his ships into small detachments to act as commerce raiders. Pocock wrote to Pitt and Cleveland that although it was the greatest satisfaction to be able to tell them that British "arms both by sea and land in these parts have been successful" it was, in Pocock's opinion, doubtful if something didn't happen to mar the record. The French were ominously quiet; no sign of their squadron was to be seen, and the British East India Company's trade was too widely scattered for the squadron to protect completely,

"Since the Company can't lay by their Trade to China for one year, I am really Apprehensive there is a great likelihood they will suffer by persisting in sending their Ships this year from the Coast [of India] to China...as the French may have Cruizers in all the different Straits, through which they must pass, which I think more than probable may be the case and more so Especially since M. D'Aché has not made his appearance on the Coast this Season."¹

To strengthen further his squadron Pocock kept with him several company ships that had troops on board. If an

1. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/335, August 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 12, 1759, Yarmouth, off Pondichery.

action took place, these would be useful as extra marines, or even to fill up gaps in the crews of the worst-hit ships. The Elizabeth, Tyger and Salisbury were leaky but the remainder of the squadron were "in general in a better condition for all services than they have ever been before in India."²

On the 8th of August a new development in the strategic situation occurred which increased the pressure of events on the British admiral. Six Dutch ships from Batavia arrived at Negapatam loaded with troops and warlike stores. Pocock received intelligence from Negapatam that the Dutch intended sending the troops to Bengal to settle a dispute with the nabob that had arisen over the latter's refusal to allow the Dutch to export saltpetre and opium from his territories. Pocock was puzzled as to the meaning of the Dutch movement and wrote several express letters to Madras, mentioning in one that,

"I shall enquire of Baron von Eck, the Governor of Negapatam what this Armament is designed for; The Baron himself seems very far from being in the French interest; he assisted the Squadron while in that road with everything in his Power."³

Yet it was difficult to see how the Dutch were not

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2. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/335, August 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 12, 1759, Yarmouth, off Pondichery.
 3. Same to Same; Ibid.

aiding the French by this open challenge to the British position in Bengal. In fact, the Dutch, Pocock felt, had more reason to act against the French interest; Lally had seized a Dutch vessel, the Haarlem, during the summer of 1758 and had, during the siege of Madras, temporarily taken possession of the Dutch factory of Sadras although he had relinquished it when he had abandoned the siege. Surely if the Dutch were now coming in on the side of the French they were making a mistake. The French, having lost control of the sea, could not budge the British from their positions on the Coromandel coast and in Bengal. Even if the Dutch ignored this factor and counted on the ultimate success of the French,

"...by all the actions of the French were they able to dispossess us of this Coast, the Dutch would remain but a short time Masters of their Settlements..."

Although the motivation of the Dutch was unknown, their action was certainly hostile. Pocock sent the Duke of Dorset, Oxford, and Denham with the company's troops, which he had been holding to Madras and advised the council to forward them to Calcutta to counter any hostile move by the Dutch in Bengal,⁴ if they were of the opinion that it was in the best interests of the company to do so. But these developments were soon driven from Pocock's mind by the news of the

4. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

sighting of the long-awaited French squadron.

On the morning of the 2d of September Pocock and the British squadron were making a sweep to the south of Negapatam with the double intention of searching for the enemy and watering the ships at Trincomalee. The Revenge frigate had preceded the squadron and was cruising on her station off Ceylon when she was driven away by a more powerful French frigate during the morning of the same day, and shortly afterwards, the Revenge, sighted the French just over the horizon. The British frigate, closely pursued by the French vessel, ran back to the British squadron to announce her discovery. About 10 o'clock in the morning, the Revenge with her pursuer came in sight of Pocock's squadron and soon afterwards the French could be seen from the British mastheads.

D'Aché's squadron⁵ had made heavy going from the Islands. The French ships had been indifferently refitted and carelessly equipped. The heavy losses in men that D'Aché had suffered in the two engagements during 1758 had been made up, not by fresh sailors from France, but from drafts of natives from East Africa. The temper and morale of the squadron was very low and although in numbers alone they were superior to Pocock's nine ships, the British force

5. Actif (64), Minotaur (74), Duc d'Orleans (60), St. Louis (60), Vengeur (64), Zodiaque (74), Comte de Provence (74), Duc de Bourgogne (60), Illustre (64), Fortune (64), Centaur (70), Diligente (26), Sylphide (30), and two store ships.

was by almost any standard the stronger.⁶ On sighting the French squadron, Pocock made the signal for general chase and stood towards the French with all the sail the squadron could make.⁷ The French frigate that had pursued the Revenge rejoined her own ships to avoid being cut off, but the wind died in the afternoon and Pocock was unable to bring the enemy into action.

About 7 o'clock in the evening Pocock ordered the Revenge to keep between the British squadron and the French during the night. The next day and the following day, Pocock kept attempting to bring D'Aché to action but the French avoided it and the light breezes--"barely enough for steerage way"⁸--prevented the British squadron from forcing battle. On the morning of the 4th of September, Pocock lost contact with the French and concluding they were bound for Pondichery, ordered his ships to make all the sail they could for that place.

Pocock reached Pondichery on the 8th of September and about 1 o'clock in the afternoon the first of the French squadron was discovered to the southeast. By 3 o'clock

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6. G. A. Ballard "The First and Second Anglo-French Conflicts in the Indian Ocean", Mariners Mirror, XIII, 34.
 7. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road; Log of HMS Yarmouth; PRO:Adm. 51/1090, September 2, 1759.
 8. Same to Same; Ibid.

thirteen of the French ships were in sight, but again the reluctance of the French and light winds prevented Pocock from joining battle. The following day was a repetition of the action of the day before, but at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of September the French were observed to be formed in a line of battle about eight miles from the British squadron, evidently waiting for Pocock's forces to come down upon them.⁹

Pocock's squadron was formed in a line of battle abreast, and at about 11 O'clock he made the signal to form line of battle on the same tack the French squadron was holding.¹⁰ The British continued to edge down upon the French ships until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. When the Yarmouth was nearly abreast of the Duc de Bourgogne and within musket shot of each other, D'Aché made the signal to engage and Pocock followed suit, "both fleets began to cannonade each other with great fury and continued hotly engaged until 4:10 in the afternoon when the Enemy's Rear began to give way."¹¹ This development was followed soon afterwards

9. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road; Log of HMS Yarmouth; PRO:Adm. 51/1090, September 10, 1759.
10. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road; Log of HMS Yarmouth; PRO:Adm. 51/1090, September 11, 1759; Log of HMS Tyger; PRO:Adm. 51/994, September 11, 1759.
11. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road; Log of HMS Yarmouth; PRO:Adm. 51/1090, September 11, 1759.

by the French center sheering out of line while the van steered on. Soon after, the French ships made all the sail they could and steered to the south south east, but the British squadron was in no condition to pursue.

The Weymouth and Sunderland were the only two ships that were relatively undamaged and this was because they were unable to get into the action. The next day the crippled British squadron sailed for Negapatam Road, with the Sunderland towing the Newcastle, the Weymouth the Tyger and the Elizabeth the Cumberland. On the afternoon of the 12th, the squadron anchored about three leagues to the southward of Negapatam Road and Pocock sent the Revenge with letters to Madras informing them of the battle. On the 15th the squadron moved into the Road and anchored there until the 26th of September. Emergency repairs were carried on with the utmost haste. The damage, as in the earlier engagements with the French had been mostly in the masts and yards, but this time casualties had been heavy. By the morning of the 26th, the squadron was in condition to sail, and at 5 o'clock Pocock sailed to the northward to seek out the French ships. On the way north the squadron was joined by the Revenge returning from Madras, with congratulations and 73 seamen to help fill up the gaps caused by the battle.¹²

12. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

These welcome replacements were ordered on board the Tyger and Newcastle, the two ships that had suffered most in the engagement.

By the morning of the 27th of September Pocock and his squadron were off Pondichery, where he found D'Aché engaged in disembarking stores and troops. D'Aché had not landed and had sent word ashore that he was resolved to return to the Islands. The council protested strongly against his proposed departure, "and a great assembly of citizens solemnly declared that the loss of the colony was inevitable if he did not remain."¹³ D'Aché's squadron was lying at anchor in line of battle under the guns of the fort and Pocock felt that "the attacking both the Fort and Ships at the same time did not suit our condition"¹⁴ but he formed the British squadron in line of battle and cruised back and forth before the entrance to Pondichery Road for the better part of the day. D'Aché's squadron weighed and left the harbor about 10 o'clock, avoiding all action with Pocock's ships. Pocock held a council of war at which Stevens and all the captains of the British squadron were present at which time they decided "that as the present condition of

13. Albert Von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (Translated by H. J. Chaytor), (3 vols), (New York, 1907), II, 350.
14. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.

the Squadron would not permit us to follow them to the Southward it would be most Adviseable to proceed to Madras ...¹⁵ This step was acted upon by Pocock and on the evening of the 28th of September the squadron anchored in Madras Roads.

It seemed certain after the departure of D'Aché from Pondichery on the 27th of September that the French had lost the campaign of 1759 if not the whole war in India. It was in this light, at least, that the council of Madras wrote Pocock immediately after news of his engagement with D'Aché on the 11th had reached Madras.

"We look upon this as the last effort of the Enemy, and well might they boast of their superiority; but the check they have met with, will show them they are disappointed of the mighty effects they expected from this armament..."¹⁶

Certainly these latest developments were further proof that the French strength in India was crumbling. The price paid for the command of the sea was high, but the price entailed by its loss was equivalent to total destruction.

Pocock had had 184 dead and 122 dangerously wounded on board his ships after the battle; added to these casualties were 263 more whose wounds were "slight"; a grand total of

15. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.
16. Governor and Council of Fort St. George to Pocock, September 16, 1759, Beatson, II, 298.

569 men.¹⁷ However grim this account was, it was apparent that D'Aché's squadron had suffered even greater casualties. Anthony de Souza, a Portuguese, who had acted as helmsman on the Grantham, Indiaman, had been taken prisoner by the French early in the year. He was taken on board the French squadron when they sailed from the Islands on August 1, 1759 and was present on board the French squadron during the action. On the arrival of the shattered French ships at Pondichery, de Souza escaped and travelled overland to Trichinopoly where he made a deposition to the English authorities of all that he had seen while with the French.¹⁸

De Souza's testimony was taken at face value by Pocock and the council at Madras, both of whom read and forwarded his deposition to England. Although his estimate of the French casualties¹⁹ suffered is probably high, the French documents available mention approximately the same numbers

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17. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.
 18. "Report of a man who came in the French Fleet from the Islands"; IO:HM 95/429; Enclosed in Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/405, October 12, 1759 and Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.
 19. "It is most impossible to describe the massacre on board the French Ships, the least had a 100 killed and wounded and many more in several, particularly D'Aiguille's Ship [Minotaur (74)], 180; their loss of killed and wounded he computes at the least 1500 men...." "Report of a man who came in the French Fleet from the Islands"; IO:HM 95/429.

of killed and wounded.²⁰ The most important part of de Souza's testimony however was that which showed the morale and condition of D'Aché's fleet to be very low.²¹ Very few seamen and stores were landed at Pondichery, and if de Souza's testimony is to be taken at face value, the wounded from the squadron were sent ashore only at night so "that the prodigious number might not be known and half of them were sent ...out of town [to]...Straw Sheds."²² The French ships had taken a heavy beating; only the thought that it "would give spirits to the English" prevented D'Aché from running the Comte de Provence aground at Pondichery, and she was taken back with the squadron with the firm belief in everyone's mind that she would founder on the way. The Zodiaque and the Minotaur were in much the same condition as the Comte de Provence and only by keeping their pumps going 24 hours at a time were they kept afloat in Pondichery harbor.²³

20. Beatson, who used the French sources, says "The loss the enemy sustained in this battle, was near fifteen hundred men killed and wounded", Beatson, II, 296.
21. On the way to Pondichery, D'Aché's squadron had touched at Ceylon for wood and water. There he had received information of two English fleets; one of 17 sail and the other of 15. A council of war held on board the Zodiaque nearly decided to force the admiral to return to the Islands. So desperate did the French consider their condition that on board 7 of their squadron the crews were given orders to board the British ships, "having been given Caps and Breast-plates for that purpose", "Report of a man who came in the French Fleet from the Islands", IO:HM 95/429.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

On Pocock's arrival at Madras the squadron set to work to water their ships, to take on supplies and to send ashore the wounded to hospitals. While these necessary duties were being carried out, Pocock took the opportunity to concert his plans with those of the governor and council of Madras. These officials agreed with the admiral that the squadron could do little more work in the Bay of Bengal during the remainder of the season; the monsoon was nearly arrived and the best place for the shattered, but victorious ships was at Bombay in the hands of the dockyard officials.²⁴ The Weymouth and Sunderland would be left at Tillichery to refit as quickly as they could and then to return to the Coromandel coast early in January. Meanwhile a reinforcement²⁵ had already appeared in Indian waters under the command of Rear Admiral Samuel Cornish.²⁶ This force, after reprovisioning at Tillichery would join with the Weymouth and Sunderland and return to the Coromandel coast. Pocock intended to take with him to Bombay, the Yarmouth, Grafton, Elizabeth, New-

24. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/443, October 19, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 19, 1759, Yarmouth, at sea, Madras NbW 42 leagues.

25. Lennox (74), York (60), Falmouth (50), Duke of Aquitaine (64).

26. Rear Admiral Samuel Cornish (d. 1770). First appears in Navy Lists as lieutenant November 16, 1739. Flag captain to Matthews 1741-1742. Promoted to rear admiral, February 14, 1759. On the death of Stevens succeeded to the command of the East Indies station. In command of expedition that captured Manila October 5, 1762.

castle, Cumberland, Salisbury, Tyger, Queenborough, Patty,
victualler, Pocock storeship, and Protector, fireship.

These ships would be thoroughly refitted at Bombay and then the squadron would reinforce Cornish, who would have six of the line in the Bay of Bengal by January.²⁷

Pocock planned leaving Madras for Bombay the 16th of October but the arrival of the Revenge²⁸ with letters from Admiral Cornish kept him in Madras for another day. Early the 17th, Pocock's squadron sailed from Madras and on the afternoon of the 18th of October met Cornish with his four ships at sea. In accordance with the plans worked out at Madras, Pocock ordered Cornish to take his ships together with the Weymouth and Sunderland to Tillichery to refit. Pocock informed him that as soon as the first three of his ships were repaired they would be sent to Tillichery to join Cornish and that he expected the admiral with these nine ships of the line to be on the Coromandel coast by the beginning of January.²⁹ Thus, if D'Aché should reappear, he

27. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/429, October 12, 1759; Same to Same; IO:HM 95/443, October 19, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 19, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.
28. The Revenge had been sent with orders from Pocock on September 27th and had been cruising off the southern tip of Ceylon (Point de Galle) waiting for Cornish to appear, in order that he might know the situation in the Bay of Bengal and Pocock's instructions for his conduct. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/429, October 12, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 12, 1759, Yarmouth, Madras Road.
29. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/443, October 19, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 19, 1759, Yarmouth, at sea, Madras NbW 42 leagues.

would find a sufficiently strong force to prevent him from aiding the French troops at Pondichery who might renew the offensive that had ended disastrously in 1759.

Cornish having received these orders for his future conduct acknowledged them and gave Pocock three sets of orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

These three instructions were comprehensive. First, Pocock was informed that Cornish had with him troops designed by the East India Company for service in Bengal and that they should be convoyed there as soon as possible. The second, order informed him, in addition to the instructions he was already under, to employ his squadron in the protection of the trade and settlements of the East India Company and to keep in close correspondence with the company's officials in India to further these ends. The last order was a discreetly worded request for the admiral's recall:

"Whereas you have been employ'd a long time in the East Indies, where your Services have given great Satisfaction to His Majesty and as it will be necessary for the prevention of your Health that you should be relieved from the fatigue attending the Command in those Seas, We do therefore hereby Require and Direct you to make the best of your way home with such one or more of His Majesty's Ships under your Command as shall not be in a condition to tarry longer abroad; leaving the rest under the Command of the next Senior Officer and giving him an attested copy of all Instructions you are under with directions to put the Same in execution

(signed) Anson
Gilbert Elliot
J. Forbes"30

30. All three of these orders are to be found in PRO:Adm. 2/1331, March 30, 1759.

Pocock decided on reading these orders that three of the squadron were too weak to return--the Cumberland, Tyger, and Salisbury--"as their frames are rendered very weak, which occasions them to grow leaky whenever a fresh gale arises to make a Sea", but after the "ablest Carpenter in the Squadron with the Company's Builder" made a survey on them at Bombay "they can be made fit for one more year's service in this fair weather country" which Pocock believed would do "much better than to risque the lives of a great number of valuable Seamen." As for himself, he proposed to take passage home in the Yarmouth "as she begins to break a little, and now may be spared" for "if none of the old Ships go home there will be twelve sail of the line in these seas."³¹

In accordance with the orders brought out by Cornish, Pocock detached the Queenborough with the troops destined for Bengal and sent them to Madras. The passage around Ceylon to the Malabar coast was rough. Fresh winds from the west raised such a sea that thirty of the Salisbury's guns had to be thrown overboard to save her from foundering; and the Cumberland, Elizabeth and Tyger had to keep one watch constantly at the pumps.³² Since these older ships retarded

31. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/443, October 19, 1759; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, October 19, 1759, Yarmouth, at sea, Madras NbW 42 leagues.
32. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/593, January 8, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 8, 1760, Yarmouth in Bombay Harbor.

the progress of the rest of the squadron, Pocock made signals to Cornish to leave him on October 31, 1759 and proceed directly to Tillichery with the Lennox, York, Falmouth, Weymouth, Sunderland and Duke of Aquitaine, and then, after "refreshing the Ships Companys [to] make all possible despatch back to the Coast of Coromandel agreeable to the plan..."³³ However, the weather eased after Cornish and his six ships left the squadron. Pocock with the Yarmouth, Elizabeth and York arrived at Tillichery on November 20th five days before Cornish appeared. Stevens was dispatched on the 22d with the Grafton, Elizabeth, Tyger and Salisbury for Bombay "in order that no time should be lost in refitting," while Pocock followed on November 28th from Tillichery at a more leisurely rate with the remainder of the squadron, arriving at Bombay December 13th.

Repairs were rushed, and Pocock soon after his arrival at Bombay had hopes that Stevens with the Grafton, Tyger, and Newcastle might leave "for the other Coast early in the next month [January 1760]." The Cumberland and Salisbury, however, were in no condition "to risque a Passage home" and "must remain here in order to make them serviceable if possible one Season more" and that would take a longer time.³⁴

33. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/593, January 8, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 8, 1760, Yarmouth, in Bombay Harbor.

34. Same to Same; Ibid.

With the disposition of his ships now attended to Pocock began making plans, in obedience to his orders of March 30th from the Lords of the Admiralty, to transfer his command to Admiral Stevens. Steps had been taken towards this end when on January 1 and 5, 1760 two letters from Madras caused Pocock to alter his decision and retain his command of the squadron temporarily.

Although the center of Dutch power and wealth lay not in India but in the islands to the eastward, they had watched the Anglo-French struggle for political predominance in that land with growing disfavor. Especially was this true after Watson, Pocock and Clive had conquered Bengal and Mir Ja'far and Siraj-ud-daula were established as nabobs. The Dutch on the establishment of Mir Ja'far as nabob had attempted to exact a price for recognition. This entailed the grant of a secret monopoly of the export of opium from Bengal and other favorable trading rights; and as a penalty had seen their trade stopped and their agent seized.³⁵ Added to this mortification they observed that when Pocock left the Hughley for the Coromandel coast, the English established their own measures for customs duties, which, in the main, consisted of subjecting all foreign vessels to an intensive search.³⁶

35. Kierk de Reuss "De expeditie naar Bengale" De Indische Gids (1889), V, p. 6; Robert Orme, History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, (3 vols), (London, 1803), II, 183.

36. Bengal Select Committee, March 2, 1758.

Then too, Clive obtained for the English company a monopoly of the saltpetre produced in Bengal, so as to prevent this necessary store from reaching the French, and this step, which hurt Dutch trade, was bitterly protested. In fact the Dutch looked upon themselves as in the same position as the English would have been in on the Coromandel coast, had nothing been done to prevent the French encroachments.

In June 1759, the Dutch governor-general dispatched from Batavia a fleet of seven vessels with 300 European soldiers and 600 Malay troops, bearing directions to proceed to Negapatam and follow such orders as they should receive there. This fleet had been observed by Pocock on August 8th, while his squadron had been watering in the roads, and a shrewd suspicion of its ultimate objective had been enough for him to contact Clive and the authorities in Bengal and communicate this intelligence.³⁷

The ships lay at Negapatam for nearly a month, during which time Clive had ample opportunity to prepare for the intended invasion. "Even when at the beginning of October the Dutch reached the entrance to the river, they still had not made up their minds what they would do." ³⁸ They

37. Klerk de Reuss, "De expeditie naar Bengale", De Indische Gids V, p. 8-9; Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/335, August 12, 1759, Yarmouth off Pondichery.

38. H. H. Dodwell (Ed.) The Cambridge History of India, (7 vols), (Cambridge, 1929), V, 155.

were then faced with a prohibition, in the name of the nabob, of introducing troops into Bengal. Simple enough to attempt to induce the nabob to withdraw his orders, they failed to realize that in reality these were the orders of Clive. More than a month was spent by the Dutch in futile negotiations before they decided to force their way in. They seized various small English vessels near the mouth of the river and landed their troops on the night of November 21. But they met with complete and utter failure. On the 24th their ships were all captured by three company's ships that Clive had equipped for the purpose of defending the river. On the next day Colonel Forde decisively routed the Dutch landing party.³⁹ The Dutch, crushed, acknowledged they had begun the hostilities, submitted to a demand that the forces they maintained in Bengal should be limited and promised to pay ten lakhs damage.⁴⁰

This then was the situation outlined in the two letters Pocock received on January 1st and 5th. The French fleet had

39. "Before fighting the Dutch Forde had qualms about attacking a nominally friendly power and asked Clive for an Order in Council to authorize him. Clive was at cards when Forde's message came; without interrupting the game he wrote on a slip of paper: 'Dear Forde, fight them immediately. I will send you the Order in Council to-morrow.' " Cited in Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt Earl of Chatham (2 vols.), (London, 1913), II, 25.

40. Price to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 1/161, December 25, 1759; D.S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 127; "An Account of the Proceedings of the Dutch in Bengal..."; IO:HM 95/573. A Lakh was equivalent to 100,000 units of currency. In this case Rupees were indicated and during the greater part of the 18th century the Rupee was worth about 45¢.

disappeared; no word had been had from them since they left Pondichery;⁴¹ were the Dutch making new preparations in conjunction with the French ? Pocock felt that duty necessitated his remaining in Indian waters for a time until a clearer view of this development was known.

"It is very necessary that I should be acquainted with an event that may bring a train of ill consequences upon our affairs in these Parts should the Dutch assist Our Enemies, though I have every reason to hope The Severe Blow they have sustained by the Company's Forces under the command of Colonel Forde and from the Company's Ships on the River will intimidate them from acting against us in other parts of India; but as it is uncertain what steps the General of Batavia may take when the News is brought to him, by whom the Equipment was made at Batavia and sent to Bengal and by whom all Orders are issued to their Settlements in India; it has put a stop to my Resolution of proceeding to England in Pursuance of the Orders I am under from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty..."⁴²

Since naval strength would be the prime factor in deciding any struggle between the Franco-Dutch coalition, supposing one existed, Pocock felt that,

"upon advice of the aforementioned affairs the large naval strength the French have in these Seas and that to be further reinforced by some Dutch Ships this season from Batavia, many of whom may be furnished with 50 or 60 Guns, I

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41. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/593, January 8, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, January 8, 1760, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
42. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/523, February 11, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 11, 1760, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

hope His Majesty will not disapprove of my returning to the Coast of Coromandel in order to make myself acquainted with the Embroilment that has happened in Bengal... [but] when I arrive at Fort St. George and should I find ... that affairs are settled with the Dutch... I shall proceed home...as only Real Necessity of the Service could keep me longer in this Country." 43

Cornish having repaired and revictualled his ships had passed Anjengo on December 27, 1759 so that Pocock had every reason to hope that by the middle of January he would arrive on the Coromandel coast. Pocock, himself, hoped to leave Bombay with the Yarmou5h, Grafton, Elizabeth, Newcastle and Tyger by the beginning of March. The Cumberland and Salisbury had so much work to be done on them that they would be left in the docks after the rest of the squadron sailed, since Pocock believed it would take at least two months to make them ready for sea. D'Aché and his squadron were still unreported, but Pocock believed they had retired to the Islands to refit.⁴⁴

On February 25th Pocock wrote Pitt that it would be the middle of March at least, before the ships at Bombay could be ready to proceed to the Coromandel coast. In reply to a

43. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/523, February 11, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 11, 1760, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

44. Same to Same; Ibid

request from the governor and council of Bombay he had sent the Newcastle to convoy the Clinton, Indiaman to the south of Ceylon "and then to wait there for my arrival with the other four Ships."⁴⁵ To Cleveland he wrote that the squadron's rations of beef and pork had dwindled to only about a three months' supply,

"I was under a necessity of applying to the President and Council here [Bombay], to Supply the Agent Victualler with what Salt Provisions they could spare out of the Company's Stores, which...they complied with..."⁴⁶

He urged the Secretary to send out salt provisions so that the squadron might be well equipped for the coming year.

On March 1 a letter arrived at Bombay addressed to Pocock that cleared the air of all the phantoms of Franco-Dutch alliances. It contained a detailed account of the Dutch defeat and humiliating settlement in Bengal and an account of several victories over the French troops. No longer was there any danger of a threat from those quarters to British supremacy in Bengal, nor correspondingly was there need for Pocock to remain in Indian waters with the squadron. As if to underline this account of British successes he received another letter from Madras that told him that Cornish arrived there with his ships on February 23 and that

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45. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/559, February 25, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 25, 1760, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.
46. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 25, 1760, Yarmouth, Bombay Harbor.

after the successful captures of Chittiput, Arcot and Allemparve plans had been made for Cornish, with the aid of the company's troops to invest Carical.⁴⁷ Accordingly, Pocock on seeing

"our Affairs on the Coast of Coromandel being so prosperous a Situation, and the Disturbance that happened with the Dutch at Bengal being adjusted and all Apprehensions removed from that quarter..."⁴⁸

he dispatched the Grafton, Elizabeth, Tyger, Revenge and Pocock, storeship under the command of Rear Admiral Stevens to sail for the Coromandel coast and join Cornish. This Stevens did on March 21. Since Stevens was now to be the senior officer on the station, Pocock turned over to him all his orders and instructions and "also communicated every other light in my power for his guidance."

When the Yarmouth was ready on April 7, Pocock sailed from Bombay for home. Touching only at Anjengo for water, where he left April 21, he made good passage all the way round the Cape of Good Hope to St. Helena, where he arrived June 18, 1760. There he found, as was usual, the Colchester (50), Rippon (60), and seventeen East India Company ships waiting to make up a convoy for England. Taking these ships under his command he sailed on July 6 from St. Helena and

47. Pocock to Pitt; IO:HM 95/567, September 22, 1760; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, September 22, 1760, Yarmouth, in Downes.

48. Same to Same, Ibid.

after a leisurely passage⁴⁹ arrived in the Downes August 20.

Shortly afterwards Pocock came up to London to report his arrival to the Admiralty, to which Secretary Pitt had been writing notes daily asking for news of him.⁵⁰ For Pocock was now justly famous and all sorts of figures, political and otherwise outdid themselves to honor him. Pocock was received at court and made a Knight of the Bath by the old king who complimented him on his work in India. The East India Company led all the other sycophants in singing his praise. On September 24, 1760, the general court of the company recorded a vote of thanks to Pocock and

49. Only one small incident served to mark the tedium of the homeward passage and that was not without moment:

"Sir,

I am sorry I have Occasion to acquaint you that Yesterday Evening between the Hours of Seven and Eight I had a Complaint made to me of Andrew Richardson, Seaman's having thrown Overboard Alexander Nairn, a Black Boy rated one of my servants, his Intention as I am informed, was to remove him from a Case of strong liquor, which the Gentlemen he waited on had left him to Guard. As the Boy must be undoubtedly drowned, I have confin'd Andrew Richardson in Irons and by this you will please to order him to be Tried by a Court Martial, whenever we have a sufficient number of Captains to hold one.

I am,

Sir,

To
Vice Admiral
George Pocock

Your most humble,
Obedient Servant,
John Harrison

Captain of the Yarmouth
His Majesty's Ship Yarmouth, at Sea
2 August 1760."

Harrison to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 1/161, August 2, 1760.

50. "Mr. Secretary Pitt desires to be informed whether the Lords of the Admiralty have any advice of Admiral Pocock's arrival in England." Pitt to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/4124, Monday, September 22, 1760.

sent a secretary to wait on him to find out whether he would prefer either his portrait or a statue to be placed in the general court room of the East India Company's house in London.⁵¹ Besides the honor of the Bath, Pocock was promoted to be admiral of the blue. Before he left India the three Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras had all sent him letters of thanks which they forwarded to London. Clive spoke in the highest possible terms of his devotion to duty and "his Zeal for the Public Service in General" while the council of Fort St. George wrote to London that "his Actions have made it known to the world."⁵²

To what cause can all this tribute be places; Sir Julian Stafford Corbett in his classic study of the period sums up Pocock's qualifications for merit.

"It is the fashion now merely to deride his battle tactics, which after three actions in eighteen months had failed to secure a real decision, though the tactics that would have secured a decision against a superior force determined to avoid one are never clearly indicated. More just it would be to praise his vehement 'general chases', the daring and resolute attacks which in manner yielded nothing to Hawke's and above all for the strategical insight and courage which enabled him to dominate a sea which it was practically impossible for his inferior force to command. Thus it was his conduct was justly regarded

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51. IO:HM 455A/311; IO:HM 455A/327. Pocock preferred a statue and one was accordingly made and placed in the general court room beside similar effigies of Lord Clive, General Lawrence and Admiral Watson; the whole expense coming to £ 605.10s.
52. "Extracts of East India Company Advices from Fort St. George"; PRO:Adm. 1/3912, May 28, 1760.

at the time....He had been sent out to 'protect the East India Company's trade and settlements' and well had he done his duty."⁵³

For Pitt, Pocock was the kind of sailor he wished. In a speech to the House of Commons on December 14, 1757 he spoke of England having lost "our glory, honour, and reputation everywhere but in India." "There I find Watson, Pocock and Clive." He compared Pocock to Clive "that Heaven-born general" and said that he wished England could produce more men like him.⁵⁴

There is reason to believe that had Pitt remained in power in 1761, Pocock would have enjoyed many of the major commands throughout the remainder of the war. Although Bute's ministry used him to command the naval operations at Havana, Pocock was not thought of as the outstanding figure of the operation, but Pitt looked upon him as the type of naval officer most needed by England.⁵⁵

53. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 128.

54. Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt Earl of Chatham, II, 24; Speech reported in Walpole's Memoirs of the Reign of George II and J. Almon, London Magazine (January 1758).

55. See for example the letter from J. Cleveland to Pocock dated February 13, 1761, in which Pocock is approached to command the Belleisle expedition. PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 13, 1761.

VI

Havana: The Background

Pocock's arrival in England coincided with a changed tempo in the conduct of the war. During the last weeks of George II's reign and the beginning of George III's, proposals were made by Pitt for a diversion on the coast of France.¹ These were soon expanded into a more concrete plan for the conquest of Belleisle, an island commanding the entrance to Quiberon Bay. That objective had been recommended earlier both to Newcastle in 1747 and to Pitt in 1756 as a useful base to conduct operations on the French coast.² The latter collected all the transports necessary for the expedition and began to sound out the cabinet for support. Newcastle and Hardwicke were averse to sending the expedition in November 1760, but Pitt persisted in the scheme, which was temporarily halted by George II's death. Discussions were resumed in the cabinet on November 13, 1760, and Pitt eventually gained sanction from George III for the expedition which was to take place the following year.³

1. BM: Add. Mss 32913, f 183.

2. PRO: Chatham Mss, 85; 27.

3. BM: Add. Mss 32912, f 323; 32913, ff 45, 183, 326; 32914, f 171; PRO: Chatham Mss, 79.

In February, 1761, Pitt began to cast about for an admiral suitable to carry out the proposed operation against Belleisle. Admiral Hawke, at that time in command of the Western Squadron, was the logical choice since he was on the spot. But Hawke had taken violent objection to the scheme when it was broached in 1760. Pitt therefore, decided to pass over him. On February 13, the "Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, Ireland, etc." sent a letter to Sir George Pocock informing him that a secret expedition was being planned and that he was to go to Plymouth immediately on receipt of this letter, hoist his flag on board the Sandwich (90) and take command of a large number of ships designed to be used in conjunction with a military force. On his arrival at Plymouth further and more detailed instructions would be sent for his guidance.⁴ Appended to the letter was a list of the ships available at Plymouth, Spithead, and at sea that were to be under his command.⁵ Impressive as this honor was and most

4. Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, Ireland, etc. to George Pocock, Admiral of the Blue; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 13, 1760.

5. "Admiralty Office" A List of Ships and Vessels put under the 13 February 1761. Command of George Pocock, Esquire, Admiral of the Blue.

	<u>At Spithead</u>	<u>Commanders</u>
Ships	<u>Sandwich</u> (90)	Richard Norbury
	<u>Dragon</u> (74)	Hon. Sugustus J. Hervey
	<u>Temeraire</u> (74)	Matthew Barton
	<u>Swiftsure</u> (70)	Sir Thomas Stanhope
	<u>Vanguard</u> (70)	Robert Swanton
	<u>Essex</u> (64)	Alexander Schomberg
	<u>Prince of Orange</u> (60)	Samuel Wallis

indicative of the high esteem in which Pitt held Pocock, Sir George felt that he deserved a rest. Accordingly he wrote the same day he received the order to Secretary Cleveland

"This is to acknowledge the receipt of their Lordships letter of this days date to take the enclosed List of Ships under my Command, but not finding myself in a Sufficient State of Health I hope they will excuse my proceeding in this Service and Permitt me to return the said Order."⁶

Although this refusal, for a lesser officer than Pocock, might have terminated his career; the threatening diplomatic situation in the spring of 1761 gave ample assurance

	<u>At Spithead</u>	<u>Commanders</u>
Frigates	<u>Launceston</u> (44) <u>Flamborough</u> (24)	Phillip Affleck Samuel Thompson
Sloops	<u>Escorte</u> (14) <u>Alderney</u> (12)	Charles Ellys John Peighn
Fireships	<u>Aetna</u> (16) <u>Vesuvius</u> (16)	Michael H. Pascall James Chads
Bomb Vessels	<u>Infernal</u> (8) <u>Firedrake</u> (8) <u>Furnace</u> (8)	James Mackenzie James Orrock James Chaplen
	<u>At Plymouth</u>	
	<u>Torbay</u> (74) <u>Hampton Court</u> (64) <u>Achilles</u> (60) <u>Southampton</u> (36)	William Brett Carr Scrope Hon. John Barrington Charles Antrobus
	<u>At Sea</u>	
	Seaford (20)	John Hughes"

"A List of Ships and Vessels..."; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 13, 1761.

6. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/161, February 13, 1761.

that Sir George would find employment.⁷

At the end of September 1760 the Conde de Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador, suddenly changed his tone towards the English court. He had been sent to settle claims relating to certain ships seized during the war, but mainly to protest against the settlements that the West Indian colonists had made in Honduras for cutting logwood, and to gain recognition for an alleged right of Spain to complete freedom of fishery on the Newfoundland coast and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. At first the Spanish government had urged these matters in a friendly and equable tone. Suddenly, its policy had altered and Fuentes made the extraordinary statement that the Spanish claims had been communicated to France.

Such a statement was the precursor of the changed diplomatic situation, which was known as the 'Family Compact.' In May 1761 the French foreign minister the Duc de Choiseul⁸

7. The Belleisle command was given to Commodore Augustus Keppel (1725-1786) who was the second son of William Anne Keppel, second Earl of Albemarle. Commodore Keppel had served under Anson when the First Lord commanded the Centurion, in 1758, Keppel commanded the Goree expedition, and his earlier friendship with Anson dictated his appointment to the Belleisle command. The best account of the expedition is found in PRO:Adm. 1/91 which are Keppel's letters to the Admiralty and in the relevant War Office Papers; the most satisfactory secondary account is in J. S. Corbett's England in the Seven Years' War, II, 141-170.
8. Etienne Francois de Choiseul, Comte de Stainville, Duc de Choiseul (1719-1785). Became foreign minister December 3, 1758 and remained in that office until 1770. A signer of the 'Pacte de Famille.' The text of that document may be found in Adolphe Duc de Broglie, Le Secret du Roi (Paris, 1878).

proposed to the Spanish government that a general and intimate alliance, amounting almost to a confederation be signed by the two powers. In June Choiseul added the suggestion that a Special Convention be added to the first document to meet the actual diplomatic situation. This Special Convention suggested that Spain should undertake to declare war on England on May 1, 1762, if by that time peace had not been concluded. After some discussion on both sides, both the Family Compact and the Special Convention were signed on August 15, 1761.

All the details of the two agreements were, of course, kept completely secret, but it was impossible to conceal entirely the fact that an arrangement of some kind had been come to between France and Spain. Pitt, at first, regarded the rapprochement as a mere attempt to intimidate him into giving France easier terms of peace. However, he was soon undeceived. Intercepted correspondence between the French and Spanish courts showed that France had no idea of making peace and that she was only waiting for Spain to bring her armed forces up to a state of war efficiency before the two powers would jointly attack England.⁹

In September Pitt laid all his intelligence before the cabinet and demanded war with Spain before she had time to strike at England. "Spain," he said, "is France and France

9. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, pp 186-195.

is Spain."¹⁰ However, politics, particularly the brand of political thought entertained by the young George III and his alter ego Bute, intervened and Pitt resigned from office in October. But if there was hesitation against commencing hostilities against Spain, there was none about a vigorous continuation of the war with France. Before Pitt's resignation plans had been made to shatter France's last island bulwark in the West Indies--Martinique.

In July orders had gone to General Sir Jeffrey Amherst¹¹ and Admiral Charles Colville, the military and naval commanders on the American station to dispatch ten battalions with artillery and engineers to Barbados, where they were to find their orders. At the same time Sir James Douglas,¹² commanding in the Leeward Islands, was told to expect them at Guadeloupe by the end of October. He was also informed that the French were preparing two squadrons, one at Brest and one at Rochefort, each consisting of about seven of the line, which were intended for the succour of Martinique, and

10. "Notes of Pitt's Speech, Sept. 18", Hardwicke Papers, BM:Add. Mss 35570, f 304.
11. Jeffrey Amherst, Baron Amherst, K.B. (1717-1797). Entered Guards in 1731; served in Germany as ADC to General Ligonier and the Duke of Cumberland. In 1758 Pitt promoted him to be major general in command of an expedition designed for North America. From 1758-1760 he was occupied in conquering Canada and in September made commander in chief and governor general of British North America.
12. Sir James Douglas (1703-1787). Appointed captain in 1743 and served under Boscawen and Knowles. Was a member of the court martial that tried Admiral Byng.

that if they escaped the home blockade he was to station a squadron off the island strong enough to deal with them. General Robert Monckton,¹³ who was bringing troops from America, was to command ashore, and was to arrange a rendezvous. There, Andrew Rollo, Lord Rollo's¹⁴ troops, and all that could be spared from the garrisons of Guadeloupe and Antigua, were to be concentrated, and the whole force would then amount to about eleven thousand men. Douglas would have about twelve of the line available to act with the military force, and with these he was to render the expedition every assistance possible.¹⁵

But for the chance of Spanish intervention such a force would have been ample for its purpose. But as the diplomatic horizon darkened, it was obvious to Pitt that the conquest of Martinique would not be enough. It must also serve as a springboard for the attack upon the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean the moment Spain declared war. Consequently, in September, Pitt reinforced the Martinique expedition further with four regiments from Belleisle and

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13. General Robert Monckton (1726-1782). Served in Germany, Scotland, Flanders, Nova Scotia, Canada, and Martinique.
 14. Andrew Rollo, fifth Lord Rollo (1700-1765). Entered army at 40 and distinguished himself at the Battle of Dettingen in 1743. Served on Louisburg expedition and against Montreal. In June 1761 he was sent in command of 26,000 troops to the West Indies and captured Dominica. Served in the operations against Martinique and Havana.
 15. LCA to Douglas; PRO:Adm. 2/1331, July 22, 1761.

ordered Admiral Rodney¹⁵ to hoist his flag, proceed to Guadeloupe with five of the line, and take Douglas and the whole naval force under his command. This notable appointment, necessitated by a need to increase the naval forces and by the growing danger from Spain, was the last Pitt ever made as war minister.¹⁷

On December 24, 1761 the diplomatic situation with Spain came to a head and war was declared.¹⁸ The Spanish strength at sea and on land was the subject of much conjecture by the ministry. Intelligence received by the Admiralty placed the Spanish navy at fifty-four ships of the line and twenty-eight frigates. Of this number, there were located in America only twenty-four ships and ten battalions.¹⁹ Earlier intelligence had indicated that on the outbreak of war, the Spanish fleet would join the French at Brest and

16. George Brydges Rodney, Baron Rodney (1719-1792). Entered navy in 1732 as a king's letter boy. Served under Haddock and Norris in home and Mediterranean waters. In 1742 he was made captain; in 1759, rear admiral and in 1778 admiral.
17. LCA to Rodney; PRO:Adm. 2/1331, October 1 and 7, 1761.
18. In the Admiralty the news moved more slowly. On December 26th orders were sent to the commanding officers at Plymouth, Leeward Islands, Jamaica, Mediterranean, North America, Belleisle, Downes, Ushant, Portsmouth and Havre de Grace of the probability of war with Spain. Not until Monday, January 4, 1762 did the Lords of the Admiralty send out to all flag officers, captains, and commanders news of the declaration of the war on Spain. PRO:Adm. 2/87; PRO:Adm. 3/69.
19. Intelligence Reports; PRO:Adm. 1/3948, January 2, 1762.

Toulon,²⁰ and the latest information that had come from Madrid indicated a squadron of eleven of the line in Ferrol ready for sea, and that fifteen hundred troops had marched to that port to embark for the West Indies. These preparations were elaborated in the newspapers and newsletters and a clamor arose for preventative measures against the Spanish threat,²¹ and for aggressive counter measures to be undertaken against Spain's possessions overseas.

The problem that faced the British government was where to strike Spain in order to cripple her and deprive her of the resources necessary to carry on the war. During the first week of January 1762 at a secret meeting the members of the government most concerned with the prosecution of the struggle against Spain decided on the war plan and on what would be the major objectives of the British forces.²² The decision reached through these deliberations was to select Havana on the Island of Cuba as the main objective of the British arms, so that the Franco-Spanish naval forces would be deprived of their last good operating base in the West Indies, and Spain would lose the main rendezvous point of

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20. Intelligence Reports; PRO:Adm. 1/3948, Geneva, December 29, 1761.
 21. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 232; The London Chronicle, February 19-21, 1761.
 22. This "secret committee" consisted of the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Anson, Lord Ligonier, George Grenville, the Duke of Newcastle, Bute, and Egremont.

her convoys of bullion. The capture of Havana would provide Britain with an excellent point d'appui for a complete conquest of Spanish West Indian and mainland colonies.

The choice of Havana was derived of a long line of strategical thinking dating back to Tudor times which recurred whenever hostilities broke out with Spain.²³ The plan developed during the winter of 1761-1762 has been attributed to many people.²⁴ The general opinion now held by historians is that the plan is the product of Lord Anson's fertile mind,²⁵ although Anson's plan owes much to the work of Admiral Sir Charles Knowles²⁶ who had visited Havana in

23. A brief survey of this problem may be found best developed in Arthur Percival Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688, (London, 1933); Philip Ainsworth Means, The Spanish Main; Focus of Envy, 1492-1700, (London, 1935); German Arciniegas, Caribbean; Sea of the New World, (New York, 1946), although there are many general and special works relating to this subject. Primary materials for later 17th century and 18th century plans for the conquest of Havana abound. In the British Museum, Add.Mss 32694, ff 101-152 are papers relating to expeditions against Havana from 1695 to 1711. In Add.Mss 32694, ff 3-100 are similar papers relating to the period 1727-1740. In the Public Records Office CO 28/56 and CO 137/13 are papers relating to the Sieges of Havana of 1740 and 1718, and there are many further sources of information.
24. Pitt, George Grenville, Sir Charles Knowles, the Duke of Cumberland, Lord Anson and Temple have all been suggested by various authors or have, like Grenville, taken the credit for themselves. See for example "Chatham and the Capture of Havana," The Athenaeum, No. 3898, July 12, 1902, p. 63; John Almon, Biographical, Literary and Political Anecdotes of Several of the Most Eminent Persons of the Present Age, (3 vols), (London, 1797), II, p. 68-70.
25. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 247.
26. Admiral Sir Charles Knowles (c. 1697-1777). Entered navy 1718 and served under Byng at Cape Passaro. Made post captain 1736 and in 1739 was at abortive siege of Porto Bello.

1756 and had drawn up a report of what he had seen, with suggestions as to the best places for attack should war with Spain ever occur.²⁷ Early in October 1761, Knowles' observations of Havana's defences were given by him to George Grenville with the request that they be forwarded to Pitt. After conferring with Temple, Grenville passed Knowles' papers on to Pitt, who, as a contemporary wrote,

"so eagerly embraced the whole plan, that in case the war with Spain had commenced during his continuance in power his fixed determination was, to have ordered the fleet and army he had sent against Martinico, as soon as they had reduced that island, to go immediately against the Havannah; and to have sent to them timely reinforcements sufficient to ensure the success..."²⁸

Pitt, on his fall from office, gave Knowles' papers to Lord Anson, who incorporated them with his own ideas, which

In 1741 was surveyor and engineer of the fleet with Sir Chaloner Ogle at Cartagena. Commodore 1743-1745 in West Indies. Rear admiral 1747-1748 made unsuccessful attempt to take Santiago.

27. This curious document is to be found in the British Museum, Add.Mss 23,678. It locates the landing places most suitable for an army engaged in investing Havana, and other information of value. Appended to it is a Journal of the Seige which Knowles says, after the Seige was over he was asked to revise before its publication. As Corbett points out "he seized the occasion, after his crossgrained manner to draw up an intemperate invective on the whole conduct of the operations and Anson's plan of campaign, being particularly bitter against the soldiers. No great importance need be attached to it." Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 246-247, note 1.
28. John Almon, Biographical, Literary and Political Anecdotes of Several of the Most Eminent Persons of the Present Age, II, 69.

were presented during the first week of January 1762 at the secret meeting of the "cabinet".

The plan as finally envisaged by Anson and approved by the government consisted of two expeditions operating in widely different parts of the world. A force of troops and ships to be collected on the East Indies station under the command of Rear Admiral Charles Stevens²⁹ would assault Manila, the chief Spanish possession in the East Indies. Another force of troops mustered in England under the command of Admiral Sir George Pocock³⁰ and the Earl of Albemarle was to join the forces engaged in the reduction of Martinique and the squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Rodney. This combined force was to be reinforced by troops from the command of Sir Jeffrey Amherst in North America who were to meet Pocock and Albemarle's forces at a rendezvous off Cape Nicholas, the northwest end of the Island of St. Dominique; then this combined and reinforced armament would pass through the Old Straits of Bahama³¹ and attack Havana. If the attack were successful the city was to be garrisoned, and the victorious army and fleet were to proceed against the Spanish

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29. The actual attack of Manila was carried out by Stevens' successor Rear Admiral Samuel Cornish since Stevens died before his orders reached him.
30. At a meeting of the Board on Tuesday, February 16, 1762 Admiral Pocock was appointed to be commander in chief of the squadron designed for the expedition against Havana. PRO:Adm. 3/79, Tuesday, February 16, 1762.
31. The passage located on the north side of Cuba.

possessions of "La Vera Cruz, Pensacola, St. Augustine, St. Iago de Cuba or any other part of the Spanish Colonies which from the State of the Climate, Season and your Troops, you think most likely..."³²

If the Havana operation failed any of the above mentioned objectives might be attempted, although the discretion of the commanders was to be the deciding factor in any undertaking. Although the defense of Jamaica was important, the siege of Havana was not to suffer because of an imagined threat to Jamaica. Pocock and Albemarle were given freedom to decide if Jamaica was in danger.

After the successful conclusion of the Havana campaign, Albemarle was directed to return the North American troops to the command of Sir Jeffrey Amherst since that officer was under orders to attack Louisiana "on the news of the issue of Havana"³³ and both Albemarle and Pocock were to concert their further offensive measures with Amherst.

In addition to the troops on Martinique, and those from North America, Albemarle was informed that a "Corps of

32. Lord Egremont to Lord Albemarle, "Secret Instructions for Lord Albemarle"; PRO:Colonial Office 117/1/24-36 (Hereafter cited as PRO:CO 117/1/24-36), February 15, 1762; LCA to Pocock, "Secret Instructions for Sir George Pocock, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships employed or to be employed on a Secret Expedition"; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, February 18, 1762; See Appendix V for the complete texts of the instructions and the additional instructions delivered to both Pocock and Albemarle.

33. Egremont to Albemarle; PRO:CO 117/1/24-36, February 15, 1762.

"Free Negroes" was being raised by Governor William Henry Lyttleton³⁴ of Jamaica to aid in the reduction of the Havana, as were a large force of slaves, who would provide an adequate labor force for the expedition.³⁵ Such then were the main outlines of the expedition as they were agreed upon by the government.

The choice of the commanders for the Havana expedition was settled at the same time the war plan was drawn up. Pocock's appointment was certainly Anson's work, although in February 1761, Pitt had chosen him for the Belleisle operation and thus marked him out for any future work of major significance. The plan of campaign demanded for its conduct a man of the highest powers, not only as a fighting admiral but as a navigator and seaman as well and from both points of view no better choice could have been made. After Hawke, Boscawen and Saunders, no one could show so fine a combat record as Pocock, whose fleet actions in the Indian Ocean were a tribute to his aggressive spirit. Furthermore Pocock had served as commander in chief of the Leeward

34. William Henry Lyttleton, first Baron Lyttleton of Frankley (1724-1808). In 1755 made governor of South Carolina. In 1762 made governor of Jamaica. In 1766 ambassador to Portugal.
35. Egremont to Albemarle; PRO:CO 117/1/24-36, February 15, 1762; LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, February 18, 1762; In addition to the negroes, Pocock was informed that "two companies of Protestant prisoners" under the command of Major Freron would be embarked with the troops from England as an additional labor force. These were to be taken from the neutral prisoners quartered in England. PRO:CO 117/1/11.

Island station during the War of the Austrian Succession and the waters he would now have to operate in were not unknown to him.

For the post of second in command of the squadron Commodore Augustus Keppel was chosen. His conduct of the Belleisle operation had proved him an active and capable officer, and he was given a special commission to be Pockock's successor in case of his death.³⁶ This was not quite fair to Rodney, whose knowledge of the Caribbean theatre of operations and well-earned successes should have marked him for the post of second in command. In Keppel's appointment as Corbett points out "he was probably persona grata to Anson, we perhaps see traces of an influence which was flagrantly evident in the military command."³⁷

The military officers selected to command on the expedition were the choice of the Duke of Cumberland, who was the sole authority at the War Office. "The young king had a high regard for his uncle, and, though he held no office, he was the real military adviser to the throne."³⁸ In the Duke's eyes no one could be fit for a command of any importance who had not been at one time on his staff. He believed that those men who had had that honor embraced all the real

36. LCA to Keppel; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 16, 1762; PRO:Adm. 3/79, Tuesday, February 16, 1762.

37. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 249.

38. Ibid, II, 249.

military talent in the country, and highest of all in his favor stood Keppel's eldest brother, the Earl of Albemarle. Although he was not yet forty, ever since he was sixteen Albemarle had been a member of the duke's household and had served on his staff at Fontenoy and Culloden. Whatever Albemarle's hereditary abilities for command, he had never held one, and whatever knowledge of his profession he had acquired as the duke's aide-de-camp he had never proved it. This young man was the choice then for the command of the military force of the expedition.

For second in command there was General George Eliott, Lord Heathfield who had distinguished himself by the defense of Gibraltar. His record during the Seven Years' War had to date been very high.³⁹ The two divisional generals were La Fausille and Albemarle's youngest brother, William Keppel.

"Thus no less than three of that favoured family were given the chance of a lion's share in the enormous booty that was confidently expected from the expedition, while the men on the spot like Haviland and Rollo, who had borne the heat and burden of the day [at Martinique] and made themselves masters of amphibious warfare, had to be content with brigades."⁴⁰

The only redeeming feature in the staff besides Eliott,

39. For his efforts during the expedition against Cherbourg and St. Malo to set right the mistakes of the incompetent quartermaster general see Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford Sackville of Drayton House, Northamptonshire, (2 vols.), (London 1904-1910), I, 72.
40. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 250; Albemarle to Amherst; War Office 34/55/93 (Amherst Papers), (Hereafter cited as WO 34/55/93), London, January 19, 1762.

was the appointment of Colonel Guy Carleton to the important office of quartermaster general. He had been Wolfe's favorite officer, and in spite of George II's vehement objections, Pitt had insisted on having him appointed to the same post for the Quebec expedition. He was fresh from the successful command of a brigade at Belleisle, and as he also had served with the duke, there was no real difficulty about his appointment.

While these preparations were taking place in England operations in the West Indies were moving on apace. On March 5th, 1762 news reached Rodney that Commodore de Blenac with the whole Brest squadron of seven of the line and four frigates had evaded the British forces blockading them and had sailed for the West Indies. By the 10th of March it was apparent to Rodney that Blenac had slipped by him and the Frenchman's objective in those waters was Jamaica or Cap Francois, with the probable intention of effecting a pre-concerted junction with the Spaniards. Rodney thus found himself confronted with a strategical situation which called for all his wisdom and readiness to take responsibility.

In Havana he knew that a formidable naval concentration had been going on for some time. Reports had indicated that fourteen of the line were there, and others were on the station. He felt that at all costs the French and Spanish squadrons must be prevented from getting together. Detaching part of his squadron under Sir James Douglas to

sail immediately for Jamaica, he resolved to water the remainder of his ships at St. Pierre⁴¹ and join Douglas off Jamaica as soon as he could. As he was watering his squadron at St. Pierre an urgent express came to him from the governor and council of Jamaica, to say that they had learned from intercepted letters that the island was to be attacked by the combined forces of Spain and France, and the French officers who were to command were on board Blenac's ships.⁴² Blenac had reached Cap Francois on the 15th, that is about the same time Rodney was watering at St. Pierre. Only a single British sloop the Merlin was watching the port, but the trite device of signalling with lights and guns as though the rest of the British battle fleet was within call succeeded in preventing her capture. It was no part of Blenac's orders to fight the British fleet single-handed, and he took his ships into Cap Francois harbor in

41. St. Pierre: the chief town and port of the Island of Martinique.

42. "A list of the French Squadron under M. de Blenac, in the West Indies in 1762."

<u>Ships</u>	<u>Guns</u>	<u>Companies of Infantry on Board</u>
<u>Duc de Burgoyne</u>	(80)	7
<u>Defenseur</u>	(74)	7
<u>Hector</u>	(74)	6
<u>Diademe</u>	(74)	6
<u>Prothee</u>	(64)	5
<u>Dragon</u>	(64)	5
<u>Brilliant</u>	(64)	5
<u>Zephire</u>	(32)	3
<u>Diligente</u>	(32)	3
<u>Opale</u>	(26)	3
<u>Calypso</u>	(16)	1
Total		51 or about 3000 men

such a hurry that one of his squadron, the Dragon (64), ran on a sand bank and was lost.⁴³ Thus threatened by the appearance of Blenac's squadron the authorities at Jamaica sent renewed requests urging Rodney and Monckton to send relief. Rodney at once resolved to move to the Jamaica station with every ship that could be spared and he pressed Monckton to let him take a body of troops as well. In spite of Rodney's requests, Monckton refused, saying he did not consider himself sufficiently authorized to detach troops from his command without authorization from England. Rodney then went off with practically his whole fleet.

"I flatter myself," he wrote, "their lordships will not be displeased with me if I take the liberty to construe my instructions in such a manner as to think myself authorized and obliged to succour any of his Majesty's colonies that may be in danger; and shall therefore hasten to the succour of Jamaica with ten sail of the line, three Frigates, and three bombs."⁴⁴

When Rodney wrote this dispatch, he had already reached Antigua. By this intended division of his force he would have perhaps twenty of the line, a force about equal to the combined squadrons of the enemy, and sufficient to prevent an overseas military expedition. At the same time he would be able to send back Douglas with eight of the line, which would be ample to deal with Blenac if he doubled back, or with the French squadron at Rochefort if it escaped the

43. R. Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, III, 167.

44. Rodney to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/307, March 24, 1762.

blockade and came out. To Holme's successor, Forrest, as acting commander on the Jamaica station, he wrote that he was to meet him with his whole squadron at Cape Nicholas in the Windward Passage,⁴⁵ as it was his intention to get between the enemy's squadrons and blockade Blenac wherever he found him. This done he went on to St. Christopher's⁴⁶ where he meant finally to divide his force. He reached it on March 26th, but only to suffer a bitter disappointment, for there he was met by Captain Elphinstone, of the Richmond frigate, with fresh orders direct from England.

These told him that a secret expedition was coming out by the middle of April under Sir George Pocock and the Earl of Albemarle. He was to be superseded in the supreme command, but with a handsome apology it was explained that the importance of the enterprise demanded an officer of high rank at its head. The actual objective was not disclosed. Rodney was merely informed that the intention was to make an impression on the Spanish colonies and everything must give way to it. Even if Martinique were not entirely conquered, all further operations must be suspended. Rodney was to be under Pocock's orders, and was to devote himself

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45. Cape Nicholas: located on the northwest end of the Island of Haiti on the eastern side of the Windward Passage and directly opposite the east end of Cuba.
46. St. Christopher's or St. Kitts: a British possession lying in 17°17'N and 62°45'W. 46 miles west north west from Antigua.

to preparing for the "grand expedition." He had strict orders himself to repair to Martinique to prepare transports for Monckton's force to take its part, and to organize a division of ten of the line, whose captains were junior, for special service with the expedition. To leave no room for independent judgment, the order concluded in the most stringent form;

"As you must be sensible of the great importance of these orders it is unnecessary for us to add any motives to enforce the most punctual and expeditious obedience thereto"⁴⁷

Even as clear and direct as these orders were, it was beyond Rodney's nature to obey them. He could not bring himself to abandon the measures he had already taken to protect Jamaica and to prevent the junction of Blenac's squadron and the Spanish ships at Havana. And it is at this point that his conduct becomes doubtful. There was in his possession information that the Admiralty and the home government did not have. Blenac's squadron was at Cap Francois, bent on forming a junction with the Spaniards. All strategic and tactical concepts urged beyond all other considerations that Blenac's ships be kept where they were. On the other hand Rodney should have realized that the government must have had plans in mind drawn from far reaching sources that were denied him, and he knew they were apprised of Blenac's escape from Brest. There was a

47. LCA to Rodney; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, February 5, 1762.

a new war plan on foot, the details of which had been kept from him, and to which he was strictly enjoined to make himself subservient.

For him to leave his station now was impossible. His orders were too clear for that. But in spite of these plain instructions to have a squadron of ten of the line ready for special service for Pocock when he arrived, Rodney decided that Douglas should still go on in accordance with the discretion his original orders allowed. While he, therefore, returned to Martinique, Douglas with ten of the line, held on for Jamaica.

In Port Royal, which Douglas reached on April 12th, he found nine ships. Here too he heard that Blenac's squadron, now reduced to six of the line and three frigates, was in Cap Francois, and that any intention there may have been of an attack on Jamaica from Havana had been abandoned, owing, it was believed, to the dispositions which Rodney had made. He also heard that more troops were expected down from North America to join the "grand expedition", and had seen the orders which had been sent to Holmes, in view of the coming expedition. In these the dead admiral was ordered to assist Governor Lyttleton in raising the corps of free negroes to act with Albemarle's troops and to await Pocock's instructions at Port Royal with all his squadron ready to sail. The orders ended with the same stringent clause as

Rodney's.⁴⁸ But Douglas was as little affected as Rodney had been. The danger of the ships from North America which were expected to rendezvous with Pocock and Albemarle seemed to him to justify the freest interpretation. Instead, therefore, of obeying, he immediately sent seven of the line and two frigates away to take station at Tortuga, an island which lies just to the leeward of Cap Francois, so as to cover the passage of the North American transports, and deal with Blenac if he attempted to come out.⁴⁹

Rodney himself returned to St. Pierre. There he found Monckton had been concentrating every man that could be safely recalled from the island garrisons. Rodney busied himself with transport arrangements according to his new instructions. Still he could not be content to see what few ships that remained in his squadron idle, and in spite of the order to undertake no new operations, he dispatched the greatest part of these ships to cruise on the Spanish main.

There was, however, a good strategical reason which was quite in accord with his other dispositions. For in Cartagena⁵⁰ lay a Spanish squadron of three of the line and a frigate, which might well be destined to form part of a

48. LCA to Holmes; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, February 5, 1762.

49. Douglas to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/307, May 8, 1762.

50. Cartagena or Cartagena de las-Indias: a city and seaport of Columbia. Latitude 10°25'N; Longitude 75°34'W.

general concentration against Jamaica, and had to be watched as well as Blenac in Cap Francois.⁵¹ Even if it is assumed that this was his intention, the responsibility he took in sending a squadron so far to leeward was very serious. He was still further scattering the fleet he had been told to concentrate, and surely without sufficient justification. At best Rodney's conduct on this occasion must stand for an example of latitude in interpretation being stretched to the extreme limit.

Meanwhile in England affairs were moving along with some dispatch. On January 13, 1762 the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty gave Pocock orders to go to Portsmouth and hoist his flag aboard the Namur (90),⁵² and there to collect the ships of war, troop transports and supply vessels intended for the expedition. Advance orders had already been sent out to the Navy Board that from eight to ten thousand tons of shipping might be wanted on the shortest notice.⁵³ The bulk of these transports would come from the Belleisle operation, and the Navy Board was ordered, on the arrival of these ships at Portsmouth, to inspect them and

51. Caesareo Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola Desde La Union De Los Reinos De Castilla Y De Leon (Hereafter cited as Duro), (9 vols), (Madrid, 1895-1903), VII, 43. There is, however, no actual evidence that Rodney knew of this squadron.

52. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/87, January 13, 1762.

53. LCA to Navy Board (Hereafter cited as NB); PRO:Adm. 3/69, January 7, 1762.

fit them for foreign service. The west coast ports were scoured for shipping⁵⁴ and orders were issued on the 9th of January to build twenty-five flat bottomed boats in the vicinity of Portsmouth⁵⁵ suitable for landing operations. The Commissioners for Victualling were given orders "to cause six months Provisions for 6000 Troops to be provided,"⁵⁶ and so that the 'inner man' would not be neglected the same ration of brandy was ordered made ready for 6000 men.⁵⁷

At the same time orders were sent out to collect all the pilots in the West Indies who were capable of taking ships through the Old Straits of Bahama and hold these pilots ready to join the fleet commanded by Sir George Pocock.⁵⁸ General Amherst and Lord Colville were sent detailed instructions to provide transports and convoy for the troops sent from North America to Lord Albemarle's army. A rendezvous was established off the northwest end of the Island of St. Dominique; off Cape Nicholas. If the North American convoy did not find Pocock and Albemarle there, it

54. LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/69, January 8, 1762.

55. Same to Same; PRO:Adm. 3/69, January 9, 1762.

56. LCA to Commissioners for Victualling (Hereafter cited as CV); PRO:Adm. 3/79, January 11, 1762.

57. Same to Same; PRO:Adm. 3/79, January 13, 1762.

58. Egremont to Shirley; PRO:CO 117/1/9, Whitehall, January 12, 1762.

was to follow the Old Bahama Straits to Havana where it was to join the fleet and army.⁵⁹ Recognition signals were provided so that there would be no confusion on meeting.⁶⁰ Lord Colville was to provide transports for 4000 troops at New York, and in case sufficient ships could not be found at once, two divisions of the convoy were to be made. In either case, the convoy was to be provided with escort vessels from Lord Colville's command.⁶¹

These orders were supplemented a few days later by a letter from Lord Albemarle to Sir Jeffrey Amherst which recapitulated the orders Albemarle had himself received, the arrangements that Amherst was expected to make, and the progress of preparations afoot in England. Albemarle stressed the necessity of Amherst's sending without fail the 4000 American troops.

"I place great dependance," wrote the anxious General, "on the Quantity as well as the Quality of the troops from you, from the great uncertainty of the numbers I am to get from General Monckton if he has failed in the

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59. LCA to Capt. Houlton; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, January 13, 1762; "Rendezvous for the Ships from North America..."; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, January 13, 1762.
60. "Signals for Ships in the West Indies and from North America to know each other by:
The ship to Windward is to hoist a Dutch Flag at the Maintopmast Head.
The ship to Leeward is to answer by hoisting an English ensign at the Foretopmast Head."
PRO:Adm. 2/1332, January 13, 1762.
61. LCA to Rt. Hon. Lord Colville; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, January 13, 1762.

final attempt of landing at Martinique; while he [Monckton] has had considerable Reinforcement from here [England], if he has landed and is engaging the Enemy when I arrive at Prince Rupert's Bay (my first Rendezvous and Watering Place) what assistance can I receive from Monckton's Corps that has been engaging both Enemy and Climate?"⁶²

Amherst was also notified that the expedition was expected to leave England about the middle of February and that it was probable that Lord Albemarle would "have frequent occassion of writing"⁶³ as soon as the preparations in England were further advanced.

Meanwhile careful instructions were sent to Governor Lyttleton of Jamaica ordering him to organize on a war footing, as quickly as he could a regiment of free negroes.⁶⁴ In addition to this regiment, Lyttleton was to raise a labor force of 2000 slaves that would join the expedition

62. Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/93, London, January 19, 1762.

63. Same to Same; Ibid.

64. The drafts and memoranda relating to this order are preserved in PRO:CO 117/1/1-32. The companies of the regiment of free negroes were to be limited to only 70 men. This was to relieve the governor of obvious difficulties "should he follow the usual establishment in the Army of 100 men to a Company, which possibly would be found too small a proportion of officers for a Corps of this nature and thus rapid and circumstanced." The governor was given the power to grant commissions as high as the rank of captain, and the "expense of levying, subsistence, clothing, etc. would be defrayed by Lord Albemarle." To keep the cost of the regiment down (it was expected to be high), the regiment was to remain on half-pay until it formally joined Lord Albemarle's force.

with the regiment of free negroes.⁶⁵

The English regiments that constituted Albemarle's initial force were the 22d (Lieutenant General Whitmore's), 34th (Major General Lord Cavendish's), 56th (Colonel Keppel's), 72d (Major General the Duke of Richmond's) and two companies of Protestant prisoners of war under the command of Major Freron.⁶⁶ These troops received their marching orders to move to Portsmouth and board the transports that were to be made ready for them there.

65. Egremont to Lyttleton; PRO:CO 137/32, February 1762.

66. Albemarle to James Rivers; PRO:CO 117/1/15, Whitehall, February 13, 1762.

with the lines of operations
against Havana in 1762.

Statute Miles.

British  **French**  **Spanish**



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VII

Havana: The Approach

The naval preparations for the great expedition were put entirely in the hands of Sir George Pocock, who after discharging his private affairs in London, reached Portsmouth on February 18, 1762.¹ There, all was chaos. Although Pocock had received his orders to go to Portsmouth on January 14, the Namur, his flagship, was still in dry-dock, the resolute admiral felt that strong measures were necessary if his fleet was ever to get to sea.² Consequently the Admiralty ordered that the shipwrights repairing the Namur and the other vessels tentatively assigned to Pocock should do a "double days work" to get them ready for sea.³ On the morning of February 19, Sir George's flag was

1. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, February 18, 1762, Portsmouth.
2. Same to Same; PRO:Adm. 1/237, January 14, 1762, Benner Street.
3. NB to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 106/2194, January 20, 1762.
The ships assigned to Sir George Pocock's fleet were:

<u>Namur</u> (90)	Captain Harrison- Admiral Pocock
<u>Valiant</u> (74)	" Duncan - Commodore Keppel
<u>Hampton Court</u> (64)	" Innes
<u>Orford</u> (66)	" Arbuthnot
<u>Belleisle</u> (64)	" Knight
<u>Edgar</u> (64)	" Drake
<u>Rippon</u> (60)	" Jekyll
<u>Mercury</u> (24)	" Goodall
<u>Laurel</u> , Transport	" Randall

"Orders to above Captains to put themselves under the

hoisted on board the Namur and the necessary orders began to be transmitted and carried out that would organize the fleet into an efficient unit.⁴ What transports had been collected at Spithead were ordered to fit themselves out with canvas ventilators and an allowance of vinegar was ordered issued them so that the ventilators might be washed. In case of accidents, and to further the meager rations that the troops would have while at sea, each transport was ordered provided with a set of fishing gear.⁵ However, news of Pocock's thoroughness in preparations must have filtered back to the Admiralty, for, included among the various orders and memoranda enjoining urgency and haste in preparing his ships for sea was an order from the Lords Commissioners urging the strictest economy in "the use of cables, cordage, rigging and sails."⁶ No war was too serious, no campaign too important, and no situation too perilous to prevent their lordships from hampering it with injunctions that savored of pettiness.

Arrangements were made by the government for Pocock and Albemarle to draw all their bills of credit on the Navy Board rather than on the Lords of the Treasury. Thus at

Command of Admiral Sir George Pocock, K.B."; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 16, 1762.

4. HMS Namur; PRO:Adm. 51/621/X, Friday, February 19, 1762.
5. LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/79, January 22, 1762.
6. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 13, 1762.

least a clear financial policy was inaugurated from the beginning of the expedition.⁷ The Navy Board was ordered to advance a sum of £ 1000 to Sir George "to enable him to defray the contingent expences of a Squadron of His Majesty's Ships put under his command."⁸ This was at any rate a handsome gesture and was followed soon after by an Order in Council which allowed 20 shillings a day table money to "Flag Officers, Commanders in Chiefs of Fleets or Squadrons...."⁹ This marked an increase of benefits for Sir George, who might otherwise have had to pay the difference between his own pay and allowances and the cost of entertaining Lord Albemarle aboard the Namur on the voyage to Havana.

In the middle of February, the Admiralty sent down to Portsmouth the necessary warrants enabling Pocock to assemble courts martial, appoint officers to vacancies and administer the "Oaths and Test appointed by Act of Parliament" as well as the equally necessary formal orders which placed all the commanders of transport vessels and warships "employed on a Secret Expedition" under his command.¹⁰ A

7. Anson to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/17-18, February 13, 1762.
8. LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/79, February 15, 1762.
9. Same to Same; PRO:Adm. 3/79, February 16, 1762.
10. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 15, 1762; LCA to Hon. Augustus Keppel, Capts. Harrison, Duncan, Innes, Arbuthnot, Jekyll, Goodall, Randall, Drake, Knight; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 16, 1762; PRO:Adm. 3/79, February 13, 1762.

few days later a letter arrived advising him that the paymaster general was sending a deputy on board the Namur, and that this officer, his treasure, servants, and baggage were to be under the admiral's especial care.¹¹ Nor was Albemarle spared this formidable snowstorm of paperwork; "Blank Commissions for twelve Persons to be Colonels of Foot in America only...", "Secret Instructions," "Seperate Instructions," muster reports, memoranda from every government office in London descended upon the unfortunate earl.¹² There was nothing to do but minute the dispatches, write covering letters, reply assiduously to every inquiry and hope that soon Sir George Pocock would see fit to gather his fleet together and leave Portsmouth and the horrors of paperwork far behind.

Sir George did not spare himself, his staff, or the dockyard workers in Portsmouth. Nothing was too little or too small to escape his eye.¹³ As Lord Albemarle wrote

11. LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/79, February 18, 1762; LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/87, February 18, 1762.
12. Townshend to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/19, War Office, February 16, 1762; Egremont to Albemarle; PRO:CO 117/1/21, Whitehall, February 18, 1762; Same to Same; PRO:CO 117/1/24-36, Whitehall, February 15, 1762; Same to Same; PRO:CO 117/1/38, St. James, February 18, 1762. For the text of the "Secret Instructions" and "Seperate Instructions", see Appendix V.
13. Observing that the stores for the four regiments being embarked at Portsmouth were so bulky that little room was left for troops, Sir George applied first to the Admiralty for an extra ship for these stores (since they would not be needed on the voyage) and then observing a great quantity of rotten sailcloth lying in storage at Portsmouth, and that the four regiments were ill-equipped in the matter of tents

Secretary Egremont, "Sir George is indefegatable...and the rest of the Gentlemen of the Navy are doing as much as Men can do...."¹⁴ Pocock's mind was racing far ahead of the rest of his companions; realizing that a landing on a hostile shore with only eighteen flatboats might prove disastrous, he suggested to the commanders of the transports and victuallers that they each take one flat boat on board,

"I have ordered one boat on each man of war and directed such of the victuallers to take flatboats as can carry 'em, but they refus'd unless they were made an additional allowance as they are hired by the Tons they carry, therefore hopes their Lordships will give Directions to the Victualling Board to settle that matter as it may be necessary to carry as many of those boats as possible."¹⁵

The Admiralty chary of innovations and worrying about added expense and "the lack of time to make any alteration in the disposition of the ships"¹⁶ vetoed the idea, but Pocock was not dismayed. His letters to Secretary Cleveland reiterate the theme that while he is in charge "no time is lost in getting everything ready."¹⁷ But there were interruptions

for campaigning in the tropics, Pocock quietly wrote the Navy Board asking that this condemned material be allotted to Albemarle's forces. LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/69, February 22, 1762.

14. Albemarle to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/53, February 22, 1762.
15. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, February 23, 1762, Namur, at Spithead.
16. Same to Same; Ibid, Admiralty endorsement on reverse side in Secretary Cleveland's handwriting.
17. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, February 24, 1762, Namur, at Spithead.

over which he had no control.

On Sunday the 28th of February the Duke of York came down to see the preparations and say goodbye to the commanders of the expedition.

"At One the Duke of York with some Nobility came on board, then we struck Sir George Pocock's Flag and Hoist'd the Duke's Standard and Saluted him with 21 guns as did the rest of the Ships here...at 4:30 on the Duke's going on shore we fired 21 guns...and hoist'd Sir George Pocock's Flag..."¹⁸

Finally on March 3, 1762, the fleet was ready. The signal for unmooring was hoisted on the Namur's yardarm and 67 transports, victuallers, tenders with the Valiant, Rippon, Belleisle and Hampton Court and three Indiamen sailed out of Spithead. The next day they had arrived at St. Helens, where the fleet anchored for the night. At 3:30 on the 5th, the fleet again weighed and stood out of St. Helens, but on leaving the roads, the Houghton, Indiaman rammed the Laurel, transport and Pocock was forced to detach the Rippon to escort both ships to port where they could be repaired.¹⁹ On February 7, Pocock wrote Cleveland explaining in great detail the circumstances of the accident. The Laurel proved so very leaky after the accident that her stores could not be taken out and

18. Log of HMS Namur; PRO:Adm. 51/621/X, Sunday, February 28, 1762, Moor'd at Spithead.

19. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, March 5, 1762, Namur, at St. Helens; Same to Same; Ibid, March 6, 1762, Namur, off Portland.

"they will be much wanted, being chiefly spare oars, boards, and Timbers, etc, for repairing the flat bottomed boats, I therefore hope their Lordships will please to send them by the first opportunity and presumes their Lordships will likewise think it necessary to send an armed ship..."²⁰

Unfortunately the Laurel was so badly damaged that she sank off Duness before reaching port, but the Admiralty decided to fit out another vessel to take her place.²¹

The voyage out to the West Indies was calm and orderly. On March 11th a French ship the St. Priest from Bourbon was taken by the Valiant.²² Pocock ordered the captains of the Burford and St. Florentine, two transports, to put a prize crew on board the St. Priest "but on the 14th it being thick weather, they and the Prize lost Company, and I saw nothing of them afterwards...",²³ however, Pocock had made preparations for contingencies of this kind. The captains had orders to join Lord Howe if they separated from the convoy.²⁴ On the 20th of April Pocock and the fleet sighted Barbados.

20. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, March 7, 1762, Namur, off Plymouth Sound.
21. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas; LCA to NB; PRO:Adm. 3/69, March 12, 1762.
22. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas; Log of HMS Namur; PRO:Adm. 51/621/X, March 11, 1762.
23. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.
24. Lord Howe commanded the squadron in Basque-road which was watching French activities in Rochefort.

and at quarter past eight in the morning anchored in Carlisle Bay. There Pocock found the Rippon already arrived and letters from Rear Admiral Rodney informing him of the state of his squadron, the best place to water the fleet and the preparations made for embarking the troops on Martinique.²⁵

Rodney had been notified in February officially and unofficially some weeks earlier that Pocock's fleet was to be expected and that his squadron and the forces under the command of General Monckton would be needed.²⁶ Consequently it was something of a surprise for Pocock to read in Rodney's letter that Sir James Douglas had taken ten of the line to Jamaica, since he had had news of an intended attack

25. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas; Log of HMS Namur; PRO:Adm. 51/621/X, April 20, 1762.
26. General Monckton's forces consisted of the 1st (Royals), 22d (Gage's), 94th (Vaughn's), 95th, 77th (Montgomery's Highlanders), 4th (Durooure's), 65th (Malpas's), 100th (Cambell's), 38th, 69th, 76th, 90th (Grant's), 15th, 17th (Monckton's), 27th (Blackney's), 28th (Townshend's), 35th (Otway's), 40th (Armiger's), 1/42 and 2/42 (1st and 2d Bns. of Murray's), 43d (Talbot's), 48th (Webb's), 3/60th (3d Bn. of the Royal Americans), Artillery and Engineers totalling nearly 14,000 men. Admiral Rodney's squadron consisted of Marlborough (70), Dublin (74), Foudroyant (84), Dragon (74), Temeraire (74), Culloden (74), Temple (70), Vanguard (70), Modeste (64), Sterling Castle (64), Devonshire (64), Raisable (64), Alcide (64), Nottingham (60), Rochester (50), Sutherland (50), Norwich (50), Falkland (50), Woolwich (44), Penzance (44), Dover (40), Echo (32), Stag (32), Repulse (32), Acteon (28), Crescent (28), Lizard (28), Levant (28), Nightingale (20), Fowey (20), Greyhound (20), Rose (20), Antigua (10), Barbadoes (10), Ferret (16), Virgin (12), Zephyr (12), and bombs, Basilisk (8), Thunder (8), Grenada (8), Infernal (8).

on that island by a combined Franco-Spanish force.²⁷

Pocock contented himself with completing his ships' provisions to six months and sailed on the morning of the 23d of April. He was joined shortly after leaving the harbor by the Mercury (24), and Frederick William, tender, and five transports that had lost company with the fleet on the passage to Barbados. Albemarle received letters from General Monckton at the same time that Pocock had received his from Rodney. In these letters was the disquieting news that a large proportion of the transports available at Martinique had been sent to England with French prisoners. This information the earl passed on to Sir George. All that the admiral could do was hire what was available in Barbados to supplement his own transport vessels.

"I ordered Captain Randell to hire the Duke of York an Old East India Ship, and Ordered four Months Provisions on board of Her for three Hundred Men, with Water in proportion, which not having finished when I sailed, I left the Hampton Court to assist her, with Orders for the Barbadoes, Sloop to follow me as soon as she had got in a new Main Mast..."²⁸

Arriving at Cas Navire Bay, Martinique on the 25th Pocock and Albemarle were prepared for almost anything. Both commanders were alarmed at the casualness which General

27. Rodney to Pocock; PRO:Gifts and Deposits 20/8 (Rodney Papers, hereafter cited as GD 20/8), March 31, and April 9, 1762, Marlborough, Basse Terre Road, St. Kitts; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.
28. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

Monckton and Admiral Rodney had treated the orders sent them to prepare for their coming. Cas Navire Bay was however, not one of the disappointments. As Rodney had written Pocock it was "the most proper and Convenient Place in all these parts of the West Indies...where a very large Fleet can always Water with ease."²⁹ Pocock, without losing time set to work watering the fleet and preparing the transports to receive Monckton's troops. While these preparations were taking place Captain Shuldham of the Raisable arrived with Admiral Rodney's apologies for not being at the rendezvous to meet Pocock but "he was much indisposed and...could not wait upon me." Captain Shuldham also brought the "State of Mr. Rodney's Squadron" and an "intelligence of Twenty Ships of the Line being at the Havanna" and that the French squadron under Blenac was at Cap Francois and had lost the Dragon (64) while entering the harbor there. Shuldham provided the list of ships³⁰ that Sir James Douglas had taken on Rodney's orders to Jamaica and the information that the Culloden (74) was at St. Christophers waiting for masts and that the Cambridge (80) was at Jamaica and reported to be in very bad condition. Whereupon the sorely tried admiral

29. Rodney to Pocock; PRO:GD 20/8, March 31, 1762, Marlborough, Basse Terre Road, St. Kitts.

30. Dublin (74), Culloden (74), Temple (70), Dragon (74), Temeraire (74), Devonshire (64), Sterling Castle (64), Sutherland (50), Alcide (64), Nottingham (60), Penzance (44), Dover (40), Grenada (8), Thunder (8).

blew up.

"For these reasons," he wrote Cleveland, "and as the Squadron which went to Jamaica with Sir James Douglas only consisted of Eight Ships of the Line, as the Sutherland could not be reckoned one, I sent a Letter to Rear Admiral Rodney desiring to be inform'd where the Ships under His Command were cruizing and the intelligence he had received of the Island of Jamaica being in danger, which occassioned his sending all the Squadron thither, with every thing else necessary for me to be informed of..."³¹

Rodney's answer to Pocock's queries did not improve Sir George's temper and

"finding by his Answer, that from the Distance of the Stations in which the Ships of the Line under his Command were Cruizing, there was no possibility of ordering any of them to join me during my short stay at Martinique, I therefore thought it absolutely necessary for His Majesty's Service to take the Marlborough, and Ordered Admiral Rodney to take his Flag on board the Rochester, until such time as some other Ships of his Squadron should join him when he was to hoist it on board such of them as he should think proper"³²

Pocock's anger was surely pardonable, for in consequence of what Rodney had done, he found himself confronted with a situation that must have looked almost desperate. The information he had received from Captain Shuldham was that Spain had in Havana twenty of the line and that the Brest squadron had gotten into Cap François, but whether it was still there or not was unknown. Pocock now had to conduct a combined operation in the face of two fleets with the

31. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

32. Same to Same; Ibid.

smallest of which he was barely equal.

The problem of commerce protection proved to be almost as great. At St. Kitts lay about fifty merchantmen outward bound to Jamaica with a convoy of two of the line waiting to proceed across the danger zone under his protection, while at Jamaica the first homeward bound convoy of the year was gathering and he was charged with its protection as well.³³

Lord Anson had based the whole operation upon a naval concentration that was to be effected outside the danger zone, but as the harassed admiral wrote to Cleveland, Rodney had scattered his units so widely that it was impossible to order them to close upon Pocock at Martinique. Thus Rodney had committed him to a concentration at Cape St. Nicholas, between the French and Spanish fleets, and from this there was no escape. Even a Nelson might have shuddered at the implications of this dilemma. However, as Sir Julian Corbett acknowledged in his great study of the Seven Years' War.

"The way in which he [Pocock] finally solved the problem presents one of the most instructive strategical combinations in the whole war."³⁴

There was one important consideration which rendered the problem less difficult than it appeared and went far to

33. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.
34. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 256.

alleviate the discomfiture of Rodney's dispositions. A concentration of the French and Spanish fleets was by no means a simple matter. In the first place, two allied squadrons are seldom, if ever, the same thing strategically as two divisions of one fleet. They have opposing interests drawing them in opposite directions and hardly ever is it easy for them to agree on courses of action. This was markedly so in the present case.

Both hostile admirals who had express orders on the subject, and particularly Blenac, counted on a concentration of their strength. Each, however, was anxious that it should be effected at a point which would best cover the interests of his own country. Blenac, who had left France before the war with Spain was declared, had come to save what he could of the French West Indies. Don Juan de Prado Porto Carrero,³⁵ the Spanish captain general, on his part, was strictly charged with the defense of Havana. He had to support him twenty sail,³⁶ not twenty of the line as Pocock had been informed. There were in addition to these ships three of the line at Santiago de Cuba³⁷ at the opposite end

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35. Don Juan de Prado Porto Carrero: no information available.
36. Tigre (70), Reyna (70), Soverano (70), Infante (70), Neptuno (70), Aquilon (70), Asia (64), America (60), Europa (60), Conquistador (60), San Genaro (60), San Antonio (60), Vinganza (26), Thetis (22), Marte (18), Phoenix, storeship, Africa (60), and some smaller craft.
37. Monarcha (74), Arrogante (70), Gallicia (70), Pallas (26).

of the island, two ships cruising in the Bay of Campeachy,³⁸ three of the line and a frigate at Cartagena³⁹ and one or two at La Vera Cruz. All these ships were under the command of Don Gutierre de Hevia, Marques del Real Transporte who had come out with Prado as commander in chief of the American squadrons.⁴⁰ His orders were to keep the Havana squadron concentrated within the port ready for any emergency and not to risk needless sorties.⁴¹ These at least were the last instructions that Hevia and Prado had received and they were nearly six months old. When war between England and Spain became certain later orders were sent out but the Aviso⁴² carrying them was intercepted by the Milford (16) off the western most part of St. Domingo and after an all-day fight forced her to strike. The commander of the Aviso sunk his dispatches and nothing ever reached Havana except a copy of the Madrid Gazette containing the declaration of war against England.⁴³

Added to these considerations there was in the way of easy concentration for the French and Spanish squadrons the

38. Vencedor (70), Castilla (60).

39. Serio (70), Firmé (70), Dichoso (70), Fleche (30).

40. Don Gutierre de Hevia, Marques del Real Transporte: no information available.

41. Duro, VII, 43.

42. Aviso, a dispatch vessel.

43. Duro, VII, 45.

difficulty of the prevailing weather conditions. It would be very easy for Blenac to run down to Havana, but very difficult for Hevia to beat up to Cap François. This Rodney and Douglas knew and since it was apparent that there was little chance of Hevia's attempting to get to Blenac they had taken care by their dispositions that Blenac should find it impossible to join Hevia.

Prado and Hevia had come out from Spain with a squadron of six of the line. Blenac had expected them to call at Cap François but disappointed by their failure to make that port a stopping point on their way to Havana, he now urged them to come to his help. He informed them that only a small British squadron lay before Cap François and if Hevia came it might easily be surprised and destroyed. Then together they might take the offensive and strike an important blow against the English. But Prado and Hevia, entrenched in their defensive orders and fortified by their natural Spanish reserve and indolence, would not move.⁴⁴

Under these circumstances a concentration at Cape Nicholas was imperative and the day after Pocock reached Martinique he sent off an express to Douglas to meet him there with all the Jamaica squadron, which according to Rodney's information he believed was awaiting his orders in Port Royal. The following day he sent the Barbadoes, sloop

44. Duro, VII, 46-47; Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 258.

with duplicates of these orders directing her to call at St. Kitts and inform the captains of the Culloden, Edgar and their large convoy for Jamaica "to hold themselves in constant readiness to get under sail the moment I appeared in the offing."⁴⁵

There was plenty of time for Albemarle had spent some days rearranging Monckton's transport dispositions, getting more troops from Dominica and fitting out horse transports. Lord Albemarle on arriving at Martinique now received his share of surprises. Writing to Amherst he vented his indignation on the state of affairs at Martinique. Monckton had informed Albemarle by letter at Barbados that his command had suffered few casualties, his troops were healthy, and that all was arranged for embarking these troops in transports. On his arrival, Albemarle found that Monckton's statements were far from true. "I found them [the troops] very sickly, many dead and the sick list increasing daily." This deplorable condition Albemarle believed chiefly due to Monckton's slovenly camp discipline, which led to the troops availing themselves of quantities of bad rum,

"a sure proof that diabolical liquor is the cause of all our sickness is that the soldiers were very healthy when employed and could not come at it."⁴⁶

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45. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.
46. Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/132, May 5, 1762, Namur, Cas de Navire.

The four regiments from England were still healthy as great care was taken to keep rum from them and them from it. But liquor was not the only problem. "I found the troops wanting all sorts of camp equipment and complaining of the badness of their arms," and the regiments he saw were so very incomplete that "they have chosen the best of the arms for the soldiers able to carry them." Fortunately he had brought out a complete new lot of arms with him and "came out from England very well provided with Victuallers" and camp equipage. Albemarle hastened to add that he hoped Amherst would aid him as much as he could. The big problem at the moment was money and Albemarle did not know where to procure any. His four regiments from England had been paid to May 24th but Monckton's had received their last payments on February 24th and Albemarle had had to lend Monckton £ 10,000 to pay his troops on account.⁴⁷

As the North American troops were to be returned to Amherst's command, Albemarle hoped that Amherst would send him some money to tide him over for their payment. After describing the naval situation and castigating Rodney for "detaching the ships destined for Sir George Pocock's Squadron" he outlined a theory to Amherst as to the probable employment of the French troops now at Cap François. It was clear to him that the "French mean to establish them-

47. Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/132, May 5, 1762, Namur, Cas de Navire.

selves in Louisiana" and he thought they would pour their troops into there "as soon as we are passed the Cape."

Albemarle expected to land 8000 men at Havana but he urged Amherst to send him 4000 from North America as soon as he possibly could. Excellent reports of their fighting value were retailed him by Monckton but "he doesn't doubt that the four Regiments from England will distinguish themselves."⁴⁸

The following day Albemarle wrote again unburdening himself still further. Not only were the transport arrangements confused, but the army agent was a rogue. Monckton instead of joining Albemarle's staff, had decided to throw up his command and go back to America. Utter confusion seemed the order of the day.⁴⁹ Monckton and Rodney having been on bad terms "the service suffers" and had "they taken the proper measures which they had time to do as they knew of our coming the 20th of March we should not have been detained forty-eight Hours." As it was, Albemarle wrote, "the Admiral sent the French prisoners away in our best

48. Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/132, May 5, 1762, Namur, Cas de Navire.

49. "Dear Jeff,

It is very strange to me to write to your Excellency in a formal way....Captain Schackerly, agent of the Transports is a stupid dog...Major General Monckton...returns home to North America...[and] Entre nous I found Everything in the greatest confusion here..."

Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/139, May 6, 1762, Namur, off Martinique.

Transports" and the rest were "so neglected that they were so nasty it was a Shame to put troops on board them." Furthermore, many troops were embarked without any system whatsoever; "every Regiment taking what transports they liked or could get."⁵⁰

Albemarle could not praise enough the valor of the North American troops but he included in his letter a word of caution to Amherst.

"Your Army is a very fine one, brave to the last degree, almost spoilt by the expedition up the River St. Lawrence, your Officers are all Generals with a thorough contempt for everybody that has not served under Mr. Wolfe. They either suffer or cannot prevent the Soldiers doing what they please...I dare not find fault as yet [but] I am greatly afraid they will oblige me to tell them my mind when we are better acquainted, they have conquered in a few days the strongest Country you ever saw in the American way running on with the Indian hoop [whoop], that manner of fighting will not always Succeed and I dread their meeting of troops that will stand their ground, they are extremely brave and will be cut to pieces..."⁵¹

Finally all the troops were embarked, and Pocock anxious to get to sea, led the fleet out of the bay on May 6, shaping a course for St. Kitts. On the evening of the 8th, the Jamaica convoy joined Pocock's fleet off Basse Terre Road⁵² and the immense collection of ships headed

50. Albemarle to Amherst; PRO:WO 34/55/139, May 6, 1762, Namur, off Martinique.
51. Same to Same; Ibid.
52. The fleet then consisted of 160 transports, victuallers, hospital ships, etc., 46 trading vessels and the Namur (90), Valiant (74), Culloden (74), Belleisle (64), Orford (66),

towards Cape St. Nicholas for the rendezvous with Douglas and the Jamaica squadron.⁵³

The reason for the final concentration at Cape St. Nicholas which lies in the Windward passage between St. Domingo and the eastern tip of Cuba shows the most brilliant part of Anson's grand design and Pocock's skill. This was not, of course, on the ordinary route from the Windward Islands to Havana. That was straight ahead, past Jamaica and through the Yucatan Channel with an "easy beat back of some two hundred and fifty miles with the current along the North West end of Cuba."⁵⁴ The natural plan, and therefore the one that the enemy would expect, was a concentration at Port Royal, with a squadron held back off Cap Francois to blockade Blenac and to cover the line of passage from North America. So long as the Spanish could observe no concentration at Jamaica they would be lulled into comparative security.

There was, however, another route to Havana which lay through the old Bahama Channel and which was regarded as impracticable for the fleets of the eighteenth century

Edgar (64), Rippon (60), Hampton Court (64), Marlborough (70), Mercury (24), Alarm (32), Basilisk (8), bomb, and Lurcher (14), cutter.

Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

53. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

54. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 259.

maritime powers; it was never used by the Spaniards except for very small craft and it was unreasonable to expect they would prepare for a seaborne invasion along this route.

Anson had at the Admiralty Spanish charts and they "convinced him that under such a man as Pocock, a British fleet could pass."⁵⁵ This line of advance was both unexpected and quicker than any other and it also provided an unexpected concentration of force between the two bases of the French and the Spanish.

Pocock arrived off Cape St. Nicholas the 17th of May where he was joined by the Barbadoes, sloop from Jamaica carrying letters from Sir James Douglas. These told Pocock that Douglas had received his orders and that he was about to join him with nine of the line⁵⁶ and that he had given orders to Captain Hervey's squadron, who with seven of the line was blockading Cap Francois to join Admiral Pocock there as well.⁵⁷ Contrary winds kept Douglas at Jamaica, but on the 17th and the two succeeding days Captain Hervey joined Pocock with his squadron,⁵⁸ informing him

55. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 260.

56. Dublin (74), Dragon (74), Temeraire (74), Temple (70), Devonshire (66), Cambridge (80), Dover (40), Alcide (64), Centaur (74), (careening), Sutherland (50), Thunder (8), bomb, Grenada (8), bomb.

57. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

58. Sterling Castle (64), Defiance (60), Nottingham (60), Pembroke (60), Hampshire (50), Centurion (50).

that the Dragon (74), Temeraire (74), and Alcide (64) were at Jamaica.

Douglas also advised Pocock in his letter that the Bonnetta, sloop had just arrived at Jamaica from Providence⁵⁹ and had brought nine pilots who were reputed to know the Old Bahama Channel. However, upon examination, Douglas thought them "very ill qualified to take charge of a Fleet through the Old Streights of Bahama" and that he had sent Captain Elphinstone in the Richmond (32) to go down the channel himself as far

"to the Westward as the Leewardmost end of Kee Sal, and both going thither and returning back again, to be extremely careful in taking Sketches of the Land, the bearings and distance of the different Islands from each other, Depths of Water, Soundings, etc, and to anchor every Night in the same manner as he would if a Fleet was with him, and having done so to return off Cape Nicholas...and also to endeavour to entice on board the Sloop and detain them there some of the Spanish Pilots of Barracoa..."⁶⁰

Douglas finally sailed from Jamaica on the 18th and joined Pocock's fleet on the 23d with the Dublin (74), Dragon (74), Temeraire (74), Cambridge (80), Devonshire (66), Temple (70), Thunder (8), and Grenada (8). Douglas informed him that the Centaur (74) was careening and the Alcide (64) was at Port Royal but that both ships would

59. Providence: (actually this is a misnomer, the proper name is New Providence), an island in the Bahamas located between Andeos Is. and Elenthero Is.

60. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.

join at Havana. Pocock then ordered Douglas to shift his flag to the Centurion (50) and take charge of the Jamaica convey. On his arrival at Port Royal, he was to collect all the merchant ships there and sail about June 20th with the Centurion (50), Boreas (28), and Viper (14) for England, but if the French squadron was still at the Cape when he left, he was enjoined to come by Havana "in order to go through the Gulf of Florida."⁶¹

By the 26th, Pocock had heard that Amherst was having trouble getting seamen for his transports, but Pocock decided not to wait for them off Cape St. Nicholas. In any case his secret instructions told him that he was not to wait for them if by so doing he imperiled the safety of the expedition. On May 27th, Douglas was detached and Pocock sailed from Cape St. Nicholas with the whole fleet without waiting for the American transports.⁶² Pocock organized his fleet into seven divisions for passing through the Old Straits of Bahama⁶³ and put his greatest strength in the van

61. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, May 26, 1762, Namur, off Cape Nicholas.
62. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off Chocoma River, near the Havana.
63. The whole fleet now consisted of Namur (90), Valiant (74), Cambridge (80), Culloden (74), Temeraire (74), Dragon (74), Dublin (74), Temple (74), Marlborough (70), Orford (66), Devonshire (66), Belleisle (64), Sterling Castle (64), Hampton Court (64), Defiance (60), Rippon (60), Pembroke (60), Edgar (60), Nottingham (60), Dover (44), Alarm (32), Trent (28), Mercury (24), Cygnets (18), Bonnetta (10), Turcher (8), Bombs, Thunder, Grenada, and Basilisk, Echo, sloop.

because his main anxiety was an attack from the windward on the rear of the fleet by Blenac, but nothing untoward happened to spoil the stately progress of the fleet.

Fires were built on the rocks in the most dangerous parts of the channel and by June 5th the fleet was clear of Cay Sal and in sight of Matanzas,⁶⁴ less than one hundred miles from Havana. On the 2d of June the Alarm and Echo engaged the Spanish frigate Thetis which was escorting a small convoy. The Thetis struck as did the Phoenix an armed store ship, but the remainder of the convoy escaped. By the morning of the 6th of June the fleet was within five leagues of Havana and Pocock made his final plans for the attack. The entire operation had thus far been entirely successful and Anson's confidence in Pocock's ability was thus proved correct.⁶⁵

64. Matanzas or San Carlos de Matanzas: city on the north coast of Cuba in Lat. 23°3'N and Long. 81°40'W, approximately 56 miles ESE of Havana.

65. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana.





VIII

Havana: The Siege

The plan for the landing had been worked out in some detail. Albemarle's force was organized in five brigades¹ and on the 6th of June directions were given to the masters of the transports that the main landing would be under the command of Commodore Keppel with six ships of the line and would be directed against the shores of Coximar Bay;² while Pocock with thirteen of the line and the bomb vessels would threaten and blockade the city. Prior to the main landing Pocock was to place the marines of the fleet in ships' boats and make a feint landing on the west side of the city. Such was the plan and it worked to perfection. Keppel destroyed without any trouble the two small stone forts guarding the entrance to Coximar Bay, and by the late afternoon of the

1. 1st Brigade (Brigadier General Haviland): 1st (Royal's), 56th (Keppel's), 60th (Royal American's), Haviland's. 2d Brigade (Brigadier General Walsh): 9th (Whitmore's), 28th (Townshend's), 48th (Webb's), 27th (Blackney's). 3d Brigade (Brigadier General Reid): 75th (Amherst's), 43d (Talbot's), 35th (Otway's), 34th (Cavendish's). 4th Brigade (Brigadier General Grant): 17th (Monckton's), 1/42d and 2/42d (Murray's), 77th (Montgomery's), 65th (Malpas's), 4th (Durore's). 5th Brigade (Brigadier General Lord Rollo): 22d (Gage's), 72d (Richmond's), 90th (Grant's), 40th (Armiger's). Artillery, Engineers, and Independent Corps. Total: 12,041 men.
2. See map of the siege. Coximar Bay is to the east of the Morro.

6th, Albemarle had his army on shore without a single casualty.³

The Spanish preparations for this sudden and successful assault by Pocock and Albemarle were poor in the extreme. Not only was Havana virtually undefended but the defenses of all Spain's Caribbean and American possessions were exceedingly weak.⁴ The garrison at Havana consisted of three regular regiments of infantry, nine squadrons of cavalry, and three companies of artillery.⁵ These forces were

3. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana; "McKellar's Journal of the Seige of the Havana" (Hereafter cited as McKellar's Journal) PRO:CO 117/1/110, June 6, 1762; Log of HMS Namur; PRO:Adm. 51/621, June 7, 1762.
4. It was only in 1762 that a professional army was first organized in New Spain, partly from regiments from Europe and partly from local levies. Although the war with England had brought the strength of the army in America up to a comparatively large number of men, it was maintained after 1762 at that scale only intermittently. In New Spain there were maintained four regiments of infantry and one separate battalion (5000), two regiments of dragoons (1000), a brigade of artillery (720), one small company of engineers, and local defenses of negligible size stationed at the minor seaports. One regiment of infantry was maintained at the Havana. These forces, together with the colonial militia, brought the strength of Spain's military forces in the West Indies and America up to about 22,000 men, but the ranks were rarely, if ever, completely filled. Clarence Henry Haring, The Spanish Empire In America, (New York, 1947), p. 124-125.
5. This made a total of 4610 regular troops according to the Spanish muster rolls. There has never been agreement upon the numbers of the forces defending the Havana by any historians who have touched upon the incident. Duro only gives the figures of the troops defending the Morro, P. J. Guiteras, a Cuban historian, maintains the English estimates are to be preferred to the official Spanish figures, and other historians, including A. J. Hart, Fortescue, Clowes, and Beatson say the total number was about 25,000 men. This figure

strengthened by drafts from the crews of the fleet in Havana harbor and from the militia and citizens of the city. Probably there were not at any time more than 12,000 fighting men facing Pocock and Albemarle but with the addition of the numerous auxiliary forces, there were possibly 24,000 people engaged in resisting the English attack in one fashion or another.

Although the appearance of the English forces was a distinct surprise to the Spanish commanders at Havana, orders had been sent out from Spain months before the declaration of war to improve the defenses of the city. Havana was surrounded by only a low wall that had served very well to discourage pirates during the time of Charles the Second, but was worse than useless in the event of a formal siege of the city.⁶ Notwithstanding, little had been done to put into action the rather elaborate instructions from Spain for the city's defense. The weakest part of the city's works lay in the unfortified state of a rocky ridge called Cabana Hill which ran along the east side of the harbor opposite the city. Cabana Hill was high enough to command all or nearly all of the fortifications of the city and

includes regulars, militia, slaves and citizen volunteers. The best estimate the writer has been able to make has been a total of 12,000 regulars and sailors, and 12,000 militia, slaves and citizens who acted as auxiliaries but were not actively engaged in the fighting.

6. Duro, VII, p. 41.

the harbor. The official scheme of defense called for its occupation by a powerful redoubt⁷ at its inner or landward end; the Morro fortress being the terminating point on the seaward side. The work was only talked about until the news of war arrived, and then the ground was cleared, but little else was done since the laborers and troops engaged on the task had come from Mexico and had introduced an outbreak of Yellow Fever in the city with the result that all work was abandoned.

Don Juan de Prado, moreover, was convinced that the city was impregnable, even without the unfinished Cabana defenses and that if the British were foolish enough to attempt an attack upon the city they would but break their heads against the Morro's stone walls. So confident was the Spanish commander that when a Spanish merchant from Jamaica appeared before the captain general earlier in the month of June with the news that the British were indeed planning an attack on Havana he was not believed. On the very morning of the attack the officer of the day at the Morro, who brought the news to the captain general that a strange fleet was in sight was reprimanded by the Spanish commander for spreading false alarms, and told that what he had seen was

nothing but the homeward bound Jamaica fleet. Only when the flatboats were in sight, loaded with troops, was the news believed, and only then was the garrison called out, the

7. Redoubt: a small fort.

militia mobilized, horses sought for the cavalry, and preparations made to defend the city.⁸

The Spanish were completely fooled by the feint landing to the west of the city, and a strong force of infantry and cavalry under the command of Colonel Don Carlos Caro were sent to oppose the supposed landing thus effectively weakening the Spanish forces available to defend the western part of the city.⁹ Unfortunately Albemarle made directly for the Morro rather than occupying the undefended Cabana ridgeline from which he would have had an excellent position to harass Prado in his efforts to prepare the defense.¹⁰ A force under the command of Elliot was sent to take possession of the village of Guanamacoa. After a brief skirmish with some Spanish infantry and cavalry the village was occupied and Albemarle and the main body of troops occupied positions

8. "Diary of Don Juan de Prado," Archives of the Indies; 81/4/24, 81/4/23, (No. 366); Report of the Spanish Court of Inquiry paraphrased in Duro, VII, 46-49; "Report of Balthazar Ricaud de Tirgale to the Council of War in Havana;" Archives of the Indies; 81/4/19; MS Diary of the Siege of Havana of Juan de Casta, deposited in the New York Public Library; F. R. Hart, Spanish Documents Relating to the Seize of Havana, Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 64, (1932). (This is a list of the photostats of the documents in the Archives of the Indies and other places relating to the siege of Havana and deposited in the Library of the Massachusetts Historical Society, where they have been consulted by the writer).
9. "Diary of Don Juan de Prado," Archives of the Indies; 81/4/24, 81/4/23 (No. 366). A photostat copy is deposited in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. and has been consulted by the writer.
10. J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, II, 266.

before the Morro and prepared to invest the fortress by siege operations.

The Spanish commanders met in a council of war on the night of the 9th and decided to sink three warships in the mouth of the harbor, and by the 10th this had been accomplished. Pocock left the mouth of the harbor after the Spaniards had sunk their blockships and anchored off Chorera River with the bulk of the fleet. Keppel remained on the east side of the harbor, where the original landing was made, and aided Albemarle's siege operations as best he could,

"keeping the Number of Seamen on shore which the Earl of Albemarle thinks it necessary to assist the Army in Landing their Cannon and Ordinance, Stores of all kinds, or manning Batteries, making Fascines and supplying the Army with Water from this Side, their being no Water or Wells on the Cavanios, as the weather has been for the most part very dry..."ll

The two naval commanders of the British fleet found plenty to occupy them. On the morning of the 10th Albemarle planned to occupy Cabana Hill, and Pocock "to facilitate the measure" made a diversionary attack on the west side of the harbor. On the evening of the 10th, the Belleisle went in-shore and battered the small stone fort at the mouth of the Chorera River and throughout the night the Cerebus, Mercury, Bonnetta, and Lurcher kept up a constant fire on the woods

11. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Mamur, off the Chorera River, near the Havana.

behind the fort. The next morning two battalions of marines and some troops under the command of Colonel Howe landed at the mouth of the Chorera River. While this diversion was taking place, Colonel Carleton attacked the Cabana hill and successfully captured it.¹²

By the 12th the first batteries had been established on Cabana hill, and the siege of the Morro had been entrusted to General Keppel. Every day that passed thereafter saw the addition of more batteries to those established against the Morro. The Thunder, bomb, which had been shelling the city since the arrival of the fleet, had so badly strained her timbers that her two great thirteen inch mortars were taken out of her and added to the fortifications on Cabana hill.¹³ These howitzers were most effective in driving the Spanish shipping up the harbor. Prior to the establishment of the mortar battery "they threw a great deal of random shot into the woods and annoyed us very much."¹⁴

By the middle of June Albemarle and Pocock had taken up the positions their forces were to hold for the remainder of

12. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off the Chorera River, near the Havana; "English against the Havana" (A journal of the siege operations by an officer employed in the diversionary force under Colonel Howe); PRO:WO 34/55/181, August 17, 1762; McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, June 10, 1762.
13. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off the Chorera River, near the Havana; McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, June 13, 1762.
14. McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, June 13, 1762.

the siege. General Elliot and a detachment of troops occupied the village of Guanamacoa on the south east side of the harbor and threatened the communications of the city from that side. Similarly on the west side of the harbor Colonel Howe with a small force proved useful in harassing the enemy,

"We have had daily skirmishes on this side the west and made excursions eight or nine miles in the country which is equally beautiful and rich. By a choice of ground and disposition of it with redoubts etc. we are hors de prise and nothing can pass or repass in the day to and from the town that we can't discover. The inhabitants eat nothing but the Cassada bread and it brought daily to the town..."¹⁵

The main effort, however, was confined to the batteries on Cabana hill which were directed against the town and the Morro. To aid Albemarle in battering the Morro, Pocock acceded to his request that some warships bombard it from the sea side, while Keppel's batteries were battering it on the land. Pocock may have been doubtful of the effectiveness of warships attempting to bombard the Morro, since the walls of that fortress were considerably higher than the decks of the ships and it would be difficult if not impossible for the guns on the ships to be elevated high enough to reply to the Spanish fire.¹⁶ But if he had doubts as to the wisdom of what he was asked to do, he made no protest against the

15. "English against the Havana;" PRO:WO 34/55/181, August 17, 1762.
16. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana.

scheme.

Accordingly the Dragon, Marlborough, Cambridge and Sterling Castle were ordered to attack the north east side of the Morro. The Sterling Castle was to lead the other three ships into position, absorbing all the punishment from the guns of the Morro until the other three ships were in the best possible places for bombarding the fortress, and then she was to sail out of action as best she could. Captain Hervey of the Dragon volunteered to command the operation and on the morning of the 1st of July the four ships began to move towards the fortress. At about eight o'clock in the morning they commenced their bombardment, but the return fire they received from the Morro was so devastating and powerful that at about two in the afternoon, the ships hauled off; nearly two hundred of their complements killed and wounded and the Cambridge so knocked about that nothing short of a complete over-haul would set her right again.¹⁷ Still in spite of the seemingly worthless and damaging efforts by the ships, the Earl of Albemarle wrote Pocock a note expressing his pleasure with the ships' performance and,

"signified to me the Ships had done incomparably well, having drawn much fire from our Batteries, by which means they had an opportunity of dismounting some of the Moro's guns which played

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17. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off the Chorera River, near the Havana.

against them..."¹⁸

The attack by the Dragon, Marlborough and Cambridge enabled several new British batteries to be constructed on the landward side of the Morro. This advantage would have been more than noticeable in the next few days, had not on July 2d one of the main batteries caught fire "from the dryness of the Fascines and the constant fire kept up by the battery." By the following day the battery was completely destroyed and "seventeen days labor of 500-600 men wasted." Pocock, however was equal to the emergency; the carpenters of the fleet were collected, two old transports were destroyed for lumber, and the burned battery and two fresh ones were completed by July 13th.¹⁹

On July 20th a mine was emplaced under the right or sea face of the Morro's right bastion and ten days later the mine was sprung. The resulting explosion had the result of making a breach in the Morro's walls "which the General and the Chief Engineer thought practicable"²⁰ and on the same day the Morro was taken by storm.

Two days before this event the reinforcements long expected from North America arrived, although four of their transports were wrecked in their passage through the Bahama

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18. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, July 14, 1762, Namur, off the Chorera River, near the Havana.
 19. McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, July 13, 1762.
 20. Ibid; July 30, 1762.

Straits and five other transports were captured by a squadron of French ships on July 21st, the bulk of the troops, reached Havana in time to take part in the storming of the Morro.²¹

With the capture of the Morro, the resistance of the city must of necessity have come to an end, yet a determination to resist prevailed and the fortifications continued to be strengthened wherever it was possible. Albemarle lost no time, however, in placing guns on the Morro where they would command the city and by August 10th his preparations were completed.²² The city was formally summoned to surrender but Governor Prado relied upon reinforcements promised him by the governor of Santiago de Cuba and hoped also for the possible arrival of the French squadron commanded by Blenac, so he refused. The people of the city were also opposed to surrender for they had within the last six days received reinforcements from several sides; two hundred and twelve rifles and ammunition from the town of Cuba, five hundred more from Jagua and fifteen hundred firearms of various types arrived during the 10th of August from the villages nearby. However the fierce fire which poured down on the city at daybreak on the 11th induced Prado to give up

21. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, August 16, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana; McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, July 30, 1762.
22. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, August 16, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana; McKellar's Journal; PRO:CO 117/1/110, August 10, 1762.

hope.²³ About noon the Spanish hung out flags to signify a truce and the governor sent word that Havana was ready to capitulate.²⁴

The same day the British forces occupied the city. So after a two months' siege fell the Queen city of the Indies. It had come to be regarded as impregnable, the inviolate symbol of the power of Spain. The moral effect of such a blow at the outset of the war was incalculable. As always it had been the hope of Spain in challenging England that she would recover Gibraltar, the gate of the Mediterranean. Instead, she had lost the gate of the Indies, and the British had won another Gibraltar in the west. Such a gain was well worth its terrible cost. The day after the capitulation, the return of the British forces showed eighteen hundred dead, besides thousands of sick and wounded, who were dying daily.²⁵ And that was only the beginning. The sickness continued to rage unabated all the rest of the autumn. Early in October the return showed five hundred and sixty killed or died of wounds, and no less than four thousand seven hundred dead of disease.²⁶ This alone was well over

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23. "Diary of Juan de Prado," Archives of the Indies; 31/4/24, 31/4/23, (No. 366); Diary of Juan de Casta.
24. McKellar's Journal, August 11, 1762; Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, August 16, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River; Albemarle to Egerton; PRO:CO 117/1/100; For the terms of the capitulation see Appendix VI.
25. Albemarle to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/135, August 12, 1762.
26. Albemarle to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/146, October 2, 1762.

a third of the whole force, and it took no count of the hundreds who died afterwards in England or America. Albemarle himself was a sick man for the rest of his life. This terrible loss by disease was the cost of the delay caused by the ministry's hesitation and their general's lack of experience.

Yet when the casualties were all reckoned, the fact remains that probably no conquest, at once so rich, so decisive and of so high a strategical value, was ever made against trained forces at so small a loss. Over and above the moral and strategical effect, the actual booty was enormous, and the direct loss to Spain even greater still. With the city were surrendered nine ships of the line, besides the three that had been sunk and two nearly finished on the stocks. It meant a fifth of the whole Spanish navy. Added to these were some half dozen royal frigates and dispatch vessels captured either in the port or outside at various times, a ship of seventy-eight guns and six more frigates belonging to the great trading corporations of Spain and nearly a hundred merchantmen.²⁷ The booty was further swelled by over a hundred brass guns, quantities of warlike stores, and an immense amount of merchandise.²⁸

The actual sum of prize-money divided equally between

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27. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, August 19, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River near the Havana.
 28. Albemarle to Egremont; PRO:CO 117/1/163, October 11, 1762, Havana.

the navy and army was nearly £ 750,000. Each commander in chief received over £ 122,000 and the three Keppel brothers between them over £ 150,000, or more than a fifth of the whole. Pocock's share was at least well earned, if only for his exploits in the Indian ocean, but Albemarle had spent the majority of his active service in the Seven Years' War as Lord of the Bed Chamber to the Duke of Cumberland. Success had been won, not by generalship but by the staunchness of the rank and file who by sheer endurance had carried out the plan of attack. It was the men who had borne the heat and the burden of the siege and their reward was to every soldier £ 4, 1s. 8¹/₂d., and to every sailor £ 3, 14s. 9 ³/₄d.²⁹

With the capture of the city of Havana, Pocock's work was done and he began to make preparations to return home to England. The sickly state of the army and the sailors of the fleet precluded any further operations against Spain that year, and Pocock wrote the Admiralty explaining what he

29. Before sailing for Havana Pocock and Albemarle were given "Additional Instructions" to enable them to adjust the division of prize-money. For this purpose they were furnished with three precedents: - 1. The Expedition of Commodore Wilmot and Colonel Lillington to the West Indies in 1694-5 (William III): commanders in chief, 1/3, the rest to officers and men. Of the navy share, officers had 1/8, warrant officers 1/8, petty officers and men, 2/8. 2. Naval Orders under Queen Anne, 1702: to the Queen and the States General (i.e. the Dutch government), 2/3, of the remaining 1/3; admirals 3/16, vice admirals 1/16, captains and lieutenants 4/16, the rest 8/16. 3. The Order of 1740 (George II): Commanders in chief by land or sea, equally between them 5/15, generals and flag officers in proportion to their salaries 1/15, commissioned officers 3/15, the rest of the force 6/15.

planned to do with the fleet.³⁰ The ships that remained serviceable³¹ would be turned over to Commodore Keppel who was to assume the command of the Jamaica station. Pocock himself planned to take with him to England five worn out ships of the line and three Spanish prizes.³² A smaller force would be left at Havana to bring the Earl of Albemarle and his command home when they were ready to do so.³³

On the 4th of November Pocock sailed for England, but bad weather and weak ships made the voyage anything but a pleasant one. The Marlborough and Temple sank at sea, and the Devonshire and Culloden were so leaky that their captains ordered the guns cast overboard to ease the ships.³⁴ On the 13th of January the storm-battered fleet arrived at Plymouth, and shortly afterwards Pocock hauled down his flag and went up to London. He was never to go to sea again.

On January 27, 1763 he wrote to Pitt congratulating him on the success of "England's Arms" in the Seven Years' War which Pocock attributed rightly to Pitt, and thanking him

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30. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, August 19, 1762, Namur, off Chorera River, near the Havana.
31. Valiant, Orford, Temeraire, Edgar, Alcide, Nottingham, Pembroke, Trent, Richmond.
32. Namur, Culloden, Infante, Marlborough, Devonshire, St. Genaro, Assumption.
33. Belleisle, Rippon, Hampton Court, Thunder, bomb, Grenada, bomb.
34. Pocock to Cleveland; PRO:Adm. 1/237, January 13, 1763, Namur, in Plymouth Harbor.

for his encouragement during the tiring operations at Havana.³⁵

Sometime in 1764 Pocock retired from the navy, and although he was a member of parliament from 1764 to 1766 and an Elder Brother of the Trinity House until 1792, he remained outside the main stream of political and naval affairs until his death in 1792.

35. Pocock to Pitt; PRO:Chatham Papers, January 27, 1763.

IX

Conclusion

Any estimate of Admiral Sir George Pocock's abilities as a naval officer is apt to be studded with contradictions. His contemporaries praised him highly for his gallant actions in East Indian waters in 1758-1759, yet modern authorities label him a "text-book" fighter and tactically "docile".¹ It must be emphasized that Pocock was not necessarily wrong in the tactics which he used. Indeed, were the results of the battles in 1758-1759 the only criterion, he could well claim them to be right. For after the third encounter it was a badly punished D'Aché, and not Pocock, who withdrew his fleet entirely: and in the end it was Pondichery, not Madras, which fell into the hands of those who had sea-control. The point to notice in the modern criticism is, that Pocock made no tactical effort of any kind to get round the Permanent Instructions. Yet within the somewhat rigid framework of those rules he carried out his strategical mission.

Pocock's successes in India and his later triumph at the siege of Havana in 1762 stem rather from a mastery of logistics and seamanship than few of his contemporaries

1. Michael Lewis, The Navy of Britain, p. 487.

could show rather than from tactical excellence. Badly outnumbered in India, with rotten ships, sickly crews, and tied to bases on a treeless coast, Pocock kept his fleet in action. His opponent, D'Aché, failed utterly to grasp anything but illusory successes, and these, in the end, were denied the French commander when he could not overcome his logistic difficulties.

Similarly, in the expedition against Havana, Pocock's seamanship enabled the Spanish defenders to be completely surprised by the British forces, and his understanding of logistic problems prevented the major tactical errors of the Earl of Albemarle from wrecking the final success of the expedition.

As Pitt saw so clearly when he praised Pocock and Clive before the House of Commons,² Pocock was an officer whose breadth of vision and understanding enabled him to fight successfully and to win campaigns in a "global" war while other officers obsessed with a more limited picture of naval warfare and the means to carry it out could only win battles.

2. Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, II, 24.

Appendix

Appendix I

The Rating of British Warships in the Eighteenth Century

It was not until that great naval administrator, Admiral George Anson, had been installed at the Admiralty during the middle years of the eighteenth century that the chaos, regarding the rating of ships, was reduced to some order. Before his time, ships of very different sizes, varying in gun-numbers from over one hundred to as few as fifty, were allowed to take their place in the line of battle. This in itself was highly dangerous. It is notorious that the strength of any chain is that of its weakest link; and this maxim is particularly true of a battle fleet sailing in line ahead. It had--or was supposed to have--all the advantages of a chain; its flexibility and its series, securely joined, of strong links. Every admiral knew this; and, among them, of course, the enemy admiral, who was naturally always on the look-out for this very thing--the weak link. Anson did a little towards sheer structural standardization, but not much, for that idea was too foreign to any minds but those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But he went some way towards strengthening the whole line by seeing that the weak links were cut out altogether.

He first divided all fighting ships into two big groups, the first "fit to lie in the line", the second unfit to do so, but to be used for those many other exigencies which will always arise at sea. The first were "Battleships", the second "Cruisers". Then he sub-divided each group into three, adopting as group-names the already existing nomenclature of "rates". Thus first rates, second rates, and third rates were "Battleships", while fourth rates, fifth rates, and sixth rates were "Cruisers".

The first rates were three-deckers carrying one hundred guns or over. The second rate (of which there were seldom many) was a three-decker of ninety guns. From these two groups of powerful ships were selected the flagships, the real strong-points of the line. In an important force the fleet flagship would almost certainly be a first rate, and she would often be "seconded" by second rates, the ships next to her in the line, both before and after, being of this power.

But the rank and file of any line were almost certain to be third rates. These were two-deckers, carrying seventy-four or sixty-four guns. Anson drew the "Battleship" line at this point: the old "Fifties", and even the "Sixties" were cast out as weak links. Before very long, too, it was discovered that the dividing line was still drawn a little too low, and even the smaller third rate, the "Sixty-Four", practically vanished from, or at least became something of

a rarity in, the line. Thenceforward the two-decked "Seventy-Four" became the standard "private" (i.e. non-flag) ship.

Of the "Cruiser" group, fourth rates ("Fifties" and occasionally "Sixties") were also two-deckers, and served, amongst other duties, as flagships of squadrons composed of the still lower grades. The fifth and sixth rates were single-deckers, and became known as "Frigates". They were the maids of all work in any fleet; their duties ranging from scouting for the line of battle to carrying an admiral's dispatches home from his squadron. Lightly armed (their guns ranged from thirty-six to twenty-four) they were very speedy and swift.

Appendix II

"General Plan of operations for the squadron of his Majesty's Fleet under my command stationed at Barbados and the Leeward Islands.

1. To protect the Trade coming to and going from the Colonies.

2. To protect the Colonies from any insults from the enemy.

3. To distress and annoy the enemy.

- (1.) To protect the trade, station some ships in the track the trade most probably will come down in.

Divide those ships in such manner that while attention is given to one part all the rest may not be neglected.

Listen to nobody in particular but attend to the whole in general. The individuals will only tell their private interest, and pretend it the interest of the public or give their opinions on the whole when they are acquainted with but one of its parts, and that partially, as has sufficiently appeared already.

Send convoys with the fleets quite home and with any considerable number of the northward trade and runners as far as the latitude of 21° till clear of the Stations of privateers. Fix certain days for the convoys to sail from Barbados and collect the fleet as they pass the Leeward

Islands, and abide punctually by the time to avoid the deceitful reports that are artfully spread to the great prejudice of the credulous.

(2.) To protect the Colonies keep the enemy under apprehensions at home and consequently employed and upon their guard.

Rendezvous the strongest parts of the force where it can most speedily and easily attend to the relief and assistance of every part of the station.

(3.) To distress and annoy the enemy:

Send such prisoners to Great Britain as are officers, pilots, natives, married and settled upon the enemy's colonies and have families there, as this will deter them from going a-privateering any more and deter others, for want of which the privateersmen are no sooner returned but they are out at sea again and some of them have been taken seven or eight times during the war.

Recommend to their Lordships to put a stop to the Dutch supplying them with the provisions of Ireland and his Majesty's northern colonies of America from Eustatia, and they cannot possibly subsist, especially when the privateering trade is over, without being absolutely dependent upon us.

Also to stop their sugars being carried from their islands in small Dutch vessels to Eustatia and thence sent to Europe.

Endeavour to prevent the contraband trade carried on

in his Majesty's colonies and the enemy in Dutch bottoms.

Cruise twice a year with a strong squadron to intercept their outward bound convoys.

Never send flags of truce without a King's officer; and at least to carry 80 men to prevent the frequency of them and put a stop to the correspondence, smuggling trade and intellegence carried on by the means of them.

That the small ships and Sloops be divided as equally as possible, one half to cruise for the protection of the leeward Caribee Islands, as in my instructions to Captain Tyrrell, the other half to cruise for the protection of Barbados as in my instructions to Captain Swanton.

A ship to cruise to the northward of Anguille and St. Bartholomew to protect the trade from North America, excepting in the hurricane seasons and when the whole of the squadron cruises together.

The whole squadron excepting the small ships or sloops to cruise together part of May and June, and the great ships to go down to the Spanish main July, August and September. The whole squadron to cruise together again in November and part of December. That it be recommended at home to all the trade bound to Jamaica that if they sail the end of May or begining of June from Great Britain to make the island of Barbados and run down the Spanish main which will be guarded at that season and where they will be secure from hurricanes; and that this instruction be kept as secret as

possible.

That it be recommended at home to avoid making Deseada at any time where the privateers always lurk and are safe; but that they endeavour to make Antigua at once.

That during the intervals of times that the ships [which] are destined to cruise together are cleaning, they be either separately or jointly employed to defend his Majesty's subjects and annoy his enemies as occasions shall offer and circumstances require.

That it be recommended to their Lordships that the convoy from Europe never sail later than the middle of February [or] as much sooner as they think proper, but if it sails later there will not be time after their arrival here to get their sugars on board which will disappoint the convoy and break through all the regulations agreed upon, and subject us to very great inconveniences in this part of the world.

That the convoy sail punctually from Barbados on the 24th June and 29th September.

The Dragon and Sunderland to clean in October and April.

The Captain and Sutherland to clean the end of January and begining Febuary.

The Dreadnaught the end of December and begining of January.

The Ludlow Castle and Mary galley in June and September: the single bottom ships and vessels as often as can

conveniently be.

Avoid ever sending more ships to clean than two at a time and take care that none of them interfere with one another and if possible, to send none to clean in the hurricane months because of the sickness and rains."¹

1. Legge to Corbett; PRO:Adm. 1/305, May ?, 1747.

Appendix III

Admirals of the "Red", "White" and "Blue"

Up until 1743, the basic number of flag officers in the navy was strictly limited to nine. They were the nine who controlled the fleets of the Dutch Wars, which were so big that they had to be divided into three squadrons: the Red, White and Blue, occupying positions respectively in Center, Van and Rear: then, these squadrons themselves proving too unwieldy, they had each been sub-divided into Center, Van and Rear divisions, each of a size to warrant a flag officer in charge.

The man who commanded the whole also commanded the central--and most important--squadron, the Red, as well. He was then therefore, in practice, both Admiral of the Fleet and Admiral of the Red. But since it is always man's tendency to use the highest title to which he has a right, he almost always called himself by the former name on the principle that the whole is more important than the part, even the most important part. Thus there were, then only nine not ten posts. The tenth kind of flag officer--Admiral of the Fleet--was only introduced, as the result of an error, in 1805.

In the simple strategy of the Dutch Wars this one big

Appendix IV

"The Permanent Instructions, 1703-1783.

- I. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag at the mizzen peak and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.
- II. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship abreast of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag and a pennant at the mizzen-peak, and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
- III. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his whole squadron to tack, and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a white flag under the flag at the main top-mast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by the flagships in the fleet; and when he would have the admiral of the blue do the same, he will spread a blue flag on that place.
- IV. When the admiral would have the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, tack and endeavour to

fleet was usually enough, and the nine flag officers usually sufficed for all purposes. But by 1743 naval wars were on a much more world-wide scale. Despite the logic of the old titles more than one officer was appointed to each position thus signifying that the words Admiral of the Blue meant no longer a post but a rank. By 1805, there were seventy admirals, seventy-two vice-admirals and seventy-five rear-admirals.

gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a red flag from the cap at the fore topmast-head downward on the backstay. If he would have the vice admiral of the white do the same, a white flag; if the vice admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place.

- V. When the admiral would have the rear admiral of the red and his division tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will hoist a red flag at the flagstaff at the mizzen topmast-head; if the rear admiral of the white, a white flag; if the rear admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place, and under the flag a pennant of the same colour.
- VI. If the admiral be to leeward of the fleet, or any part of the fleet, and he would have them bear down into his wake or grain, he will hoist a blue flag at the mizzen peak.
- VII. If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet, or any part of them, to leeward of him, that he may bring those ships into a line, he will bear up with a blue flag at the mizzen peak under the union flag, which is the signal for the line of battle; and then those ships to leeward are to use their utmost endeavour to get into his wake or grain, according to their stations in the line of battle.

- VIII. If the fleet be sailing before the wind, and the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the wind, and come to the starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the mizzen topmast-head a red flag. And in case he would have the rear admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag at the same place.
- IX. When the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the flagstaff on the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun, if the red flag be not abroad, but if the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsails shall be lowered a little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards, and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
- X. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the fleet tack first, he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff at the mizzen topmast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by every flagship in the fleet.
- XI. When the admiral would have all the flagships in the fleet come into his wake or grain, he will hoist a red flag at the mizzen peak, and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the fleet are to

make the same signal.

- XII. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his squadron make more sail, though himself shorten sail, he will hoist a white flag on the ensign staff; if the admiral of the blue, or he that commands in the third post, a blue flag at the same place; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.
- XIII. As soon as the admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, every ship in the fleet is to use their utmost endeavour to engage the enemy, in the order the admiral has prescribed unto them.
- XIV. When the admiral hoisteth a white flag at the mizzen peak, then all the small frigates of his squadron that are not in the line of battle are to come under his stern.
- XV. If the fleet is sailing by a wind in a line of battle and the admiral would have them brace their headsails to the mast, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the mizzen topmast-head, and fire a gun; which all the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the ships in the rear are to brace to first.
- XVI. The fleet lying in a line of battle, with their headsails to the mast, and if the admiral would

have them fill and stand on, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun; which all the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the ships in the van are to fill first, and to stand on. If it happen, when this signal is to be made, that the red flag is abroad on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, the admiral will spread the yellow flag under the red.

- XVII. If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear and our rear abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of the fleet is to tack first, every ship one after another as fast as they can, throughout the line. And if the admiral can have the whole fleet tack together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, then he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaffs at the fore and mizzen mast-heads and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the fleet are to do the same. But in case the enemy should tack in their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships, and whilst they are in fight with the enemy to keep within half a cable's length of one another, or if the

weather be bad, according to the direction of the commander.

XVIII. When the admiral would have the ship that leads the van of the fleet (or the headmost ship in the fleet) when they are in a line of battle, hoist, lower, set or haul up any of his sails, the admiral will spread a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast head and fire a gun. Then the admiral will hoist, lower, set or haul up the sail he would have the ship that leads the van do.

XIX. If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and then to engage them.

XX. Every commander is to take care that his guns are not fired till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank; and by no means to suffer his guns to be fired over by any of our own ships.

XXI. None of the ships in the fleet shall pursue any small number of the enemy's ships till the main body be disabled or run.

XXII. If any of the ships in the fleet are in distress, and make the signal, which is a weft with the jack or ensign, the next ship to them is strictly required to relieve them.

- XXIII. If the admiral, or any flagship, should be in distress, and make the usual signal, the ships in the fleet are to endeavour to get up as close into a line, between him and the enemy, as they can; having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.
- XXIV. No ship in the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the condition of his ship and received his direction herein. But in case any ship shall do so, the next ships are to close up the line. And if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.
- XXV. If any flagship be disabled, the flag may go on board any ship of his own squadron or division.
- XXVI. If the enemy be put to the run, and the admiral thinks it convenient the whole fleet shall follow them, he will make all the sail he can himself after the enemy and fire two guns out of his fore-chase; then every ship in the fleet is to use his best endeavour to come up with the enemy and lay them on board.
- XXVII. If the admiral would have any particular flagship, and his squadron, or division, give chase to the

enemy, he will make the same signal that is appointed for that flagships tacking with his squadron or division, and weathering the enemy.

XXVIII. When the admiral would have them give over chase he will hoist a white flag at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun.

XXIX. If the admiral would have any flag in his division or squadron cut or slip in the daytime, he will make the same signals that are appointed for those flagships, and their division or squadron, to tack and weather the enemy, as is expressed in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth articles before going.

XXX. When the admiral would have the red squadron draw into a line of battle, abreast of one another, he will put abroad a flag striped red and white on the flagstaff at the main topmast head, with a pennant under it and fire a gun. If he would have the blue squadron to do the like he will put on the said place a Genoese ensign, together with a pennant. But when he would have either of the said squadrons to draw into a line of battle ahead of one another, he will make the aforesaid signals without pennant: which signals are to be answered by the flagships only of the said squadrons, and to be kept out till I take in mine. And if the admiral would have any vice-admiral of the fleet

and his division draw into a line of battle as aforesaid, he will make the same signals at the fore topmast-head that he makes for that squadron at the main topmast-head. And for any rear-admiral in the fleet and his division, the same signals at the mizzen topmast-head; which signals are to be answered by the vice- or rear-admiral.

XXXI. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their staboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizzen peak and fire a gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their laboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a Genoese flag at the same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flagships of the fleet.

XXXII. When the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that squadron or division to whom the signal is made."¹

1. Julian Stafford Corbett (ed), Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816, Publications of the Navy Records Society, (London, 1905), XXIX, pp 188-194, 197-199.

Appendix V

"Secret Instructions for Sir George Pocock, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships employed on a Secret Expedition.

1. Whereas His Majesty has been obliged to declare war against Spain, there is nothing which will make a more speedy end of the war than the capture of the Spanish colonies in the West Indies, for which purpose he has caused Troops to be assembled at Portsmouth with the proper Train of Artillery under the Command of the Earl of Albemarle who is General and Commander in Chief of all and singular of his forces employed on an expedition.
2. You are appointed Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels to be employed on an expedition. You are directed to Portsmouth and take the Ships named in the margin (Namur, Valiant, Hampton Court, Belleisle, Orford, Rippon, Edgar, Mercury), whose Captains are directed to obey your orders, hoist your flag on which ever Ship you think best and appoint the Hon. Augustus Keppel to serve under you as Commander in Chief of the squadrons in your absence, or in the absence of any other Flag or Senior Officer and to hoist a Broad or Distinguishing Pennant on board the

Valiant or on board any other of His Majesty's Ships he may happen to be.

3. You are to take him under your Command, likewise Captain Randall of His Majesty's Armed Transport Laurel and Agent for the Transports.
4. You are to cause the following Regiments of Foot viz. 22d, 34th, 56th, 72d, and 2 coys. of Protestant Prisoners under the Command of Major Freron with the Train of Artillery, Stores, Officers and Attendants and the detachment from the Regiment of Artillery to be embarked on Transports at Portsmouth. You are to cause the General and Staff Officers to be distributed on board such of His Majesty's Ships as you think proper.
5. The Transports per margin (Arnold, Richard, St. Andrew, Mary, Alderney, James, Coronation, Exchange, Unicorn, Cumberland, John and Sarah, Laurel, Pretty Betsy, John and Thomas, Strickland Castle, Pitt, galley, Scarsdale, Jupiter) are to be laden with provisions for seven months for 16,000 men for the use of the Troops. You are to make inquiry for them and all other Ships or Vessels laden with Naval or Ordnance Stores or Provisions for the Leeward Islands or Jamaica. Having collected the Transports, Storeships and Victuallers together, embarked the Troops, Artillery and all the necessaries for the expedition you are to pro-

ceed to Barbadoes where you are to cooperate with the Earl of Albemarle for the carrying out of the enterprize that you will hereafter be directed to undertake.

6. And whereas Rear-Admiral Rodney, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships at the Leeward Islands has been directed to cause Transports to be prepared for the reception of 8,000 Troops now at those Islands under the Command of Major-General Monckton, to join you with ten Ships of the line (whose Captains are junior to Captain Swanton of the Vanguard) together with three or four Frigates and all the Bomb Vessels under his Command which Ships, Vessels and Transports you are, when joined by, to take under your Command and Convoy in like manner as those with you and as you will observe in the beforementioned order to Rear-Admiral Rodney that he and General Monckton are directed to consider as circumstances may fall out which of the following places (viz.) Martinique, the Island of Santa Lucia, or Prince Rupert's Bay in the Island of St. Dominique may be properest for a General Rendezvous and they are to send an account to you and Lord Albemarle at Barbadoes with an intellegent Sea or Land Officer to give you such further information and you on receiving this are to proceed to the Rendezvous determined and to endeavour to procure Pilots qualified to take charge of Ships of war through the Old Straits of Bahama.

7. Whereas the Squadron under your Command shall be further strengthened by the addition of six of His Majesty's Ships of the line now stationed at Jamaica and the Richmond (Frigate) and we have directed Rear-Admiral Holmes (by order of the 5th Inst.)(a copy of which is annexed for your guidance) to get said Ships in readiness to proceed to sea, whenever you direct, together with the body of Free Negroes and Slaves for whom Transports are ordered as you will be informed by the orders of the 5th Inst.
8. You are on your arrival at Barbadoes, to send a Frigate to Jamaica with such orders for Ships and Transports joining you at the Rendezvous hereafter named at such time that is proper.
9. When you shall arrive at the Place fixed on by Admiral Rodney and General Monckton for the Rendezvous, you are to cause His Majesty's Ships and Transports that sail with you to complete their water in the most expeditious manner and likewise with the Transports provided by Admiral Rodney, and if these Transports are not enough for the Troops and Stores that Lord Albemarle may have to embark you are to get more, and in concert with Lord Albemarle or the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Land Forces to draw Bills on the Commissioners of His Majesty's Navy for the expenses incurred in hireing the Transports and when the Trans-

ports are completed, you are to cause the Troops to embark.

10. You are to proceed with them to Cape Nicholas at the North West end of the Island of St. Dominique, where, or in the mole of that place, you may expect to be joined by other Transports with Troops on board convoyed by His Majesty's Ships from North America and for a more particular account you may refer to the orders annexed. At this place you are likewise to be joined by a squadron of His Majesty's Ships with Transports having on board the Free Negroes and Slaves from Jamaica agreeable to orders which you shall send them for that purpose aforementioned, and by the Bonetta, sloop from the Island of Providence with Pilots for the Old Straits of Bahama and two of that country's sloops, and as the Bonetta, sloop and the Transports are directed to observe the enclosed signals, you are to send a copy to Jamaica for the guidance of the Squadron that goes from thence and to observe the same yourself on your arrival off Cape Nicholas or in adjacent parts. But if His Majesty's Troops from North America do not join you by the time that you arrive at Cape Nicholas, you are not to wait for them.

11. You are to proceed through the Old Straits of Bahama to the Havanna on the Island of Cuba, where in conjunction with the land forces you are to make the

most vigorous attack on said place and exert all your energies to take the same with all Defences, Fortifications, Works thereunto belonging.

12. In case, by the Blessings of God upon His Majesty's Arms the attempt against the Havanna shall succeed and the place be taken, you are with Lord Albemarle to take all necessary measures for maintaining possession and proceed to the attack of any other part of the Spanish Colonies which may have been pointed out by His Majesty to his Lordship and which may be practicable.
13. And if you do not succeed in the attack, you are to proceed immediately to Vera Cruz, Pensacola, St. Augustin, St. Iago De La Cuba or any other part of the Spanish Colonies where you and Lord Albemarle may think it may succeed with the forces you have left.
14. It is left to you and Lord Albemarle's discretion whether in this case to attack or to proceed to the defence of Jamaica or any other of His Majesty's Possessions in those parts should you have advice that the enemy is actually attacking them.
15. Lord Albemarle is to send back to North America after the attack on the Havanna such Troops as Major-General Sir Jeffrey Amherst shall have sent to join him and you are to order sufficient Transports and Convoy to proceed with the Troops to the part of North America as his Lordship shall desire and the Commanders

of the Convoy are to follow orders from Lord Colville or the Commander in Chief of the North American Station.

16. You are to provide the provisions and bedding for the Landing Force and the bedding is to be returned to you on board the Transports when it is no longer needed.

17. The success of the expedition depends on the good understanding between the Land and Sea Officers and we require and direct on your part to cultivate such an agreement. You are to communicate your instructions to the Commander in Chief of the Land Forces and he is to communicate his to you.

18. When your services are ended in those waters, you are directed to appoint ten Ships of the line to proceed to Jamaica with Commodore Keppel, whom we have appointed Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels at and about that place. You will then order so many ships of the line to the Leeward Islands as will complete those with Admiral Rodney to ten sail and if more are wanted on the coast of North America (than which came from thence and are to return with the Troops) for operations carried on by Sir Jeffrey Amherst and Lord Colville you must send such additional force as may be necessary.

19. Having done so you are with the Ships and Trans-

ports and Vessels remaining to return to England.

20. The Orford and either the Belleisle or the Edgar are to proceed with the Trade to the Leeward Islands and Jamaica and you are to have them join you at the places aforementioned.
21. You are to send to the Secretary of the Admiralty a particular account of all your proceedings.

(Signed) Anson
Geo: Hay
J: Forbes"¹

"Additional Instructions for Sir George Pocock"

1. You and the Earl of Albemarle are to settle in what manner and proportion, Booty taken from the enemy is to be distributed between the Land and Sea Forces.
2. Copies of former Regulations are enclosed; the Precedent of Commodore Wilmott in 1694 in the West Indies against the French, the other is the Regulation by Queen Anne for the distribution of Prizes and Booty in 1702 together with a Paper of 1740 that was in conformity with the two aforementioned.
3. His Majesty's American Forces and the Corps of Free Negroes are to have an equal share in the Booty."²

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1. LCA to Pocock; PRO:Adm. 2/1332, February 18, 1762.
 2. Ibid.

"Secret Instructions for Lord Albemarle

1. You are to go to Portsmouth where the 22d, 34th, 56th, 72d Foot and 2 coys. of Protestant Prisoners under Major Freron are assembled with Artillery, Stores, Officers' Stores, etc. and also a proportional detachment from the Royal Regiment of Artillery. You are to take the said Troops under your Command, embark them on Transports, and as soon as this is done, proceed to Barbadoes under Convoy of Admiral Sir George Pocock who is instructed to cooperate with you.
2. Whereas considerable numbers of our Troops enumerated in the General Return order'd on the Expedition Under the Command of his Excellency Major-General Monckton, November 1761, together with the 69th, 76th, 90th, and 98th Regiments of Foot sent from Belleisle are now employed under General Monckton against the Island of Martinique, whatever the issue of those operations the greatest part of those Troops under General Monckton's Command shall join you and act under your orders. A copy of a Letter to General Monckton dated February 5, 1762 will be given to you for that purpose. Having taken such part of said forces under your Command as you think proper you are not to exceed 14,000 Regular Troops.

If there are no despatches at Barbadoes from

General Monckton, you will get in touch with him and order his Troops to join you.

Transports (over and above those engag'd in our service) shall be taken up and retained in the West Indies as many as you deem necessary.

You are to concert with Sir George Pocock to draw Bills on the Commissioners of the Navy for expences for such Transport Ships.

3. A copy of a Letter from the Secretary of State dated January 13, 1761 is sent you showing you Sir Jeffrey Amherst the Commander in Chief in North America is to make a detachment of 4000 Troops under his Command to join you together or in two seperate detachments off Cape Nicholas, at the North West end of the Island of St. Dominique (Hispanola) or in the mole of that place; and if the Transports are in two parts, the latter are to repair directly to Havana.

You are to take these Troops under your Command either at Cape Nicholas or at any other place.

If Sir Jeffrey Amherst finds it impracticable to send these 4000 Troops, you will not wait for their arrival from North America but will proceed to operations hereafter prescribed.

4. On assembling your forces, you are to proceed to the Havana on the Island of Cuba in conjunction with the Ships of Sir George Pocock and attack that place.

5. If you succeed you are to take all care to maintain possession of the place and you are to place therein a sufficient garrison under a qualified officer, after which you are in conjunction with Sir George Pocock to proceed to La Vera Cruz, Pensacola, Ste. Augustine, St. Iago De La Cuba or any other part of the Spanish Colonies which from the state of the Climate, Season, and your Troops you think most likely to be attended with success and you are to use the utmost endeavours to reduce all or any of said places to our obedience.

6. If you do not succeed in the attack on the Havana you are to proceed to any of the objectives aforementioned or any Spanish Settlement you think most proper according to the Climate, Season, Condition of your Troops and you are to use all your efforts to reduce that place to our obedience.

You have the descretion to act either offensively against the Spanish Colonies or defensively to protect Jamaica or any other of our Colonies in those parts if you receive certain advice that the enemy has actually attacked any of them.

7. Sir Jeffrey Amherst is to attack Louisiana with 8000 men on the news of the issue of the Havana expedition and the 4000 North American Troops are to re-join him for that purpose, you are to correspond and

concert measures with him for the good of your respective Commands and you are to let him know what Troops you can spare after the Great Object of your Instructions shall have been decided. It is hoped that you can spare him as many Troops as you can consistent with the security of the Havana, and over and above the 4000 men you will afford him such assistance as you can spare him consistent with these Instructions.

8. Sir Jeffrey Amherst is engaged to furnish a certain quota of Provincials as part of the detachment of 4000 men and in order to get these Troops, he has had to assure them that after the campaign is over, the Provincials shall be set down in New York and that during the campaign they will be treated in all respects as on the same footing and with the same indulgence as our Regular Forces, but he is also authorized to offer to the said Provincials any further Douceurs as he shall think proper and reasonable and you are to comply with the conditions aforementioned. You will during the time that such Provincials shall remain under your Command, take especial care that they be treated with all such proper attention and Humanity, that they may not return home disgusted with the Service, but on the contrary, may be induced readily and chearfully to act in conjunction with our Regular Forces on any future occasions.

9. The Provisions on board the Ships are for the use of your Command and will be supplied on Shore, and Sir George Pocock is directed to furnish sea-bedding for the Troops on board ship and to land some for their use on shore.
10. The success of the expedition depends on the good understanding between the Sea and Land Officers and we require and direct on your part to cultivate such an agreement. You are to communicate your instructions to Sir George Pocock and he is to communicate his to you.
11. A Corps of Free Negroes is to be rais'd in Jamaica and you are to despatch Captain Thomas Alexander Fuller to that place with a letter to Governor William Henry Lyttleton with orders to raise 500 Negroes. These if ready, are to join you and to be under your Command.
12. You have the authority to appoint Officers and to grant Commissions.
13. You are to send to the Principal Secretaries of State a particular account of all your proceedings."³

"Seperate Instructions for Lord Albemarle

1. You and Sir George Pocock are to settle in what manner and proportion, Booty taken from the enemy is
3. Egremont to Albemarle; PRO:CO 117/1/24-36, February 15, 1762.

to be distributed between the Sea and Land Forces.

2. Copies of former regulations are enclosed; the Precedent of Commodore Wilmott's expedition to the West Indies in 1694, Queen Anne's Regulation for the distribution of Prizes and Booty in 1702, and a paper of 1740 in conformity with the two preceeding.
3. His Majesty's American Forces and the Corps of Free Negroes are to have an equal sharé in the Booty."⁴

4. Egremont to Albemarle; PRO:CO 117/1/24-36, February 15, 1762.

Appendix VI

"Articles of Capitulation agreed upon between their Excellencies Sir George Pocock KB & the Earl of Albemarle Commanding the Fleet and Army of His Brittanick Majesty on their Parts & by their Excellencies the Marquis of Real Transporte Commander in Chief of His Catholick Majesty's Squadron & Don Juan de Prado Governor of the Havana for the Surrender of the City & all its Dependencies with all the Spanish Ships in the Harbour.

Preliminary Article

Fort La Punta & the
Land Gate shall be deliver'd
to His Brittanick Majesty's
Troops tomorrow Morning the
13th of August at 12 o'clock
at which time it is expected
the following Articles of
Capitulation shall be Signed
& Ratified.

1. The Garrison consisting
of the Regular Troops, the
Dragoons dismounted, leaving
their Horses for His Brit-
tanick Majesty's Service, in
consideration of their vig-
orous & gallant Defence of
the Moro Fort & the Havana,

1. The Garrison consisting
of the Infantry, Artillery
Men & Dragoons, the different
Militia of the Towns in this
Island shall march out of the
Land Gate the 20th Inst. pro-
vided in that time that no
Relief arrives so as to raise

shall march out of the Punta Gate with 2 pieces of Cannon and 6 rounds for each Gun & the same number for each Soldier, Drums beating, Colours flying with all the Honours of War. The Military Chest refused, the Governor will be allowed as many Wagons as are necessary to transport his baggage & effects on board the Ship destined for him, the Militia with out the Town as well as those with in to deliver up their arms to His Brittanick Majesty's Commissary who shall be appointed to receive them.

2. The Officers of the above Garrison will be allowed to carry with them all their private effects & money on board the ships which will be provided at the expence of His Brittanick Maj-

the Seige with all the Honours of War, Arms Shoulder'd, Drums Beating, Colours Flying, 6 Field Pieces with 12 rounds each & as many to each Soldier & likewise the Regiments shall take with them their Military Chests & the Governor shall have 6 cover'd Wagons which are not to be examin'd on any pretence whatsoever.

2. That the said Garrison shall be allowed to take out of this City all their effects, equipage & money & transport themselves with it to another part of the Island for which purpose shall be allowed & per-

esty to transport the Garrison to the nearest Port of Old Spain. The Intendant of Marine, Commissary of War & those employed in the management of His Catholic Majesty's Revenues as soon as they have delivered over their accounts shall have liberty to leave the Island if they desire it.

3. The Marques del Real Transporte with his Officers, Sailors & Marines as making part of the Garrison shall be treated in every respect as the Governor & the Regular Troops. All Ships in the Harbour of the Havana & all money & effects whatsoever belonging to His Catholic Majesty shall be delivered up to such persons as shall be appointed by Sir George Pocock & the Earl of Albemarle to receive them.

mitted to come freely into the said City all the Beasts of Burden & Carts & this Article is to extend & to include all other Officers belonging to His Majesty employed in the Administration of Justice Intendant of Marine - Commissary of War & Treasurer General who are to have the choice of going out of the City.

3. That the Marines & the Ship crews in the Harbour who have served on shore shall obtain in their going out the same Honours as the Garrison of the City & shall proceed with those honours on board the said ships that they may together with their Commander in Chief Don Gutierrez de Hevia Marques del real Transporte & Commander General of His Catholic Majesty's Naval Forces in America sail in their said Ships as soon as the Port is

open with all their effects & money in order to proceed to some other Port belonging to the Dominion of Spain in doing which they will oblige themselves that during their Navigation to their designed Port they shall not attack any Squadron or any single ship belonging to His Brittanick Majesty or his Allies nor Merchant Vessels belonging to his subjects & likewise they are not to be attacked by any Squadron or single ship belonging to His Brittanick Majesty nor any of his Allies, likewise liberty shall be given to go on board the said Ships, the aforementioned Troops & Ships crews with their Officers & others belonging to them together with their effects & monies that are in the City belonging to His Catholick Majesty with the equipages & effects in Specie of Gold or Silver be-

longing to the said Marques & others employed in the different Marine offices granting them likewise everything that should be necessary to protect them & their ships as well as in the fitting them out from His Catholick Majesty's stores & whatever more should be wanted at the current prices of the Country.

4. All the Artillery & all kinds of arms, Amunition & Naval Stores without reserve shall be delivered up to such persons as shall be appointed to receive them by the Admiral & the General.

4. That all of the Artillery stores & amunition & Provisions belonging to His Catholick Majesty except such as are well known to belong to the Squadron an exact inventory shall be made thereof by the assistance of 4 persons Subjects of the King of Spain which the Governor shall appoint & by 4 other subjects to His Brittanick Majesty which are to be elected by His Excellency the Earl of Albemarle who shall keep possession of all until both Sovereigns come to another determination.

5. The Count Superunda Lieutenant General of His Catholick Majesty's Forces & late Vice Roy of the Kingdom of Peru & Don Diego Tavares Knight of the Order of St. James Major General & late Governor of Carthagena shall be conveyed to Old Spain in the most Commodious Ships that can be provided Suitable to the Rank, Dignity & Character of those Noble Persons with all their Effects Money & Attendants; at Such time as may be convenient for themselves.

6. Granted.

5. That as by mere accident were residing in this City the Count de Superunda Lieutenant General of His Catholick Majesty's Forces & late Vice Roy of Peru & Don Diego Tavares Major General of His Majesty's Forces & late Governor of Carthagena both here in their Return to Spain, these Gentlemen & their Families shall be comprehended in the Capitulation allowing them to possess their Equipage & other effects belonging to them & to grant them Vessels to transport them to Spain.

6. That the Catholick Apostolick Roman Religion shall be maintained & preserved in the same manner & form as it has hitherto been in all the Dominions belonging to His Catholick Majesty without putting the least restraint to any of their Public Worships which actually

are the Rites of the Church & practiced in & out of their Temples to which as well as the Solemn days Celebrated therein there shall be the due Regard they have hitherto had, & that the Ecclesiastical body, the Convents, Monasteries, Hospitals & the different orders Universities & Colleges shall remain in the full enjoyments of their rights together with their Effects & Rents moveable or Tenements in the Same manner as they have hitherto enjoyed.

7. Granted with a Reserve that in the appointment of Priests & Other Ecclesiastical Officers it shall be with the Consent & Approbation of His Brittanick Majesty's Governor.

7. That the Bishop of Cuba is to enjoy all the Rights, privileges & perogatives that as such belong to him for the direction & Spiritual Instruction to those of the same Catholick Religion with the nomination of Curates and other Ecclesiastical Ministers with the annexed jurisdiction over them as he has had hitherto with the free-

dom to receive all the Rents & Revenues within his Bishopric which priviledges shall extend to all other Ecclesiastics in those Shares belonging to them.

8. Granted

8. That within the Monastarys of Religious Men & Women shall be observed & kept the same Interior Government as hitherto under Subordination to their Real Superiors agreeable to the Establishment of their particular Institutes without any novelty or variation.

9. Refused

9. That in the same manner as the effects & Monies in this City belonging to His Catholick Majesty is to be shipped on board of this Squadron in this Harbour to transport the same to Spain, all the Tobacco which likewise belongs to His Catholick Majesty & also shall be permitted even in time of war to His said Catholick Majesty the Purchase of Tobacco of the said Islands in the district Subject to the King of Great Britain at

the Established prices & the free exportation of the same to Spain in Spanish or Foreign Vessels & for which purpose & receiving & keeping & curing the same shall be kept & possessed the warehouses with all other buildings which are destined for that purpose & likewise shall be allowed & maintained here all such officers as should be necessary to manage the Same.

10. Refused.

10. That in consideration that this Port is situated by Nature for the Relief of those who navigate in these parts of Spanish & British America that this Port shall be reputed & allowed to be neutral to the subjects of His Catholick Majesty who are to be admitted in & out freely to take in such refreshments as they may be in need of as well as repairing their vessels paying the current prices for everything & that they are

not to be insulted nor interrupted in their Navigation by Vessels belonging to His Brittanick Majesty or his subjects or allies from the Capes Catoche on the Coast of Campeche & that of St. Antonio to the Westward of this Island nor from the Tortuga Bank to this Port & from here 'till they get into the Lat of 33° N. till both their Majesty's agree to the contrary.

11. Granted & they shall be 11.
allowed to continue in their
offices of Property as long
as they conduct themselves
properly.

That all the Inhabitants
Europeans & Creoles in this
City shall be left in the free
possession & management of all
their Offices & employments
which they have by purchase as
well as of their estates & all
other Effects moveables or
Tenements of an quality or kind
whatever without being obliged
to account on any other Terms
than those on which they did
to His Catholick Majesty.

12. Granted.

12. That the said offices shall preserve & keep the Rights & priveledges which they have hitherto enjoyed & they shall be governed in His Brittanick Majesty's name under the same laws & administration of Justice & under such Conditions as they have done hitherto in the Dominions of Spain in every particular appointing their Judges & Officers of Justice agreeable to their usual Customs.

13. The Inhabitants will be allowed to dispose of & remove their effects to any part of the Kingdom of Spain's dominions in Vessels at their own expense for which they will have proper passports for it is understood that such Officers as have property in the Island Shall have the same indulgence allowed the rest of

13. That to any of the aforesaid Inhabitants of this city who should not chuse to stay, it shall be permitted them to take out their property & Riches in such Specie as should be most convenient to them & to dispose of their Estates or to leave them under the Administration of others & to transport themselves with them to Such of His Catholick Majesty's

the Inhabitants.

Dominions as they should chuse, granting them 4 years to execute the Same & vessels to transport them either upon purchase or on Freight with the necessary passports & authority to bear Arms against the Moors & Turks upon this express Condition that they shall not use them against His Brittanic Majesty's subjects or his Allies who are not to insult them nor abandon them & that this & the 2 foregoing articles are to comprehend & admit to be included all His Catholick Majesty's Ministers & Officers as well as Civil, Marine & Military who are married & established with families & estates in this City in order that they may obtain the same priviledges as the other inhabitants.

14. Granted except that
Quartering the Troops in
cases of Necessity must be

14. That to these people no
ill consequence shall arise on
account of having taken up arms

left to the direction of the
Governor All the King's
Slaves are to be delivered
up to persons who will be
appointed to receive them.

owing to their fidelity & their
being enlisted in the Militia
on account of the necessity of
war Nether Shall the English
troops be permitted to plunder,
but on the contrary they shall
completely enjoy their Rights
& perogatives as other Subjects
of His Brittanick Majesty al-
lowing them to return without
the least hinderance or impedi-
ment from the Country into the
City with all their Families,
Equipages & Effects, as they
went out of the City on account
of this invasion & who are to
be comprehended in the present
articles & that neither of them
shall be incommoded with having
troops Quartered in their
houses but that they shall be
lodged in particular quarters
as it has been practiced during
the Spanish Government.

15. Refused.

15. That the effects detained
in this City belonging to the

Merchants of Cadiz which have arrived here in the different Register ships & in which are interested all the European Nations a sufficient passport shall be granted to the Super Cargoes thereof that they may freely remit the same with the Register Ships without running the Risk of being insulted in the passage.

16. All Public Papers to be delivered to the Secretarys of the Admiral & General for inspection which will be returned to His Catholick Majesty's officers if not found necessary for the Government of the Island.

16. That those Civil or other officers who have had charge of the management of the Administration & Distribution of the Royal Treasure or any other affair of a peculiar nature from His Catholick Majesty they are to be left with the free use of all those Papers which concern the discharge of their duty with Free Liberty to remit or to carry them to Spain for that purpose & the same shall be understood with the Managers of the Royal Company established in this City.

17. Answered in the foregoing Article.

17. That the Public Records are to remain in Custody of those officers who possess them, without permitting any of the papers to be taken away for fear of their being mislaid as it may be productive of great prejudice not only to the Public but also to many private people.

18. Granted, the Government leaving proper Commissarys to furnish them with Provisions, Surgeons, Medecines & Necessarys at the expense of His Catholick Majesty.

18. That the officers & Soldiers who are sick in the hospitals shall be treated in the same manner as the garrisons & after their recovery they shall be granted Horses or Vessels to transport themselves where the rest of the Garrison goes with everything necessary for their Security & Subsistence during their Voyage & before which they shall be provided with such provisions & medecines as shall be demanded by the hospital keepers & Surgeons thereof & all others under them who are

19. This Article cannot be concluded upon until the British Prisoners of War are delivered up.

20. The Number of Safe Guards required for the Security of the Churches, Convents & other places Shall be granted. The Rest of this article is answered in the preliminary article.

included in this Capitulation to stay or go as they prefer.

19. That all the Prisoners of War made on both Sides since the 6 June when the English Squadron appeared before this harbour shall be returned reciprocally & without any Ransom within the Term of 2 Months for those who were sent away from the City to other towns in this Island which was done for want of proper places of Security here, or before if they can arrive.

20. That as soon as the Articles of this Capitulation are agreed upon & Hostages given on each side for the performance thereof The Land Gate shall be delivered into the possession of His Brittanick Majesty's Troops that they may post a guard there & the Garrison shall have one themselves until the place is evacuated when His Excellency the Earl of Albemarle will be pleased

to send some soldiers as a safe guard to the Churches, Convents & Treasuries & all other places of Consequence.

21. As the troops are to be Sent to old Spain a Packet is unnecessary.

21. That it shall be allowed to the Governor & Commander in Chief of this Squadron despatch a Packet with advice to His Catholick Majesty as well as to other people who have a Right to the same advice to which Vessel there should be granted a safe & secure Passport for the Voyage.

22. Granted.

22. That the troops of the Punta Castle should have the same honours as the Garrison of the town & that they shall march out by one of the most practicable breaches.

23. Granted.

23. That this Capitulation is to be understood literally & without any interpretation on any Pretext whatever of making reprizals on account

Head Quarters near the
Havana

August 12, 1762

(Signed)

Albemarle Sir George Pocock

El Marques del Real Transporte

Juan de Prado"¹

of not having complied with
the foregoing articles.

Havana 12 August, 1762

(Signed)

El Marques del Real Transporte

Juan de Prado

1. Articles of Capitulation; PRO:CO 117/1/122-127, August 12, 1762.

Bibliography

This study draws heavily on manuscript sources; indeed, printed materials were only partially helpful in tracing Admiral Pocock's career, while the materials relating to his naval career preserved at the Public Records Office, British Museum, and the Commonwealth Relations Office alone made detail possible.

I.

Manuscripts

A. British Museum

1. Anson Mss (Add. Mss 15,955, 15,956, 15,957):
These letters were most valuable since they cover the latter years of Anson's life at which time he was First Lord of the Admiralty.
2. Haddock Mss (Egerton 2,528-2,529, 2,531-2,532):
These papers are valuable for Pocock's early naval career in the War of the Austrian Succession.
3. Hardwicke Mss (Add. Mss 35,584-35,597 and 35,359): These papers were valuable for the light they threw on Anson and Pocock.
4. Knowles Papers (Add. Mss 23, 678)
5. Newcastle Mss (Add. Mss 32,686-32,992): These papers are a treasure-trove for all matters of

State during the first half of the eighteenth century.

6. Papers collected by Edward Long (Add. Mss 12,402-12,440, 18,270-18,275, 18,959-18,963, 21,931-22,639, 22,676-22,680): These papers are of great value for the West Indies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and contain much naval material.

B. Commonwealth Relations Office (India Office Library)

1. Bombay Public Proceedings (1753-1760): These are the reports, journals, and daybooks of the officers of the Bombay Presidency.
2. Clive Papers (Home Miscellaneous 10): These papers were extremely valuable as they contain many of Pocock's original letters.
3. Home Letters Received (1701-1858): These letters are in the main the reports of the India Company's officials to London from various factories and offices in India and are very general in nature.
4. Home Miscellaneous (East Indies Series) (1748-85): These letters were very valuable as they are the original daily and weekly reports to London from India dealing particularly with military and naval subjects. Volume 95 of

this series are the dispatches of Admiral George Pocock to the Earl of Holderness and to Mr. William Pitt (1758-1760).

5. Letters Received from India (1703-1760):

These are abstracts of letters received from the Coromandel coast and the Bay of Bengal.

6. Madras Military Proceedings (1759-1760).

7. Madras Public Consultations (1752-1756).

8. Madras Correspondence (1692-1759).

The last three items were not of great value.

C. Middlesex County Record Office

1. Parish Registers.

2. Quarter-Sessions Records.

These items were useful in following Pocock's career after his retirement from the navy.

D. Public Records Office (London, England)

1. Admiral's Despatches from East Indies. January 10, 1755-July 25, 1761 (Adm. 1/161).

2. Admiral's Despatches from Jamaica Station. 1762-1765 (Adm. 1/237).

3. Captain's Letters (Adm. 1/1760-2739).

4. Letters to Solicitor's Department (1760-1766) (Adm. 1/3678).

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6. Letters from British Consuls (1761-1767)
(Adm. 1/3836).
7. Letters from the Board of Green Cloth (1722-
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11. Letters from the Secretaries of State (1760-
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12. Letters from the Treasury (1757-1770) (Adm.
1/4286).
13. Letters from the War Office (1761-1770)
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14. Secret Letters (1756-1800) (Adm. 1/4352).
15. Miscellaneous Letters, Reports, etc. (1751-
1770) (Adm. 1/5116).
16. Orders in Council (1761-1764) (Adm. 1/5166).
17. Admiral's Journals (1755-1763) (Adm. 50/21).
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21. Lord's Letters (1761-1763) (Adm. 2/230-232).
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23. Secretary's Letters to Admirals (1761-1763) (Adm. 2/532-535).
24. Secretary's Common Letters (1761-1763) (Adm. 2/719-722).
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29. Chatham Papers (GD 9).
30. Rodney Papers (GD 20/8-26).
31. State Papers: Military (1761-1762) (SP 41/24).
32. George III: Letters and Papers (1760-1762) (SP 37/1).
33. State Papers: Naval (1762-1767) (SP 42/43).
34. Secretary's Letterbooks (1760-1765) (SP 44/138).
35. Military Entry Books (1760-1762) (SP 44/192).
36. Naval Entry Books (1760-1766) (SP 44/231).
37. Entry Books of Petitions (1760-1767) (SP 44/264).

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E. United States Library of Congress

1. Transcripts made by Francis Russell Hart from the Archives of the Indies. S1/4/23-24 (No. 366).

II.

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recent biography, and more useful for
this study than that of von Ruville.

THE PASSAGE OF THE OLD BAHAMA CHANNEL BY ADMIRAL POCOCK, 1762

To Havana, as to Puerto Rico, there existed another route from the eastward and windward. It lay through the Old Bahama Channel, and as the similar route through the Virgins had never been used till Drake sounded his way through it, so the Old Bahama Channel, from its intricacies and dangers, was regarded as impracticable for the unweatherly fleets of those days, and was never used by the Spaniards except for quite small craft. But Anson had in his possession -- booty probably of his adventurous youth -- an old Spanish chart of it, and it convinced him that under such a man as Pocock, a British fleet could pass...To the men of Quebec, who made light of the St. Lawrence, the Old Bahama Channel can have presented few terrors. The pilots proved as useless as Douglas had feared, but fortunately, owing to his foresight, Elphinstone met them the day after they sailed. He had been right up to Cay Sal and back again, and was able to produce a complete survey of the channel, with sketches of the land and cays on both sides, and to report that Anson's chart was correct. He was therefore in a position to lead through, and the main cause for anxiety was at an end. Following the method Saunders had adopted on the St. Lawrence, Pocock organized the transports into seven divisions, each with its conducting men-of-war. The way in which the escort was distributed deserves notice. Contrary to what would naturally be looked for, there was no regular vanguard or rearguard -- the whole of the navy ships being allotted to the various divisions. With the first division were four of the line under Pocock; with the second was Keppel's ship alone; and with the third were again four of the line, the idea being apparently to provide for a concentration of nine of the line in the van or the centre. The next two divisions had between them only two of the line and a fifty, but the sixth had three of the line and a fifty and the last division five of the line and a fifty...No hitch of any kind occurred. The narrowest and most dangerous part of the channel between Cay Lobos and Cay Comfite was actually passed at night by means of fires burning upon the rocks, and by the evening of June 5th, that is a week after leaving Cape Nicholas, the whole fleet was clear of Cay Sal, and in sight of Matanzas, less than a hundred miles from its objective.

Sir Julian S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, II, pp260-64